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In context of the possibility of aging interventions leading to significant or radical
extensions in human lifespan, this thesis seeks primarily to address the question of the
value of life’s continuance to persons, as the most fundamental motivating factor behind
the project specifically to extend life beyond the classic endogenous maximum span. In
so doing, its chief focus will therefore be upon the nature of persons themselves,
especially in terms of the structure of personhood as a category of being. Much of the
investigation will therefore be of an ontological nature, with the nature of value itself, and
the relation of value both to persons in particular, and living organisms and the natural
realm in general, being a critical theme. The consideration of the latter cases is
necessitated by the requirement to analyse the structure of persons in whole, and
especially because the primary positive thesis is that persons are processes which are
motivated at base by a conative driver which itself is constitutive of their being at all. The
analysis of the nature and function of this primary driver of persons as processes, in
context of its relation to their secondary instrumental valuation of themselves, which lies
at the core of the thesis will generate the conclusion that life’s continuance constitutes an
inalienable value to persons that is profound to the degree that it obtains irrespective even
of their own evaluative judgements. This analysis suggests a grounding in the question of
the manner in which persons arise from the category of other living organisms in general,
and the manner in which these arise from the background matter in the universe. The
latter will be analysed and the nature of the conative driver will be asserted to be a
physical principle which is a defining condition of living organisms in general.
Additionally, the analysis of the category of the natural will constitute a critical theme for
other reasons, which involve the reliance by certain commentators in the discourse
concerning the ethics of aging intervention and life extension upon assertions as to
naturalness, and the ethics of human alteration of or interference with the natural, the
sacred, the normal, and the given. These latter will be argued to constitute a cluster
4
concept, which will be analysed and demonstrated largely to be lacking in soundness,
validity and real cohesion. Further, common ethical arguments against the wisdom of
radical life extension in the personal case will be analysed, and mostly found wanting.
The core thesis represents a re-evaluation of the classic liberal concept of persons as self-
conscious, autonomous, rational valuing agents. This classic analysis will be shown to be
faulty in certain key respects, and a correction will be proposed along the lines mentioned
above. The fact that these faulty aspects of the classic liberal position constitute key
points of attack for conservative personhood theorists, and that the correction offered by
the revised liberal version generates a picture of the stability of the value of persons to
themselves (and therefore generally) that at least matches that of the various conservative
positions (considered to be their main strength by their proponents), largely neutralises
such critiques, as well as removes a key rationale for those opting for the conservative
positions in their rejection of the general subjectivist liberal picture of personhood. The
conservative conception of value in general, and the value of life and persons in
particular is critiqued and found wanting. Aside from being commonly based upon a false
conception of naturalness, in which supernatural entities, substances or beings are
considered to operate, a significant aspect of the failure of this conservative picture arises
from the false conception of persons as substantial in nature, or as substances.
Accordingly, a critique of the concept of substance in universal ontology is conducted in
the first section of the thesis, which will attempt to demonstrate the ontological primacy
of process over substance.
The broad structure of the thesis is of an hourglass, beginning in Section One with the
widest possible considerations of universal and human ontology in context of the
question of the primacy of process and substance.  Section two will move through
analyses of the various paradigm classical positions on the nature of personhood, towards
the focal point of the core thesis in Subsections 2.8 through 2.9, that persons are
conatively-driven processes for whom the continuation of their being is an inalienable
value, expanding therefrom into an analysis of the nature of the driver of persons in
context of living systems in general, and in the universe as a unified processual whole.
Section Three will then discuss certain practical issues at the level of the person qua
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themselves, which have been posited in context of the radical extension of lifespan, for
which the core and more general thesis will be seen to have significant consequences. It
is important to note that I consider that there are a significant number of other issues to be
addressed in the general area of the ethics of life extension, but these are chiefly
interpersonal, and so outwith the strict focus of this thesis. The core and general thesis
will have significant implications for these, however, but dealing with them would
require a lengthy treatment, which would take the thesis far beyond its maximum
permissible extent. I append to the thesis two papers which are representative of a
number of publications that I have written on the specific and general topics of this thesis.
The first of these, “The Ethics of Aging Intervention and Life Extension.” will be seen to
cover in brief some of the issues raised by interpersonal cases, though, having been
written in 2005 prior to the full development of the thesis offered in this dissertation, does
not constitute an application of the core and general thesis to these questions. However,
part of it represents the earliest version of the nascent core thesis in my published work.
The second appended paper, “Immortality, Human Nature, the Value of Life, and the
Value of Life Extension”, published in the journal Bioethics in 2006, contains key
elements of the core, and some limited aspects of the more general thesis of this
dissertation. Further, it contains writing which appears in this dissertation, though it is
here in significantly modified, amended and expanded form. The majority of this partially
duplicated writing appears in Section Two, between 2.1 and 2.9, as will be evident from a
reading of the appended paper.
Some brief further notes are required at this juncture, in order to obviate certain
misapprehensions which may arise from my usage of certain terms and concepts, that
may appear isomorphic with meanings and concepts I respectively do not intend, and
reject. Firstly, in what follows I critique reductionism, or rather and better, certain
interpretations of reductionism. To begin with, it should be recognised that the analyses
of reducibility I perform do not impinge upon the core thesis of the phenomenal structure
of personhood. This is capable of standing alone, and independent of the grounding
conceptual structure I seek to provide for it. If these latter elements of the extended thesis
are correct, they very powerfully ground the core thesis in what amounts to the
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beginnings of a complete universal ontological system. This is of course desirable, but it
is conceivable that I may be mistaken about the connections I assert between, for
example, the concept of the conatus and the thermodynamics of living systems, without
being mistaken of necessity in my core analysis of persons. That said, I of course
consider the expanded thesis a correct and robust picture of reality. The reality thus
reflected, however, should not be mistaken to be unscientific, or anti-reductionist. I
consider the reductionist hypothesis, in terms of the dependence relation of each layer of
universal ontology upon the lower ones to be absolutely a correct picture of reality. My
argument is rather that we must respect the layeredness of the universe for what it is, and
account for the phenomena that obtain at each level, and the principles which govern
such phenomena, chiefly at their own level and on their own terms. In this way I deny the
Democritan picture of, for example, secondary qualities or the character of processes of
macroscopic and higher interactions being entirely reducible to the most fundamental
particles or processes. That they are constituted of them is important, to be sure, but my
tasting the apple is not that the apple has sweet-sharp-tasting superstrings (or whatever
such) far below the Planck scale. If we look at that level (or levels below, should they
exist) alone, then the apple, as well as myself, and the taste of the apple which is an
interaction of these systems at this level, disappears. In this way, what I am saying about
reductionism is not that things or processes at one level are magically unconnected to the
goings-on of levels below, but rather that the universe is not solely describable by
language appropriate to the most fundamental level (should it exist at all), but rather,
entities, systems and processes at each level must be fairly accounted for, on their own
terms, in a full ontological schema. If we do not accept this, we lose our capacity
meaningfully to discuss or refer to the characters of the particular kinds of processes
which occur at each level. Trees, stars, persons, planets, and bus engines, for example,
are not merely groupings of subatomic particles. This sort of “irreducibility” should be
seen to be a strictly different concept from that, say, which has been used by covert
creationists in their attempt at smuggling in supernatural forces and interventions to
evolutionary theory in the guise of “irreducible complexity”. I thoroughly reject all such
concepts, as espoused by the proponents of “intelligent design”. The evolution of the eye
(and all other biological structures) by natural selection is a fact, but this does not mean
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that there is a principle of “seeing” present or manifestly inherent in superstrings, quarks
or atoms. This latter sort of concept, applied to the property or phenomenon of life itself,
is characteristic of Alfred North Whitehead’s process ontology, which I reject on this, as
well as other bases.
On a closely related note, in what follows I will be discussing a feature of the universe I
call (following its classical as well as modern psychological usage) the “conatus”. The
concept can apply to human psychology exclusively, as described above and in the core
thesis, and in this way the core will survive a demonstration, if such there could be, of its
lack of connection to the thermodynamics of living systems as proposed in part
(subsection 2.10) of the extended thesis. However, to address the latter, the concept as
here and generally used by me, is strictly to be distinguished from any supernatural,
vitalist or quasi-vitalist concept of a “life force” or élan vital, or vis viva, or whatever else
it may be and has been called. Rather what I so describe in the extended thesis as being
seemingly isomorphic with and likely a corollary of a principle in thermodynamics,
depends upon the interaction of strictly physical processes, and may be seen both to
depend upon the second law of thermodynamics obtaining at all times and in all places,
and to be thereby a statistically-describable phenomenon of particular sorts of physical
systems. Whatever else it may be, it is a wholly natural and physical aspect of process
ontology. Further, being an emergent property or feature of particular physical systems
above the macroscopic scale (by which I mean above the level of the atom and specific to
living systems in particular) it is not some transitive force (it is not a “force” at all,
strictly speaking) which has required some prime mover as in finalist teleologies, or
original impulse for its initial generation, as was conceived by Bergson. Rather it is an
aspect of physical systems which through ordinary physical processes attain a particular
state of self-organisation that takes them beyond the “event horizon” of mere
thermodynamic stability above equilibrium.
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Section One: The Metaphysics of Nature and the
Normal in the Ethics of Aging
1.1 Nature and humanity
There exists an abiding prejudice within popular apprehension that there is a defensible
distinction between humans, or some mysterious aspect of their psychology or agency,
and the realm described as the “natural”. Rarely more formally argued for or defended at
a metaphysical level, this commitment is manifest in the work of many commentators in
the area of life extension ethics, and enhancement ethics in general, chiefly as a means to
ground arguments against enhancement or other interventions in biological processes.1
However, as others have also argued,2 this distinction is unfounded, and should be
discarded. There is nothing whatever that may be successfully defended as constituting a
boundary between humans, human psychology and any product of human agency, and
the realm of the natural. Any physically constituted substance or process that falls within
the scope of the laws and Substance (total sum of physical processes) of the physical
universe, as all must do, is natural by definition. So a human, a computer, a tree, an
Airbus A320, a memory, a tulip, biological aging, fiction, a storm composed of sulphuric
acid, psychological qualia, human science, bioluminescence, granola, uranium, a nebula,
a mass extinction event, disease, strychnine, and a transgenic animal (including
                                                 
1  e.g.: Callahan D. 2000. “Death and the research imperative.” N Engl J Med 342:654-656; Callahan D.
1987. Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society. Simon & Schuster, New York, NY; Fukuyama F.
2002. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
New York, NY; McCue JD. “The naturalness of dying.” JAMA Vol. 273, No. 13;Kass LR. 2001. “L’chaim
and its limits: why not immortality?” First Things 113:17-25; Kass LR. 2002. Life, Liberty and the Defense
of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics. Encounter Books, USA.; Kass LR. 2003. “Prefaratory Note to
Council Members.” From the report of the President’s Council on Bioethics: Beyond Therapy:
Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human Improvement. Available at:
http://www.bioethics.gov/background/kasspaper.html [Accessed Jan. 2008]
2 e.g. Mill JS. 1998 (f.p. 1874). “On Nature.” In: Three Essays on Religion: Nature, the Utility of Religion,
Theism. Prometheus Books New York, NY; Millar A. 1998 “Following Nature.” Philos Q. Vol. 38 Issue
151:165-185
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transgenic or otherwise biologically modified persons), are all equally natural.  Whether
an attempt is made to define such things in terms of substances,3 or else processes, the
outcome is the same.  So the “human” and any product of human agency that can exist in
the physical universe, therefore the “artificial”,4 are proper subsets of the “natural”.  As a
result, any and all arguments that reference a distinction between humans together with
the realm or any product of human agency, and the “natural” are founded upon a false
distinction.
It might be objected, at this point, that there are certain features of specifically human
psychology, such as qualia, self-conscious subjectivity and intentionality, which are
apparent exceptions to this general position. The objection might run that these features
of psychology are fundamentally subjective in nature, and that subjectivity in turn is
irreducible to the objective.5 Such a critique, however, makes certain assumptions that I
do not accept. Firstly, it assumes that it is necessary to the definition of the ‘natural’ that
all that is natural is reducible by this definition to strictly objectively accessible facts in
the world. This in turn assumes a definition of the natural that accepts both a hard
reductionist ontological hypothesis,6 and a constructionist interpretation of the same. It
further ignores the possibility of an emergentist7 concept of the natural, in which truly
novel features, which are either ontologically or epistemologically emergent and (at least
descriptively) discontinuous in some way from properties, laws and features of smaller-
                                                 
3 I consider that these are all composed at fundament of physical energy simpliciter, which is in the macro-
scale instantiated in the atomic by-products of stellar fusion. More broadly, I agree with the spirit, if not all
of the detail, of Spinoza’s claim in his Ethics, Part One, that there is but one substance. This idea seems to
be being borne out in modern physics, at least in terms of the idea of every substance being better described
as a substance-process of energetic wave form, capable of being unified both mathematically and, at least at
the broadest level, and not necessarily in a thoroughgoing constructivist-reductionism, descriptively. See
section on reductionism below.
4 There may be, of course, a defensible though entirely subsidiary distinction between the “artificial” and
the “wild”, but this need not detain us, as it involves quite separate concepts which are not raised by any in
this area of discourse.
5 As is argued to be the case for qualia in Jackson’s classic epiphenomenal “knowledge” argument: Jackson
F. 1982. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philos Q. 32: 127-136.
6 As typified by Ernst Nagel: Nagel E. 1961. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific
Explanation. Harcourt, Brace & Word. New York, NY
7 I remain rather agnostic about emergence, favouring neither weak (epistemological) nor strong
(ontological) emergence in particular, but if forced to choose likely would accept the former. See Section
2.10.8 for a discussion and further references in this thesis. For a “hard” emergentist view see: Laughlin
RB. 2005. A Different Universe: reinventing physics from the bottom down. Basic Books, New York, NY
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scale, less complex, lower energy levels of nature, emerge as one moves up through these
levels. I will discuss the subtleties of this view of the natural realm further below, but for
now suffice to say that I consider that nature is capable of nonlinear, or symmetry-
breaking novelties, which despite their radical novelty hold some complete dependency
relation to their underlying substrates, such that they depend in whole upon, but may not
necessarily be wholly explained8 by appeal to the more or most fundamental levels, or
perhaps more importantly described in the selfsame terms as would suffice for those
lower levels, without loss. In this way, subjectivity may be considered to be an
epistemologically, and perhaps even (though not necessarily for the purposes of this
thesis, or this monistic concept of nature) an ontologically emergent property of the
universe, such that it is indeed both formally contiguous, but also, in other terms,
formally discontinuous with objectivity in the natural realm. In any case, psychological
qualia form a part of the causal economy of the universe (even in the epiphenomenal
case, though in that case as a pure effect), and as such are wholly natural. Any attempt to
classify these as unnatural, or non-natural must fail, since it will not be able adequately or
at all to explain why this discontinuity between levels of what is manifestly contained in
or are phenomena of the universe, provides the thoroughgoing discontinuity such that the
label “unnatural” is warranted. A discontinuity of property or of higher level processes
(“substances” as will shortly be argued, are themselves processual in nature) is not a
discontinuity of ultimate Substance, being the sum of Universal Nature. One might note
that there are discontinuities between the properties of helium and uranium, and of carbon
and living cells, but that they are, in turn, composed of the same ultimate processes, -
energy merely manifest in different arrangements of subatomic particles, protons,
electrons and neutrons etc whose sum total of underlying and emergent supervenient
process is the ultimate “Substance” of Nature. This does not mean that I accept a
Democritan picture of “all is atoms and the void” (or some more modern fundamental
equivalent, such as “all is strings”) since that is the very soul of the hard reductionist
picture I consider is insufficiently rich, or is oversimplistic. I will discuss this enrichment
                                                 
8 Either because they cannot be, or else because no finite being can, in the course of a finite universal
history, or at least that part of it which affords sufficient energy gradients to afford calculation, calculate or
model the necessarily relationships accurately, or else weaker still, because we presently cannot. I would
tend to consider the middle position most likely. See section 2.10.8 below on emergence and reductionism.
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of the reductionist concept with that of emergence further below, in Section Two,
especially 2.10.8. But there is a lot of work to do beforehand, in order to fill out the
ontological background of the thesis towards which I am driving. Meanwhile, to borrow
from the language of Spinoza, subjectivity may cash out as something like an attribute of
the ultimate Substance, which depends upon modes of that Substance of certain levels of
complexity and form, as a pre-condition, and is not an attribute appertaining to all modes
of Substance. In this way, there can be radically different, or novel properties of
Substance, in different cases or modes, but yet there remain one ultimate Substance. For
Spinoza this was “God or Nature” and for me, it is “Nature”. In order for the term
unnatural properly to apply, there must be at least two ultimate substances, and since this
must require them to be utterly separate, one cannot be in another in any means or at all,
and therefore provided that we are speaking of what “is”, we are speaking of the singular
“Natural” of which we human persons are irrevocably a part.
Returning to the general or common misconception, such is the depth and near ubiquity
of acceptance of the commitment to the idea of what must amount to a fundamental
discontinuity in Substance, such that “Nature” forms only a subset of it, that it may well
be the case that any reader at this point may be considering the above claim to be very
bold, and in need of justification. Before moving on to sketch any such justification, it
should be noticed that, properly considered, the burden of proof must rest rather on any
claim to the contrary, than on the claim that humans are wholly naturally constituted.9 To
date, no non-natural properties, objects, or events have been adequately described
metaphysically or demonstrated in an unambiguous fashion to exist. That there remain
some phenomena that are not yet wholly understood in terms of their relationships with
established features of the natural universe is no grounds whatever to describe them as
non-natural. Indeed, in all but the human or personal case, the simple general assumption
is that all yet to be explained phenomena are natural, as was lightning prior to the
nineteenth century, despite up to that date lacking an adequate natural explanation. Any
other presumption, such as that all yet to be explained phenomena are to be considered
supernatural, or non-natural until rendered natural by, say, scientific elucidation, appears
                                                 
9 The same may be said of any claim of “supernatural” properties, entities, or the like.
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self-evidently wrongheaded, if not by anything else, then by induction from a posteriori,
or synthetic observations and past cases, and Occam’s Razor, but the primary case I put
forward, and on which I rely, is a priori. In view of this, in our context of the self-
evidently, and definitively otherwise wholly natural universe, from which we have
sprung, and within which we are, live, and act, the default position must be that we are,
ourselves, entirely natural and naturally constituted.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable body of philosophical discourse that treats the
situation rather differently, and accepts, in one form or another, the proposition that
humans, either in whole or in part, are non- un- or super-natural beings. This discourse
ranges from the simply religious to arguments of the likes of G.E. Moore.10 It is neither
the focus nor the intention of this dissertation fully to defend a thoroughgoing naturalism,
but the elucidation of this position is necessary both to clear away much of the
overgrowth of argumentation in the relevant area, as well as to make clear the conceptual
grounding of the wider metaphysical commitments and argumentation of this work,
which is indeed thoroughly naturalistic. While this particular grounding may not in fact
be necessary for all of these same, it is nonetheless important for orientation of the
particular cast of these positions, in the author’s conceptual framework.
The naturalism I defend is both a methodological and a metaphysical one.11 I hold that
not only is it impracticable for empirical methods to detect, much less verify, or explore
purported supernatural phenomena, but that if this is true, such phenomena as are
manifest in any way whatever cannot be said to be unnatural or supernatural, or else non-
natural. While it is not only possible, but certain, that there are phenomena (such as
consciousness and qualia) that are as yet not fully or adequately understood in naturalistic
empirical terms, such phenomena cannot be in principle inexplicable in such terms.
                                                 
10 In the case of non-natural moral properties, should these exist (which I deny in any case) I would state
that the faculty proposed by the moral intuitionists must itself be a natural faculty, and provided that there
is a causal relationship between the effects of its detection, and their causes, which there must be, then what
is being detected must also be natural, by definition.
11 The tradition to which this view belongs is venerable, and includes such thinkers as Democritus,
Epicurus, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, D’Holbach and their modern successors such as Dennett and (perhaps)
Dawkins. I do not necessarily endorse the views of any one of these, but the list is by way of a guide or
conceptual pedigree.
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Provided such phenomena have some or any effect upon, are in any way affected by, or
hold any systematic relation to other established aspects of the physical, natural realm,
which is empirically accessible, then they themselves form a part of it, by definition.12
I will try not belabour the point overmuch, but some further elucidation is in order, to
complete the concept. Firstly, it appears clear beyond argument that the physical bodies,
including electrochemistry and neurophysiology of humans are entirely naturally
constituted. The atoms which compose biomolecules are, after all, ancient parts of the
natural, physical universe, and as such are wholly naturally constituted. Our local sun is
only capable of the fusion generation of helium, so all other elements which compose our
physical structures (and most of the hydrogen and helium which also does), must have
originated in the fusion reactions of some ancient red supergiant star. Further, according
to the first law of thermodynamics, the energy from which all atoms, or substances
whatever are formed is indestructible, and is not created ex nihilo, within the energy
economy of universe. In one sense, the definition of the natural is co-extensive with that
energy (and so causal) economy. So then, no part of our physical selves is or has been, or
could be separate from the natural.
As regards our brute structures, this leaves, as has been indicated, only the psychological
elements of human persons. Some further discussion is warranted. Only a thoroughgoing
dualism could possibly contend that the psychological aspects of a person were in any
case not composed of wholly natural substances or rather better, of physical processes.
                                                 
12 This is not to say that this naturalism collapses into a simple definition of ontology. It is possible, within
this metaphysical naturalism, that something is, which is not natural, but if so, this thing, power, process or
being could not manifest in the natural realm, for if it did, it would be connected to, and thus form part of,
that realm. So for that thing, existence would not mean “being in the universe” or “being in nature” but
rather “being which is excluded from nature and the natural universe”. At present I am agnostic as to
whether ideas of things external to nature are in any way possible, though I lean towards the Spinozist side
of this, in that I think it unlikely for ideas within the natural realm to be capable of representing that which
both exists, and is outside Nature. To this extent, my conception of Nature is close to Spinoza’s conception
of nature as being ultimate substance, that which all is “in” and which is “in” itself. However I remain
agnostic as to whether more than one substance is ultimately possible, given that substantial realms beyond
the one substance would be outside the conceptual schemas afforded by this substance of nature, and so
may have a kind of being which defies the accusation of absurdity levelled at it by Spinoza. In this way, I
accept Spinoza Ethics 1p15 but deny 1p13 and 1p14, on various grounds, including the nature and
definition of “absolute” infinity not necessarily excluding multiple “infinite” substances, particularly as the
concept of “infinity” is itself within and an attribute of the substance within which we are.
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But even in such a case, provided that psychological substances or processes are manifest
within, have effect upon, are affected by, or have a common substantial13 root with
natural substances and processes, by the above principles, they must themselves be
accounted to be natural14, but would perhaps represent a conception of natural substances
in which a (“neutral monistic”) parallelism obtains, as appears to be the case in Spinoza.
To be clear- such a commitment to the pervasiveness of the natural as I defend does not
of necessity rule out the possibility, say, of a purely psychological afterlife, beyond death.
While I presently hold that this is extremely unlikely, and indeed assert that
psychological processes are emergent phenomena of certain kinds of complex, self-
organising physical processes (so, insofar as I understand it, denying Spinoza’s apparent
parallelism) it remains true that so long as mental processes are not fully described in the
natural sciences in such a manner that renders them of necessity causally bound (or as in
Spinoza necessarily parallel) to particular physical substance-processes, then it remains
possible that they may continue, or be separable from these physical substrates, perhaps
in a manner similar to that by which radio broadcasts are separable from individual radio
transceivers. I do not wish to defend such an extreme position, but it serves to illustrate
that there may be as yet unknown principles in physics which allow for such a surprising
outcome. If such exist, then nonetheless the realm of the mental in which the
psychological process would continue beyond the biological death of the brain which had
been associated with it, would be wholly natural. The purpose of describing this last
possibility is solely to illustrate the extent to which the definition of the natural I am
describing is pervasive. Simply put, even in such an extreme situation, provided that
causation or some systematic relationship clearly ties one such set of phenomena to
another, definitively natural one, or at least provided that such relationships are
mathematically describable and conceptually quantifiable, then they comprise a wholly
natural system. In this way I do not necessarily deny any conception of, say a “soul”. I
only deny that such as there may be, if manifest in any way whatever in the natural realm
                                                 
13 In the Spinozistic account of Substance.
14 Spinoza and other parallelists, or an epiphenomenalist picture would deny that these have effect upon or
are affected by (in the former case, and the latter solely in the latter case respectively), the physical mode or
realm, but in either case would still assert the entirely natural attribution of these same.
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(say by consciousness, or elements of the subconscious), can be describable as non-
natural or supernatural.
Further, while I do not wish to enter into prolonged discussion in this thesis on the
subject of free-will and determinism, I hold that whether free will is an illusion, or is
compatible with determinism15, or whether it may be in fact be correctly picked out by
the commonsense notion, as being in some sense self-originating, monopolar and sui
generis, even in this latter extreme case there exist no compelling grounds to suppose that
it is non-natural, or supernatural. Rather since even a truly “free” will forms part of the
causal and energetic economy of the natural universe, it is inescapably natural, albeit in a
boundary or monopolar fashion16, unusual, or remarkable in nature, perhaps as a
manifestation of an ontologically or epistemologically emergent property. If some story
were to be attempted of the “supernatural” causal history of such a will, stretching back
“outside nature”, such talk would be absurd, since the whole concept depends upon
“free” will being effective (even to the extent of its only being empirically detectable-
which is an effect) in some manner in the causal energy economy of the natural universe.
So any such conjectural “supernatural” causal history would itself simply be natural and
the “freedom” would collapse into determinism again. Simple unusualness,
remarkableness or novelty is not of itself sufficient to classify something as non-natural,
any more than any of the peculiarities of apparent causal discontinuity in quantum
physics17 render quantum phenomena supernatural, or unnatural. That a quantum event
may itself appear or be causally underdetermined, or indeterminate, at least in classical
terms, does not mean that it is outwith the scope of the natural.
                                                 
15 In the latter case, arguably, autonomy still obtains. Spinoza attempts a defence of a kind of autonomy
within a wholly deterministic schema.
16 Magnetic monopoles are considered a theoretic possibility in physics (see e.g. Dume B. 2003. “Have
physicists seen magnetic monopoles?” http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/18338 [Accessed January
2008]). It is conceivable, perhaps, that there are causal monopoles, and that these might manifest as
supervenient epiphenomena, as may be posited as an explanation for or descriptive analogue of
psychological qualia.
17 Such as the arbitrary values obtained by the collapse of the wave-function (if this is what indeed occurs,
as described in the “collapse” hypotheses), or else the causal discontinuities between multiple fissioning
worlds, or the else “spooky” action at a distance of EPR-Bell’s theorem quantum entanglement, etc. See
note 308.
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So then whether or not mental phenomena are wholly identical with or emergently
supervenient upon classical physical phenomena of the order of atoms and molecules, or
whether they instead represent hitherto undescribed hyperdimensional18 wave-form
processes or energy relations which are not so supervenient, they are nonetheless wholly
a part of the natural universe, and cannot be separated from it on the grounds of mere
unusualness. What other grounds, after all, can there be, than those of causation and/or
systematic interrelation, to describe the natural?
In the discourse of life extension ethics, and enhancement in general, the prejudice of the
separability of the human from the natural attains to what would appear to be its own
reductio ad absurdam in that claims are made19 that humans ought not to interfere in their
own biologically constituted “natures”, on the very basis that these are natural. But this
entails that something in human nature allows us to act unnaturally. No explanation is
given, or, as I assert, is defensible, for the entrance of this mysterious “unnaturalness”
into what a fortiori must be a fully naturally constituted being. Both the being, together
with any interference in anything by that being must be accounted as wholly natural.
                                                 
18 Current “string-theory” posits a remarkable number of dimensions above the classical 4. cf. Greene B.
2000. The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory.
Vintage Books. Chap. 8.
19 See esp. Callahan, Fukuyama Op. Cit. note 1.
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1.2 Nature and the normal
The confusion described in 1.1, though likely originating in false or else irrelevant
conceptions of supernatural “separateness”20 found in religious doctrine,21 arises in
modern discourse especially frequently in matters relating to the biological realm, largely
as an illegitimate conflation between the “natural” physical realm, and that which is
“given” or “status quo” or “normal”. The normal and natural are conflated, I believe,
precisely because there are no grounds to defend the strict, or any, natural/unnatural
distinction in the universe, and the two half-baked concepts are deemed, somehow, to
lend weight to one another. So there are various senses of “natural”, in which natural is
taken as that which is normal, or else, absent human agent interference would “otherwise
unfold”. Of course, no account is given regarding these senses of “natural” of why human
interference in events is not always both natural and, in its own terms normal. For what
else is there, for humans, other than human agency?22 In context of the wider subject
matter of this dissertation, examples of this conflation can be found scattered throughout
the literature, and are variously used to defend (and in some cases attack) a picture of the
“naturalness” of the aging process or the ordinary form, trajectory and duration of human
lifespan, and of human “nature” itself23, as well as the “unnaturalness” and therefore
illegitimacy of intervention in aging24 in particular, and endogenous human biology in
general. In this way, such conflated notions are touted as arguments against enhancement
technologies in general.  However, none of these arguments in any intelligible way
                                                 
20 Irrelevant insofar, both as no account of them has yet been adequately given, and as ex hypothesi,
anything which counts as fully supernatural will have no effect whatsoever within the natural, physical
universe, and will in turn not be affected by it.
21 E.g. the notion of “nature” being fit for mankind’s “use”, who in turn is composed most importantly of a
body and associated supernatural soul, and other similar dualisms that categorically separate humans from
the purely physical natural world.
22 As Mill notes on this point, if “unnatural” is equated to “immoral”, then humans are by this definition
incapable of moral action Op Cit note 2.
23 See next subsection.
24 e.g. Callahan D. 1987. Op. Cit. note 1; Kass LR. 2003. “Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology
and the Pursuit of Perfection.” New Atlantis. Spring (1): 9-28; Caplan A. 2004. “An Unnatural Process:
Why It Is Not Inherently Wrong to Seek a Cure for Aging.” In The Fountain of Youth: Cultural, Scientific,
and Ethical Perspectives on a Biomedical Goal. Post SG.  & Binstock RH.  eds. Oxford University Press.
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reference true “naturalness”, as can be seen from the above observations, rather, they
solely reference “normality”, the status quo, or “givenness”25 in various guises.
                                                 
25 e.g. Sandel M.  2002. What’s Wrong with Enhancement. President’s Council on Bioethics(PCBE).
Available at: http://www.bioethics.gov/background/sandelpaper.html [Accessed January 2008]
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1.3 Nature, normality and normativity
The motivation for the conflation of the “natural” and the “normal” in the above-
referenced arguments derives from an impulse to utilise these concepts in a normative
fashion, in what is usually a commission of the “appeal to nature” fallacy. At base, this
fallacy just is that it is assumed that nature simpliciter (and/or “normality”) is in some
sense morally prime, and therefore “good”, and so may be used to ground arguments
about actions or things being “bad” in some moral sense, simply on the basis that they
depart from the “natural”, (or else, the “normal”).
This is a fallacy on at least three separate levels. The first is that, as argued in 1.1,
everything in the physical universe is natural, and so such an argument is completely
redundant and tautologous with respect to any possible thing or relation within that
natural realm. This observation is comprehensive in itself, and so removes the need for
the second, more generally recognised definition of the fallacy, which is that if there
could in some way be grounds for appeal to some natural/unnatural distinction there are
no defensible grounds in any case to establish the “natural” (or the “normal”) as being
morally prime solely on the basis that it is “natural”(likewise for the “normal”). To give
an example, death by cancer, or botanical poison, or the impulse to kill a sexual
competitor is not “good”, in a moral sense, simply because (to suspend the, I assert, clear
global fallacy of the first order for a moment) it is argued on the ordinary intuition to be
“natural”, just as it is wrong to define cannibalism as “good”, even in context, simply
because it is “normal” or habitual in cannibal societies. The third level involves the
observation that if “naturalness” were morally prime, such that human agency were to
disturb it by definition, then all human agency must be accounted immoral26. It might be
objected that if some “normality” might be accounted morally prime, then we might
participate in normality, without disturbing it- but then, which normality? In both cases
the outcome is absurd.
                                                 
26 As pointed out by Mill and Millar Op. Cit. note 2.
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As indicated in 1.2, the conflation occurs because the usual reason for such an appeal is
to defend a status quo, or normal state of affairs, attempting to add some supposed
normative force to the “given” from the purported moral primacy of “nature”.27 This may
be seen by the fact that the “natural” in such arguments is always seen to be referencing
some particular arrangement of natural substances, processes or relations, to defend
against a possible movement towards another, equally natural form or set, on the false
basis that this form would somehow be, to borrow from Orwell, “less equally” natural
than the former. In this way, the conflation of the natural and the normal, together with
the groundless appeal to the moral primacy of “nature” or the “given” in general is at best
nothing other than a case of otherwise conventional purely conservative or else prudential
argument being dressed in borrowed robes to lend it an air of gravitas it clearly lacks,
since otherwise such a move would not be necessary in the first place.
                                                 
27 Usually whether or not what is being claimed as “natural” is in fact causally downstream of human
intervention, adding yet more confusion to the bankrupt notion.
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1.4 Naturalistic ethics and the origin of value motivation
The cluster of simple fallacies above are of course to be strictly distinguished from such
more sophisticated arguments as Hume’s  “is/ought problem” or “Hume’s Law”28 and
Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy”29. Both developments are separately interesting, if only to
separate them from the foregoing, and each other, and at the same time allow a short
diversion which will be useful in orienting the reader towards the location of the positive
thesis of this dissertation in the metaethical landscape.
Taking the is/ought problem to begin with, Hume points out the incommensurability of
statements about what “is” with statements about what “ought” to be. Hume’s Law30
works within a naturalistic frame, and, in the arguably prevalent interpretation,31 seeks to
replace the conventional view of moral properties with what was in its time a fairly
revolutionary sort of projectivist schema, wherein morals are painted upon the world by
our psychology, in particular by our sentiments. In this wise, Hume may be thought of as
the progenitor of the ethical projectivists, whose most prominent modern theoretical
expression is the quasi-realist Simon Blackburn’s entirely naturalistic schema.32 This is
compatible with an acceptance of the force of the above described simple fallacy, since
just because ethics arises within an entirely natural realm, does not of necessity mean that
certain ethical evaluations are necessarily matched to certain generalised states of affairs
in the world. Ethics may arise wholly naturally within a naturally subjective mind, and be
projected from the subject on the world, without it being abandoned that such a mind may
                                                 
28 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) A Treatise of Human Nature. Selby-Bigge LA., Nidditch PH. (eds.), Oxford
University Press. Book III, Part I, Sect. I.
29 Moore GE. 1993 (f.p. 1903) Naturalistic Ethics. In: Principia Ethica, Revised Edition. Cambridge
University Press. pp. 89-110.
30 As it has come to be known in the work of R.M. Hare and other contemporary philosophers. Cf. Cohon
R. 2004. “Hume’s Moral Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/ [Accessed January 2008]
31 Cohon R. 2004 ibid.
32 Blackburn S. 1985. Spreading the Word. Oxford University Press; Blackburn S. 2000. Ruling Passions
Clarendon Press: Oxford.
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not determine ethics by observation of facts or states of affairs beyond the bounds of
subjectivity.
Moore’s “fallacy”33 attempts to demonstrate an arguably more subtle error, though one
that is logically closely related to Hume’s distinction. However, Moore’s argument seeks
to defend a moral non-naturalist position.  Essentially, it is held that whatever assertion is
made concerning the moral value of a state of affairs in the world, it is always logically
open to question whether the stated value is, in fact, the true, or correct one. Moore holds
that this “open question argument”34 demonstrates that moral values cannot be reduced to
states of affairs in the natural world, and so must be “non-natural” properties. In this
way, Moore’s argument serves as a motivator towards a different conclusion. The
structure of the observation is roughly similar, but the conclusion apparently quite
different. While Hume’s Fork points towards there being no necessary non-subjective
moral “facts”, while retaining the plausibility of moral naturalism, given the naturalism of
subjectivity itself, Moore accepts the force of the argument against moral value as being a
natural non-subjective feature of the world, but instead of abandoning the non-subjective
component, opts to consider that values are non-subjective, but are instead non-natural. A
full discussion of moral non-naturalism is beyond the scope of this thesis, however
suffice to say that, accepting the force of the global supervenience35 constraint in ethics,
and in line with the thrust of the above arguments concerning naturalism, I deny that
moral properties are in any defensible sense non-natural, but rather are subjectively
person-predicated phenomena whose naturalism is guaranteed by the natural status of the
subjective person-predicators themselves. While this is true of the kinds of things we
normally take to be moral values, the very occurrence of subjectivity will later in this
dissertation be seen to coincide with what is, in essence a non-subjective, indeed likely
wholly objective value, which itself builds subjectivity in the natural world.
                                                 
33 Its status as a formal fallacy is often disputed, and was possibly abandoned by Moore himself.
34 Moore GE. 1903. Op. Cit. note 29
35 See e.g. Blackburn S. 1993 (f.p.1988). “Supervenience Revisited.” In: Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford
University Press. pp. 130-148
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Further, I accept Mackie’s arguments relating to motivational internalism,36 (being that
moral values, if they existed at all, would have to be phenomena which are themselves
intrinsically motivating, and in this way would be “queer”, or unlike any other
phenomena known) though I would deny their ultimate force as a complete error theory
of ethics. To this extent I will seek later in this dissertation to defend a position of ethical
naturalism, which largely accepts a projective non-cognitivist or rather quasi-realist
position, but is not a classic position in this school of ethics (and may depart from it
significantly enough to cause its proponents to disagree with its association), in that it is
asserted that at least one motivation is foundational and constitutive to the very
possibility of subjective persons, may very well map onto a principle or law in the
physics of non-linear dynamical dissipative systems, and so may perhaps be accounted a
value which has some claim to true objectivity, qua persons.
In this way I deny that motivational internalism has the full error theoretical
consequences which Mackie might suppose. As will be further developed in section three
below, I argue, moreover, that motivational internalism points strongly towards a quite
ordinary, and not “queer” feature of our psychology, which is foundational to possibility
of persons, as well as being foundational to valuing activity at all. This feature is the
conative aspect of our psychology. Indeed, I will argue that a proper understanding of the
constitutive role of the conative in the formation of desires of whatever order, and thus
valuing activity itself, itself explains motivational internalism. Further, I will assert that
the constitutive conative aspect of personhood underwrites a foundational value to
persons: the value of personal extension in time, or the value of life extension.
                                                 
36 Mackie, J.L. 1990 (f.p.1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin, New York, NY.  pp. 38-42
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1.5 Nature, aging, and disease: the health unto death.
There is a great deal of debate in modern scientific and bioethical literature about whether
or not aging may be said to constitute disease, per se, and so fall within the scope of
medicine, and thereby become a legitimate target for intervention or therapy. While it is
possible, and indeed sensible to sidestep this debate altogether, as some have suggested37
(since enhancements do not need to regard disease, and classical medicine does not
command a sole universal moral monopoly upon a person’s intervention in their own
predicates), the commitments are considered weighty, and so need attention. There are
two main foci of this discourse. The first is whether there are significant functional and
physical differences defensible between “age related diseases” and “aging” to warrant the
ascription of a categorical difference, which discourse centres around the definitions of
aging, and of disease.38 The second is whether there is such a thing as a “natural” body
state, from which disease may be said to be a departure, thus requiring, perhaps, a
classification of aging itself as somehow unnatural, prior to being stated to be a legitimate
target for intervention.39
A full discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but some points
do need to be made here, however briefly. The first, of course, is that I argue for rejection
of any talk of “unnaturalness” with regard to health and disease in general, since
whatever else may be said of the definitions of these terms, they both fall squarely within
the realm of the “natural”.  Talk of the “unnaturalness” of disease is a clear example of
the conflation of the “natural” and the “normal”, and the conflation occurs for explicitly
similar reasons as are described in the above sections. One such in particular is that the
definition of disease itself is not by any means a strictly empirical exercise. It is rather an
artefact of sociological and personal evaluative judgement. Health is “good” and
therefore to be promoted actively. Diseases are “bad” and are therefore to be resisted, and
                                                 
37 Murphy TF. 1986. “A cure for aging?”  The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11(3):237-255.
38 See e.g. Walker RF. 2002. “Is aging a disease? A review of the Serono Symposia Workshop held under
the auspices of The 3rd World Congress on the Aging Male.” The Aging Male 2002;5:147-169
39 See e.g. Callahan, Kass, Caplan Op. Cit. note 24
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if possible eradicated. But of course “health”, being the present freedom from the
ascription of all possible definitions of disease, is not to be found in the wild, at all, and
arguably not to be found in any person, either, except within the context of the particular
definitions of “health” that are current within the society in which an individual happens
to live. It should be remembered, for example, that it is widely accepted that all persons
carry a significant number of alleles for presently defined recessive disease phenotypes.40
The line between expression of so-called recessive and dominant disorders is frequently
contextually dependent and sometimes blurred.41 What is to prevent some future society
from declaring the carriers “diseased”, alongside the expressers? The same may well be
said of latent viruses, for the majority of us are carriers of the chicken pox virus, which
frequently manifests in later life as shingles, and nearly all of us have some herpes (cold
sore) or papillomavirus (wart) load, which in turn may well predicate neurophysiological
disorders and cancers and in later life.42 No medical intervention has yet been capable of
effectively or wholly eradicating these. Are we all diseased? That depends, of course, on
one’s favoured definition.
The picture of a “healthy” individual, then, is clearly itself a moving target, with further
requirements continually added: not just freedom from parasites, infective agents and
obvious gross malfunctions, but now optimal physical “tone”, proper nutrition, and even
freedom from genetic factors which may not be presently manifest, and which are a part
of the predicates of an organism, at its endogenous “base”. Such a picture of health, for
example, could not have been relied upon in the 1940s, let alone the 1840s or before, to
define a person as “healthy”, but is now quite standard. A person may feel and look
perfectly healthy, and assert that they are so, but on intense technologically assisted
scrutiny may be found to be carrying certain mutated alleles that will inevitably, if
                                                 
40 Lohmueller KE. et al. 2008. “Proportionally more deleterious genetic variation in European than in
African populations.” Nature 451, 994-997; Pulst S-M. 2003. “Neurogenetics: single gene
disorders”[Review]. Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 74:1608-1614
41 For example in the case of heterozygous sickle cell anaemia, wherein even given heterozygosity of this
generally recessive trait, cells may sickle under certain exogenous conditions such as hypoxia. and a case
study in.: Bock H. et al. 2003. “Sudden death due to a haemoglobin variant.” International Journal of
Legal Medicine. Volume 118, Number 2; for more general discussion see also:  Pulst S-M. 2003 Ibid.
42 Bosch F, Manos M, Nunoz N, et al.  “Prevalence of human papillomavirus in cervical cancer: a
worldwide perspective.” J Nat Cancer Inst 1995; 87: 796-802.; Itzhaki RF et al. 1997. Herpes simplex virus
type 1 in brain and risk of Alzheimer's disease. Lancet  349(9047):241-4.
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nothing else intervenes, result in their degeneration and death. Likewise, such tests may
draw a blank, but in the eyes of future medicine falsely so, since they may miss what will
by a later technology be known as a “disease”. In the cases of latent viruses and
deleterious alleles, it is easy to see that some future society will consider ourselves as
diseased as we might have considered those who, in previous ages, felt “healthy”, despite
their carrying numerous parasites. “Age related diseases” are continually emerging in our
understanding, and very many would at one time or another simply have been defined as
symptoms of “old age”.  What will one day constitute the full canon of “disease” is
therefore open-ended, and it may well transpire that none of us, in the eyes of some future
generation, may be accounted to be, on their definition, fully, or even adequately
“healthy”.
Perhaps the simplest way of expressing the idea of disease is that for a person to consider
themselves to be diseased, they must feel that they are dis-eased, either at a personal
functional, or sociological level. They must feel some impediment either in their own
sense of wellbeing, or else in the face of what they would consider to be the optimal state
of being “healthy”, available to them through their cultural understanding. Gaining
knowledge of an anomaly, defect, or latent infective agent or deleterious allele by
technological means commonly results in an apparently presently “healthy” person
feeling diseased, and being accounted to be so by medical authority. That there are
matters of fact in the biological processes which are relied upon is, in this sense at least,
secondary. To define something as a disease in the first place, we do not first identify a
disease, and then account it bad, we first identify a state of affairs, decide that it is bad,
and only then do we apply the label of “disease”. In this way there is considerable,
though obviously not comprehensive, analogy between the evaluation of disease, and the
practice of moral evaluation.43 Arguably each involve some objective and scientifically
measurable elements, but in each case, there is a complex interaction between these
                                                 
43 In this assertion, I reflect a view similar to the nominalist or normativist view espoused by H Tristram
Engelhardt Jr. For a concise definition of this school and of the main alternative, the functionalist school, in
context of a critical discussion of the role of nonlinear dynamics in the definition of disease (which itself is
interesting for, though somewhat oblique to the broad approach of this thesis, and its more specific interest
in living systems as autopoietic self-regulating dissipative structures) see: Holm S. 2002. “Does chaos
theory have major implications for philosophy of medicine?” Medical Humanities 28:78-81
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“facts in the world” and the subjective response to such facts of persons in context of
complex social and cultural environments which interaction results in the emergence of
values appropriate to the particular situation, which have a quasi-objective quality, but
are not objective in the classical sense which Mackie critiques, of being in themselves,
say, capable of detection by conventional scientific instruments.44
Even if this analysis is not accepted, a limiting factor to the delineation of health and
disease might reasonably be argued to be death, and indeed I will argue for this here. It
seems to me that, whatever else may be said about “health” versus “disease”, a set of
biological circumstances, whether endogenous or exogenous, that is defined by
inexorable and comprehensive physical degeneration ending inevitably in death, must
cross the semantic boundary between these evaluative terms at some point, or else we
lose the sense of one, and therefore both. In this way, if biological aging per se could
possibly be defined as being separate from the “diseases of aging”, and if this former
biological aging is then defined as simply a state of health, as opposed to one involving
disease, then this would be a case of the health unto death. Such a case would appear to
render the sense of “health” quite convincingly absurd.45
This is particularly so when, as any tour of a nursing home will attest, aging brings with it
a host of cruel impediments, indignities, and undoubted dis-ease, for the aged.
                                                 
44 It might be argued that morality cannot be entirely subjective and person-predicated in a self-conscious
sense, but is cooperatively or emergently calibrated, such that, while moral values and “rules” are indeed
dependent upon subjective valuing agents of one form or another, the actual shape of any such “rule” or
value is not exclusively determined by any one subjective individual. Rather, individual valuers value
things in a sub-ethical manner, and it is the collective effect of large numbers of such valuations (as I will
argue below given a basic orientation by the Master Value of the conatus towards self-preservation), which
causes these ethical values, or rules to emerge. These, in turn, are situationally dependent in a manner that
reflects a moral particularism.
45 With this constraint, at least some aspect of a functionalist or realist view of “health” and “disease” is
accepted, though essentially in a minimal fashion, such that any physical process within an organism which
by virtue of that process alone ultimately results in death, must be accounted to cross the line to being
disease at some point. In this way my view could be described as a functionally-qualified or grounded
normative view. It does not reference “normal” functioning or any particular set of optimal functions, but it
acknowledges that even a nominalist view of the definition of health must reference some function, to make
sense. It would be absurd, even on a strictly nominalist view, to label a corpse, a “healthy” corpse!
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1.6 Lifespan as natural history, aging as cultural artefact
As the eminent biogerontologist Robin Holliday has asserted, “aging is no longer an
unsolved problem in biology”. 46 While there is still some debate over the relative
significances and interplay of its multi-factorial nature, there is no longer considerable
doubt over its origins and fundamental predicates. One particular feature of this picture is
of interest to us here. This is the consensus that aging serves no natural or biological
“purpose” or “function”. There is no intelligible teleology of aging. There are no
“gerontogenes” and aging cannot be regarded as some indispensable positive function of
biology, qua biology and natural history themselves.47 Aging is rather principally a by-
product of the long-term diminished, null, or deleterious effects of alleles and processes
whose shorter-term benefits are strongly selected for.  The optimal reproductive age of an
organism is calibrated by a complex interplay between its endogenous factors and its
environment. Evolutionary selective “pressures” act upon the species to optimally
calibrate its individuals’ development and reproduction within the contexts in which the
species happens ancestrally to exist, and which its activities help to shape. Beyond this
spontaneously ordered or emergently calibrated age of optimal reproductive efficiency,48
selective pressures tail off until they fall to zero. Simply put, evolution does not regard
what occurs to the progenitors once they have successfully reproduced. There are no
selective forces holding them together, and their biological program ceases to have
positive functionality. Their systems of repair fail, their positive functions run beyond
their limits and can become antagonistic, and they degenerate inexorably until death
occurs.49 50
                                                 
46 Holliday R. 2006.  “Aging is no longer an unsolved problem in biology.” Ann NY Acad Sci. May;
1067;1-9
47 Rattan SI. 1995. “Gerontogenes: real or virtual?” FASEB J 9: 284–28; Kirkwood TB. 2002. “Evolution
of ageing.” Mech Ageing Dev 123: 737–745
48 For a general discussion on the idea of the environmental calibration of phenotypes, referencing the
concept of the “Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness”, see: see Hagen EH. 2002. What is the EEA?
(detailed answer)The Evolutionary Psychology FAQ Hosted at:
http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/human/epfaq/eea2.html. [Accessed January 2008]
49 Kirkwood TBL., Rose MR. “Evolution of Senescence: Late Survival Sacrificed for Reproduction.”
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B332 (1991): 15–24.
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However, this aging process does not (among animals at any rate) occur in the wild
essentially at all. There are no very aged wild animals, since long before they ever get to
any great age, as a result of the beginnings of their aging-predicated degeneration, they
are out-competed, and starve or are killed. In this way, advanced aging only manifests in
its profound pathologies as an artefact of high culture.  If an argument could be made
(and I consider it dubious that it really could) from the point of view that, in evolutionary
history or in animals today, the early degenerations of aging assist in the interchange of
generations, and in this way aid the evolutionary adaptive process, by facilitating easier
interchange of generations through weakening incumbents, such an argument would
simply become inapplicable to human persons, as a result of the very phenomenon which
has increased the manifestation of aging itself: cultural adaptation. Aging, then, is an
artefact of the very thing which makes the purportedly adaptively beneficial (in this
scenario) rate of turnover of generations no longer required in the same way that it once
was, in any case. The redundant requirement is that, in our evolutionary history,
adaptation to changing environmental circumstances could only occur by mutation and
natural selection, which of course meant death for those de-selected, allowing the new,
better adapted variants further to flourish and replace the existing population. Cultural
adaptation, for human persons, has rendered this wholly endogenous biological
adaptation for the purposes of mere survival, essentially obsolete.
Further, and as a corollary of this, it is of vital importance to understand that, once a
population has achieved a profoundly successful form of strictly cultural adaptation, the
biological adaptive process is bypasses, selective pressures disappear, and evolution or
endogenous biological adaptation, simply ceases. This may be termed a variety of Hardy-
Weinberg Equilibrium.51 This means that as soon as a species has reached the minimal
structure to support the advent of such cultural adaptation, once the latter has taken off,
that minimal structure will remain more or less unchanged. This further means that the
                                                                                                                                                  
50 This of course furnishes, if one accepts a functionalist account of the delineation between health and
disease, a good grounding of an account of aging processes as diseases.
51 Also known as the Hardy-Weinberg Law. It implies that in a large and randomly breeding population
allele frequencies will remain more or less constant. Most of the destabilising forces such as Natural
Selection and Genetic Drift have been more or less reduced to zero in the modern cultured world.
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members of that species will not become further adapted to their own culturally
constructed realm. Now of course this realm itself will tend to adapt around the
peculiarities and awkward features of the biology of the cultural predicators, and will
often attempt to compensate for them, but this compensation will of necessity be
incomplete, and will further constitute a significant constraint upon the capacity for the
species fully to enter into their culturally adaptive realm, for they will remain tethered to
a biology which is largely adapted to an environment which the cultural adaptivity has
rendered obsolete, and non-existent. A nice example of this, and its potential for harm, is
our tendency to eat fatty, salty foods. We enjoy these excessively because in the
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness,52 salt and fat were rare and vital
commodities. In the days of the Supermarket, this is no longer the case, and so we are
facing an obesity crisis, since we have not, and indeed cannot rid ourselves of the once
adaptive, now deleterious cravings of our precultural forebears. These observations will
be seen to have significant consequences for the kind of view discussed in subsection 2.6
below, wherein it is held by some that our culturally-predicated identity is somehow
biologically natural, in a finely tuned and preordained manner, such that our biology and
culture, as they each have been through the ages with the one changing, the other
remaining the same, are in a kind of pre-existing harmony with one another. The latter is
simply not the case.
Attempts have been made by both liberal and conservative bioethical commentators to
construct value arguments based upon the reverence either or both for “natural” wild
history, and “human” cultural history. I have elsewhere argued against the force of this
quasi-sanctity, proto-conservative position (most explicitly iterated by Dworkin,53 though
more by Kass and Sandel54 in the context of aging intervention and life extension) and
will return to them in greater detail in Section 2 below. I will not rehearse these
arguments here, though, other than to say that in absence of any explicit teleology of
aging, there is no prima facie case whatever for respecting the calibration of life span,
arising from the deep natural history of our distant, precultural ancestors, in absence of
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53 Dworkin R. 1993. Life’s Dominion: An argument about abortion and euthanasia. HarperCollins, London.
54 See Kass, Sandel Op Cit. notes 1 and 24 respectively.
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the circumstances of its formation, any more than there would be a case to preserve the
genotypes of sickle cell anaemia, in culturally-mediated absence of malaria, or in the
presence of fully effective exogenous medicinal remedies.
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1.7 The Struldbrug obsession: an example of the
natural/supernatural confusion at its most explicit in the
discourse concerning aging
There is a persistent worry that is regularly cited in publications arguing against radical
aging intervention. Among those who support aging interventions this worry has been
informally dubbed “the Struldbrug obsession”55. Its theme appears in numerous mythic
tales, such as those of Tithonus or the Sybil of Cumae, both of whom asked divine beings
for, and were granted either true immortality (in the case of Tithonus) or a guaranteed
vastly extended period of life (the Sybil) but forgot to ask for eternal youth. So they lived
on and aged and withered until out of pity for his plight, Tithonus’ lover Eos (goddess of
the dawn) turned him into a grasshopper, while the Sybil shrivelled steadily until she was
so far gone that she placed in a jar and hung from a tree, no longer to issue prophecy, but
answering to each request merely that she wished to die. Of course none could help her.
The case most frequently cited at present by critics of aging interventions derives from
Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and relates to a sub-group of a society he encounters
(the Luggnaggians), who are called the Struldbrugs. Just like the Sybil and Tithonus (on
whose archetypes they were clearly modelled) these Struldbrugs are immortal in that they
can never die, but nor are they immune from aging. In his paper critiquing what he terms
the “posthumanist” movement which espouses efforts to mitigate aging as an underlying
process, Stephen Post makes extensive reference to Swift’s allegory:
But Swift was, of course, mocking the Baconian hubris of embodied life
immortal. In fact, the Immortals, lacking the wisdom that comes from accepting
aging and death, are “peevish, covetous, morose, vain, talkative,” and the like (p.
214). They are altogether superficial and lacking in wisdom or insight. As they
age, they become increasingly demented: “The least miserable among them
appear to be those who turn to dotage, and entirely lose their memories” (p.215).
By age 90, all “forget the common appellation of things, and the names of
persons, even of those who are their nearest friends and relations” (p.215).
Suffering with what we would now call progressive dementia, they are “despised
                                                 
55 As coined by Prof. Roy Walford. See e.g. Coles S. “Life extension for the 21st Century”. Available at:
http://www.grg.org/resources/walford.html [Accessed January 2008]
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and hated by all sorts of people; when one of them is born, it is reckoned
ominous” (p.216). Moreover, “They were the most mortifying sight I even [sic.]
beheld, and the women even more horrible than the men. Besides the usual
deformities in extreme old age, they acquired an additional ghastliness in
proportion to their number of years, which is not to be described.”(p.216). The
king of the Luggnaggians wished Gulliver to bring a couple of these creatures
back to his own country, “to arm our people against the fear of death” (p. 216)56
In this passage, Post presumably unwittingly reveals all that is most wrong and frankly
ridiculous with the use of such allegories in attempts to undermine the wisdom of any
project of aging intervention. The first and most egregious problem for the attempted
analogy between this fantasy-allegory and real aging interventions in the real world, is
that such allegories rely upon a false dichotomy, which can in fact only exist in the realm
of fantasy or mythology, while ignoring the true dichotomies which exist between such
mythic tales and situations in the real, physical universe, and between chronological and
biological aging. The false dichotomy holds that biological aging can in some sense be
separated from the longevity of a biological organism. But this is simply magical thinking
and is absurd. Its mythic and fantastic origin and context (used illegitimately in the
context of an ostensibly serious attempt to evaluate the merits of scientific aging
research!) betrays the true pedigree of such types of thought. A moment’s reflection on
whether it is in fact possible continuously and indefinitely to biologically age and thereby
increase in infirmity and decrepitude, and at the same time to continue to live more or
less forever as a biological organism will reveal that this argument relies upon the notion
that biological life and its continuance, per se, can be separated definitively from its
biological context! And yet the life that these flawed accounts attempt to speak of is
clearly and explicitly biological, not spiritual or supernatural in any way. Such stories are,
quite simply irrelevant to questions relating to a real world biological phenomenon such
as aging, and use of them in such a context wrongly conflates this strict dichotomy while
respecting the false one. Such usage may, however, reveal a few things about the
reasoning and motivations of the critics of aging intervention.
                                                 
56 Post SG. 2004. “Decelerated Aging: Should I Drink from a Fountain of Youth?” In: The Fountain of
Youth. Post SG, Binstock RH. (eds.), Oxford University Press. p. 87.
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Aside from this, frankly fatal, flaw in reasoning, a reading of the above quoted passage
reveals a kind of bogeyman scarecrowing going on in such discourse.57 The old and
geriatric infirm are demonised and ridiculed. Aging, especially at the extreme, is seen as
a kind of palliative to death, since it is so horrible it will make us think that death is a
boon, rather than sufferance of the ghastly slings and arrows of biological persistence in
its face. This kind of reasoning is evident elsewhere in the literature arguing against aging
intervention, but it is quite desperately muddled. To begin with, the modern users of these
sorts of bogeyman images almost in the same breath attempt to convince us that aging is
in fact, both wholesome and “natural” and/or is divinely ordained, and so to be desired58
in some way. Of course they have to do so, if they are to maintain what is their
fundamental line: that aging in the presently existing biological trajectory is a state of
being which is somehow morally prime and good, such that we should not seek to
intervene in its progress.
This self-contradiction reveals a further critical flaw in such kinds of argument. After all,
if one turns ones attention to the actual project of aging intervention, which is these
arguments’ (to dignify them!) intended target, one is forced immediately to recognise the
absurdity of an attempted critique of aging intervention, which uses as its primary
motivating (and largely emotional) argument the proposition that the biological
symptoms of aging are undesirable!  Clearly interventionists would simply agree that
they are undesirable, which is a principle motivating factor, after all, for intervention in
the first place.
Further, the fairly common idea that the unpleasant symptoms of biological aging are to
be regarded as being beneficial for the very fact that they are unpleasant, and so gradually
persuade us that death is not so bad after all, is self-evidently absurd.
                                                 
57 This ageism is quite apparent in many biomedical approaches to the aged, even in quite ordinary medical
practice. See, e.g. Perls TT. Silver MH. 1999. Living to 100: Lessons in living to your maximum potential
at any age. Basic Books. New York, NY. pp. 4-9
58 e.g. Kass 2003 Op. Cit. note 24 ;  McCue 1995 and Callahan 2000, Op. Cit. note 1.
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I will return to an examination of this theme in greater detail in the final subsections of
this thesis.
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1.8 What then of the “Natural”?
It may at this point be objected that my definition of the natural is so wide as to be
essentially undefined, and therefore empty. If it is argued that simply everything is
natural, it may be objected that the term is effectively redundant, since it does not pick
out any category or subset of the whole of ontology. Should we, then, do away with the
term altogether? This is a conclusion which has been argued for, recently particularly by
Steven Vogel.59 I have some sympathies with his positions on this, which essentially are
presented as a dichotomy, in which all that is natural is either:
D1: Nature is only that which is not supernatural
In which case it is everything we may ever have access to within the universe, or:
D2: Nature is that set of things with which we have not yet interfered.
Essentially, I accept the former definition, and reject the latter. In accepting the former
definition, I assert that there is no intelligible distinction between humans and the natural.
As has been stated, humans, human agency, and all its products are wholly natural. This
of course entails that I reject the latter, but it will be helpful to clarify the grounds for
such a rejection a little further.
The primary reason for rejection of the latter is that I can see no warrant whatever to
stipulate that human action is generative of non-nature, or that either the artificial or the
more generally anthropogenic is not natural. For this to be the case, human action and
therefore humans themselves would, in some sense, have to either originate from, or else
somehow in whole or part have entered or stepped into a category which is partially or
wholly beyond the scope of the natural. But humans are wholly naturally constituted. Our
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physical ontology, which according to naturalists and indeed essentially all aside from
thoroughgoing dualists, is our whole ontology, is explicitly within the natural frame, and
even the most vaunted aspects of our psychology, such as our conscious rational capacity
and most pointedly our intentionality by which all artefacts are ultimately picked out,
would appear to arise wholly from within the causal economy of the natural realm. 60 To
postulate otherwise is both to deny, for example, that animals are capable of conscious
mental activity (or perhaps worse, to suggest that such animals as do possess this are
themselves unnatural!), and also to suggest a startling metaphysical power on the part of
human agents: the capacity to shatter the ontological status of the natural itself! For to be
able to generate unnatural things, and to harm the category of nature itself, to de-
naturalise components of nature, and advance the bounded area of the non-natural, within
which nonetheless all remains entirely fundamentally composed of molecules, atoms,
subatomic particles, and energy, is to presume a spectacular supernatural power, whose
origin is entirely obscure, whose effect undetectable in any conceivable scientific manner
(in that it produces no new material, has no mass, possesses no quantifiable energetic
quality whatever) at all, and the warrant for whose existence as a concept at all appears to
be traceable to nothing so much as a hubristic hope that we are somehow separate from
the biological continuum, in a manner more profound than that which separates rabbits
from flatworms and bacteria. Effectively, such an assertion would amount to the idea that
we are possessed of supernatural powers, and also that we, ourselves, are not natural, and
in effect can have no truck with nature, since all our actions, and everything we affect
becomes, by this Midas-like supernatural power, unnatural. We would exist as a kind of
inexplicable lacuna, an expanding pool of active, intelligent anti-nature. But yet at the
same time, of course, it is expected by proponents of the view that we generate
unnaturalness, that we accept that all of our actual physical components both arise within
the natural realm, and are composed of none other than the same energy in very much the
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reality, they will nonetheless turn out not only to depend upon or supervene upon the physical world, but
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rather as pure effect, sort of causal monopoles. I suspect, however, that this will turn out not to be true.
38
same forms, at least at the atomic level and below, as has always been the case, and is
unequivocally natural in both origin and constitution! If it is thought otherwise we may
ask: are, then, our very atoms, forged billions of years ago from indestructible energy61 in
red supergiant stars, unnatural? Do they remain so after we die? What an absurd idea! No
warrant for either the origin or the existence of such a godlike power or ontology in the
case of human persons can, or will be found, nor is there any warrant to postulate one,
beyond the illegitimate one just stated. It seems, in particular, to depend upon the
religious notion of creation without evolution. For what can supply the sudden radical
discontinuity by which the deep ontology of nature itself is compromised by a slightly
more cognisant primate? If we are indeed derived from a long line of gradually changing,
and entirely natural, animals, what supplies the radical discontinuity? It is no good, for
the purposes of asserting this particular distinction at any rate, to attempt to separate
humans as biological animals from humans as agents, since such a distinction would
assert that a wholly “natural” biological organism can act “unnaturally”. The claims of
those who assert that we may not interfere in aging, or in the frame of human biology on
the grounds that these are “natural”, after all, rest precisely on the ground that we are
indeed naturally constituted! The inescapable self-contradiction becomes crystal clear
when the argument is applied to the manipulation of alteration human genome or other
such fundaments of human biology.  For to argue that such an intervention was unnatural,
it must be held that the genome is itself natural, but what, other than most particularly the
genome (to hold ceteris paribus the other equally natural biological substrates, such as
the phospholipid line of generation, to which the conjecture applies equally in any case)
differentiates us from, say, other primates, or any other animal? Only a picture in which
we were formed originally from a wholly other cloth such as is found in the supernatural
tale of the Garden of Eden (where the “image” of God supplies the distinction) could
intelligibly ground even the beginnings of such an ontological claim. I of course reject
such a claim entirely. Evolution is a correct picture of the biogenesis of species. The
Garden of Eden, if extant once, must be extant still, since it contained, according to the
Bible, the “tree of life” from which we are guarded and prevented from entry by the
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Cherubim with the flaming swords.62 If this is not metaphorical, then it is clear that it
does not exist, else we either must be able to visit it or at least its gates, or detect it, or
consider that it may be locatable in current spacetime, or else we must be expected to
believe that the Divine “tree of life” is, in fact, dead, and has been swept away by
geology. But if metaphorical, then it cannot provide a guide to the actual course of events
in the actual world, as regards our origins and ontology. The simplest answer is that the
story is just that- a fable, alongside many other such, and just as I find no warrant to
believe in Audumla the great cow who, in the Viking creation myth, licked the first man
and first woman from the primordial ice, I find no warrant to accept such an origin myth,
and plenty of warrant to consider it untrue.
The second reason I offer for the rejection of D2 is that, if appealed to as a primary
definition, it essentially suggests that the very definition of the natural rests solely upon
the fact of human interference in a world. In this case, it would appear that in a possible
world wherein humans never arose, and never had the possibility (within that world) of
arising, there would be no warrant to consider such a world “natural” at all. Human
interference as the defining condition of the natural itself, however, appears to throw out
much of the sense of term, as better expressed by D1. When we consider, for example,
that the meteoritic impact which ended the Cretaceous epoch was definable as a “natural”
event, and that the meteorite itself was “natural”, we do not mean by this that the
meteorite had not yet been interfered with or affected by human artifice. Rather, we
simply mean that it was “out there” in “nature”, or simply that it was existent within
spacetime.
A third reason was given by Mill in his essay “On Nature”,63 which runs essentially that
the idea that one may act “against Nature” and that doing so constitutes a moral crime, or
creates moral disvalue, is repugnant and also may well be incoherent. It is repugnant
because for this to be true, and at the same time for it to be true that human action is what
itself generates unnaturalness, means that if nature is held to be morally prime, humans
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are essentially incapable of acting for the good. It is incoherent, since it is argued, at least
within the liberal tradition of metaethics, that ethics to a large extent, and perhaps
entirely, is in fact generated by human reason, and for and within human cultural activity.
I would, however, for reasons explained in Section 2 below, not go quite that far.
However, the preceding reasons are more than enough to reject in any case.
Returning to Vogel, he asserts that in respect of D1, everything whatever is natural, and
therefore the “natural” comprises a useless category, since it picks out nothing short of
everything entirely. The definition collapses into more commonly used terms such as
“everything”, or “universal”, and the like. In respect of D2, Vogel asserts that if the
“natural” is inaccessible to us except through our own concepts, and our own concepts
are considered to be “unnatural” or the predicators of unnaturalness, then the natural is
essentially inaccessible to us. In both cases, he argues, the concept of nature is essentially
useless to us, and should be abandoned.
These arguments have been interestingly critiqued by Robin Attfield.64 Attfield
specifically critiques Vogel’s assessment of the situation with regard to D2, stating that
Vogel “proves too much” by his argument, in that, if correct, it would mean for example
that it would no longer be comprehensible to consider that we spoke of anything
coherent, when speaking, for example, of a deity who had a transitive relation to the
Universe. Such talk would essentially be meaningless, since only that which is wholly
within human concept has any reality qua ourselves at all. So it is meaningless even to
conjecture whether such a deity might possibly exist, and supposing one such did, it
would remain meaningless to discuss such an entity, or its relation to us. In this way,
such an approach denies us significant realms of discourse concerning something which,
in his words is “…something we ought to be able to suppose to be at least conceivable…”
I agree with Attfield here, and while I still reject the definition for the reasons given
above, I am unconvinced by Vogel’s approach on D2. Attfield goes on to outline a third
important sense of the word nature:
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In this third sense, “nature” is used of the nature of an organism or creature (that
is, its inherited or evolutionary make-up, or more generally what makes anything
to be the thing that it is or of the sort to which it belongs). … For each kind of
living being, whether cat or cactus, beaver or barnacle, it makes sense to speak of
its nature, and, as I shall be arguing, it is highly important that this possibility is
open to us. … It is now time to present some reasons why the concept of nature in
the third sense is indispensable. My first reason is that the good and equally the
harm of a living organism depend on its nature. If we do not know the nature of
an organism, we could not tell what constituted its good or its harm.  This is not
just to say that the concepts of good and harm are species-specific; it is to say
(unsurprisingly enough) that grasping the good or harm of a creature involves
some grasp of its inherited constitution or make-up. If so, and if ecological ethics
is partly concerned with promoting the good of species, and preventing their
being harmed, then this discipline must also engage with the concept of a
creature’s nature, whether or not this is understood, in Aristotelian fashion, in
terms of the creature’s capacities and potentials. Equally, insofar as veterinary
ethics is concerned with the good and harm of individual animals, it too must
engage with this concept. For this conceptual connection applies to domesticated
species as well as to wild ones. Problems certainly arise for genetically modified
species, since we are less clear what their nature is; yet their derivation from
genetically unmodified species makes it likely that to a considerable degree they
too inherit a nature, just as … cultured kinds inherit much of the nature of their
pre-domesticated kin. And by parity with veterinary ethics, it is difficult to
persuade oneself or others that medical ethics, insofar as it is concerned with the
good and harm of individual human beings, can avoid being concerned with the
nature of human beings in a corresponding sense.65
Let us attempt to formalise such a definition of nature, which we may call the “nature as
essence or character” concept:
D3: Nature is that which is essential to the identity of a thing, qua itself and in
respect of its kind, such that by knowing this “nature”, it may be said that
we know the essential features of a thing and/or its kind, or else we
become aware of the particular distinguishing character of a being’s
processes and may identify it as being separate or distinct from other
things or beings/processes, or classes of things or beings/processes.
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Essentially, I agree with Prof. Attfield that “nature” in this third sense has a legitimate
meaning, and a legitimate place in our lexicon and conceptual landscape. It is indeed an
indispensable functional term. Later, in Section Two, I will explore the divergence
between the substantialist “essence” account of nature D3 and the processualist
“character” account (distinguished above by the “or else”), dismissing the former, and
accepting the latter, but this distinction need not concern us at this point. Importantly
here, there is nothing in this general definition that argues in any way for the human-
exclusivist, and divided definition of “nature”, D2. In accepting this definition, we in no
way whatever accept that, for example, although humans may have certain characteristics
which may perhaps distinguish them from other animals, such as the capacity for
complex reason and complex, language-constructed culture, these distinctions in no way
of themselves imply that humans are not natural in the sense D2. That humans have such
a particular or distinct “nature”, rather, surely implies that they participate fully in
legitimate talk of naturedness as subcategories of a universal Nature. Following Spinoza,
we might say that the natures of each mode are individual, and separate each from other
modes and from other classes of modes, but that all modes, entire, are formed from, and
approximate towards, the total category of Substance.66 Attfield goes on to attempt some
bolstering of D2 from D3:
But if the third sense of “nature” proves indispensable, the second, that of the
sphere unaffected or relatively unaffected by human action is likely to be valuable
too. How can we even understand the flourishing of wild creatures without the
concept of their natural environment? Is not understanding of the flourishing of
domesticated creatures partly dependent on grasp of both the behaviours and the
natural environment of their undomesticated counterparts? 67
But it seems clear to me that the bolstering attempt fails. For what, in relation to D3,
supplies the necessity of the lack of human intervention or affect? It may well be that
some aspects of that specifically human-unaffected sphere may be considered valuable
                                                 
66 Garrett D. 2002. “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument.” In Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Koistinen O. (ed.)
Oxford University Press. pp. 129-134.
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qua some of those wild animals, such that we should refrain from interfering with them,
but this does not justify some kind of deep, metaphysical disjunction. It is surely the
maintenance of the circumstances that supply the flourishing for certain particular natures
that is important, the alteration of which is inimical to them, whatever the origin of such
alteration. To assert that a non-human alteration of such circumstances is just fine, qua
the flourishing of the animal as picked out by its nature, even though it destroys that
flourishing, simply because it is a non-human event is patently absurd. To state that this
is impossible is likewise absurd. Such an idea would require, for example, the further
notion of some kind of ordained state of grace in nature, which supplies each species with
the ideal conditions for its “flourishing” at all times, in a manner that any alteration of the
circumstance would be inimical to such flourishing. But this is a simply false picture of
reality. Above 99% of all species, which have existed are extinct, and a very high
proportion of those became utterly extinct, rather than simply evolving into other species.
From the oxygen holocaust, through the Permian extinction, to the K-T extinction 65
million years ago, through innumerable other “natural” catastrophes which indubitably
had nothing whatever to do with human action, trillions of trillions of living organisms
have had their flourishing destroyed by changes in circumstance which did not accord
with their “nature”.68 Many of these, of course, were not brute forces of the non-living
world, but were predicated by the activities of (others of) the creatures themselves.
Countless times have species been rendered extinct by over-predation, disease, or out-
competition by other living organisms. Once again, there is not now, and never was any
“Garden of Eden”, and I strongly suspect that the core of support for D2 has historically
derived from just such an idea: that there was at some point a set of animals and plants
which was the “right” one, ordained by God/Nature, within which all relationships are to
be considered sanctified and “good” in some manner, such that disarrangement of them is
both functionally and morally wrong. This idea is straightforwardly false, and deserves to
be consigned to the dustbin of history. But it is persistent, and has certainly leaked into
some features of the environmentalist movement. The concept, for example, of biological
nature as constituting a “delicate web” in which each animal and plant “plays a vital role”
may have some elements of truth, but also fosters such an image of a static natural ideal,
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the disturbance of which is somehow “unnatural”, as though it were not perfectly
“natural” for the web both to be in a constant state of flux, but also one in which there are
often violent turbulences, which annihilate whole swathes of such “players of vital roles”.
The overall impression one is left with is that the “web”, at its fundament, is neither
delicate, nor particularly attached to any one species or group of organisms. Nature either
biological or non, is not static and brittle, but rather is elastic, robust, and constantly in
flux.
Such misguided thinking is evident in certain modern “environmental” campaigns, driven
by an impression that all human intervention is necessarily wrong, and must be put
“right” somehow, such as the one to re-introduce the beaver to Scotland.69 It is true that
beavers once inhabited Scotland, but it is of course also true that they did not always
inhabit Scotland prior to human intervention. A mere 12,000 years ago there were no
beavers whatever in the territorial boundaries of modern Scotland, as the whole of this
area was under kilometres of ice. There were no trees for the beavers to live upon. The
beavers migrated into the territory as the ice receded, and trees gradually repopulated the
landscape. Presently, there are fewer trees in the Scottish landscape than anywhere else in
Europe, and (essentially forcible) reintroduction of a species which quite literally
“beavers away” at felling them from dawn to dusk most of the year around may therefore
not contribute to the health of the present ecosystem. There are reasons to think it might,
however, and I don’t particularly consider that they should not be reintroduced. The point
is just that the basis of this should not be that they were some “native” species, part of a
set of eternally “native” species which was part of Scottish “nature” (any more than the
aurochs, bear, or brachiosaur!), and excludes “invasive” species on that basis, since
clearly the beaver is just such a species, as were all species at one time, or another in
every landscape. Are urban foxes70 invasive in a man-made landscape? The question is
more or less empty, and the reason for this is that all environments and ecosystems are
spontaneously self-organised, and the urban foxes are no more natural, or unnatural than
the buildings, or the wild parakeets which have been seen in southern England since the
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19th Century, and are presently growing rapidly in numbers.71 Are they all to be
condemned and shot? Then what of all the thousands of introduced plant species which
have rather unquestionably enriched (for example) the British landscape? The picture is
far more complex than most assume, and many species that are likely to be taken for
granted as “native” are actually recent introductions.72 Or else one might consider the
Keiko and Knut incidents. In the former a whale, star of the “Free Willy” film series,
having lived in captivity for decades since infancy and which had grown fully
accustomed to the sheltered life in a water-park was flown out to the Norwegian Sea by a
well-funded public campaign to “free Keiko”. The whale was apparently very distressed
by this experience, and its repeated attempts to reconnect with people were frustrated by
the campaigners:
Efforts to return Keiko to his native wild habitat in Atlantic waters off Iceland
have met with triumphs and setbacks. Loosely supervised, Keiko lives just off the
west coast of Norway. Charles Vinick, director of the Keiko reintroduction
project in Iceland, [talked] about the ordeals involved in the first attempt to
release a whale raised in captivity. Clamor for Keiko’s liberation came after the
1993 movie “Free Willy” galvanized children around the country. … Although he
swam more than 1,000 miles away from Iceland, Keiko reappeared in Norway a
month later and was spotted swimming with children and accepting fish from
humans. Iceland and Norway have since passed legislation banning human
interaction with Keiko. But Vinick  says it may be impossible to completely free
the whale. "Keiko is an international celebrity," Vinick said.73
It was eventually lured (using food as well as this same clear behaviour of desiring
human contact) to an uninhabited Fjord and where, further deprived, it promptly died.
The activists then hauled it out of the water and buried it in a field, with ceremony. One
of Keiko’s “caretakers”, present at the ceremony, was quoted as saying that the whale
was “free now, and in the wild”, when in fact it was dead, and in the land of Norway.74 In
the case of Knut, “environmental activists” attempted to force zoo officials to allow an
                                                 
71 See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/3869815.stm [Accessed January 2008]
72 Preston CD. et al. 2002. The Changing Flora of the UK. London: DEFRA Available at:
http://www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-countryside/ewd/flora/changing-flora.pdf [Accessed January 2008]
73 Quoted from Nadin E. Monterey Herald. Available at:
http://web.gps.caltech.edu/~enadin/Writing/MCH_FreeWilly.pdf [Accessed January 2008]
74 2003 news story “Keiko Buried in Secret Ceremony”:
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/TECH/science/12/15/keiko.buried.ap/index.html [Accessed January 2008]
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orphaned polar bear cub, born in a zoo, to starve to death, or else to kill it by lethal
injection, simply because it was born in a zoo, and it would be more “natural” to allow
this to happen, since an abandoned cub in the wild would surely die. At the time of
writing Knut is alive, apparently in good health and enjoying its food, in the zoo. Would
allowing the animal to starve to death or be killed by lethal injection (as happened to a
sloth in similar circumstances in Leipzig Zoo the previous year)75 have better respected
its “nature”? These latter cases are rather disgusting examples of the is/ought fallacy.
Apart from this, what was going in each of these cases was a total inability (or
unwillingness) to comprehend the possibility that what is “natural” to an intelligent
animal has significantly to do with what that animal actually experiences, even if what
that animal experiences is, in fact, a human-made or “artificial” environment. This
inability derives exactly from a misguided acceptance of D2, which has nothing whatever
to do with D3. Urban foxes, like urban pigeons, are not living in an “unnatural” habitat.
They are living in the natural habitat of the city, where their flourishing depends upon
circumstances which are patently “artificial” and man-made. Recently, the once seriously
endangered Peregrine falcon has been making strong adaptive inroads into this “new”
habitat, and appears to be flourishing in urban centres, which appear very much “fit for
purpose”.76 Surely denying that this is quite legitimately the case in accordance with their
“natures” is denying that they have the capacity to adapt quite happily to the environment
in which they patently do flourish, merely on the basis of its falsely being supposed “not-
natural”. Such eurytopic species (though the peregrine is perhaps closer to being a
stenotope than are its urban prey, which perhaps partly explains its rather slower
adaptation to this environment), of course, do do better than extreme stenotopes77 when it
comes to adaptation, by definition. But being a eurytope as opposed to a stenotope does
not make a species less “natural”. Consider the possibility of human intervention to
preserve existing ecosystems. One may easily light upon examples, such as the human
                                                 
75 See news story about Knut as well as the sloth available at :
http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/0,1518,472937,00.html [Accessed January 2008]
76 e.g. see article in the Boston Glove Available at:
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2004/06/27/city_birds_learn_to_fly/ [Accessed January 2008]
77 A eurytopic species is one which which has the capacity rapidly to adapt to changing environmental
circumstances- foxes, crows, pigeons, seagulls, squirrels, racoons are classic examples. A stenotopic
species is one which lacks this behavioural adaptation capacity- swordbill hummingbirds, panda bears and
social insects which depend upon relationships with particular plant species are examples of this category.
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suppression, by artificial means, of “invasive” species, which outcompete the “native”
species. Of course these latter terms themselves reference the very “essentialist”
conception of ecosystems that I have just denied; however, qua the prior inhabitant
species, it is clearly the case that new species which out-compete them are inimical to
their flourishing given their particular natures. Is such intervention to be considered
contrary to the flourishing of those existing populations in those ecosystems, qua their
nature? Patently not.
On a somewhat different tack, noting that the word, “nature” is used for all three senses,
not just in English, but in many languages, Attfield suggests that such a philological fact,
perhaps through an etymology he does not supply, indicates that there are some necessary
connections between them.78 But surely this is an example of the fallacies of
equivocation, argumentum ad populum, as well as the genetic fallacy.  That earth, wind,
water and fire were long considered the four “elements” led to the common expression
relating to the weather: “exposure to the elements”. The use of the word element in this
context, and in the context of the periodic table, shows only a broad strictly historical
conceptual connection, and says nothing whatever about the nature of reality. What were
referred to as the “elements” now roughly correspond to the phases of matter. That
“nature” was and is used to cover, in many languages, the concepts implied by D1-D3 is
a trivial truth relating to historical usage, and the nexus of concept with which they all
deal. However, it says nothing at all about the truth of this alleged connection through all
three cases.
For the above reasons, I deny that D3 lends any credible support to D2. What then of D1?
Are we to go with Vogel on this, and consider that on such a definition “nature” as a
concept is redundant, since it in fact contains all that there is, as there can be no
supernatural? I suggest not. In this, I agree with Attfield’s insight in that it is at least
conceptually necessary that there should be a defining condition of the totality of what
there is, in this “natural” universe. One might, indeed, a la Attfield, bolster D1 from D3,
by suggesting that, accepting D3 as indispensable, it remains logically open, and indeed
                                                 
78 Attfield Op. Cit. note 64 pp. 108-9
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compelling, to ask of this universe: “what is its nature?” The fact that the question has
logical ground upon which to stand appears to demonstrate that a definition of the natural
as the totality of the causal interactions of this universe is not a redundant definition. In
this way, it is possible to argue from D3 to D1, Once again, one may appeal to
Spinozistic definitions for clarification, and state that, when asking of each particular
thing: “what is its nature?”, one is asking “what is the nature of each mode” of the
ultimate Substance, Nature, whose nature is comprised of that of all of its modes and
attributes combined. If it is objected that Spinoza himself rejected the possibility that
there was more than one “Substance”79, it should be noted that Spinoza’s argument relies
on the concept of the Substance’s singular “nature”, which itself is described as being
“[with]in nature” and that Spinoza used the term “Nature” “Substance” and “God”
essentially interchangeably. It is clear from this that, as Attfield points out, for these
arguments to work in the first place, one must have access to a definitional category of
“supernature” or “unnature”. However nothing whatever may be inferred from this as to
the requirement that such a category itself is content-full, or whether we may ever have
knowledge in any way of this, or even whether such concepts as knowledge, and logical
structure, have relevance to that which is in this category, should it in fact exist, or obtain
in some way. All that is necessary is that we shall have logical freedom to refer to it, and
in this way its use is justified, for the totality of that to which we have access, even if that
is, indeed, all.
                                                 
79 Spinoza Ethics Part I; Propositions 13-16
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1.9 Substance versus process in the metaphysics of nature
Since one of the primary theses of this work will turn on the definition of persons as
processes, denying any substantial element whatever in the constitution of persons, some
notes as to the metaphysics of substance versus process are necessary and germane. The
question of substance versus process is one of the very oldest in philosophy. One of the
great dichotomies of schools of thought in western philosophy, it has its origins in the
teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers Parmenides, and Heraclitus. These two
represented the first champions of these radically opposing positions in the discourse
concerning universal ontology. We will examine them in reverse chronological order,
Parmenides, whose work was at least in part a response to Heraclitus’ first, for the sake of
argumentative structure.
Before embarking upon a brief examination of the history of the substance/process
dialectic (itself, of course, a process!), it will be useful to sketch the meanings of these
terms in philosophy. First, a substance in philosophy is an ontological category which
refers to a solid, unchanging, unitary extant- one might be tempted to say a “thing”
although “things” may also, as we shall see, be considered to be processual, and not
substantial. The most important feature of a substance in this mode is that it should
persist through time, in a changeless fashion. It is not that substances may not be the
predicators of change, or be the recipients of the same (although in the extremist
Parmenidean sense, this is arguably so), but it is argued that while there may be changes
that substances inflict, by impact or other influence, and while some of their qualities,
such as the “secondary qualities” spoken of by Locke, such as colour and flavour, they
are possessed of “primary qualities” that are intrinsic and in some sense absolute, so
changeless through time. A change in one of these primary qualities would amount to a
change in the substance itself. Since the ontology of substances depends upon the concept
of them having a changeless and unitary nature, a change in the primary quality of a
substance would represent a change of substance, and therefore the destruction of one,
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and perhaps the creation of another such substance. To accept that a substance may
change in all its qualities, or even in some of its primary qualities, and yet remain
reidentifiable as one, particular substance, is to accept that substances themselves can
undergo process, or change, and indeed is to abandon the concept of substances as such,
in favour of reidentifiable processes. A process, on the other hand, is a much more fluid
concept, literally. Process is an ontological category which refers to a succession of
events or changes, which may flow more or less rapidly, and may therefore have periods
of greater or lesser stability, but it is one in which the basic nature is change or flux.
Where a substance must have some unchanging quality or qualities for its ontological
category, a process equally must have some changing quality or qualities, else it is of
course, a substance. In this way the identity of substance depends upon changelessness,
and the identity of process depends upon change. Further, a substance must in effect be
unitary across time, and in a sense, being changeless, qua itself alone may be considered
importantly time-unaffected or even timeless.80 Any fission in a substance represents
destruction of the original substance, and creation of two or more “new” substances. The
same is not necessarily true of processes. It is conceivable that a process may divide into
two or more streams, and yet reunite into one, as a river may do. Also the identity of a
process is significantly more pliable and possibly agent-relative than is the identity of a
substance. The “effects” of global warming, for example, may be seen in the shrinking of
icebergs, but yet the shrinking of icebergs is clearly a part of the process of global
warming itself. The dying process of a polar bear due to hunger may be seen to be a
discrete process, or it may be viewed as a part of a wider process.81
Parmenides considered that the world was essentially substantial. There was only
substance, and no process whatever, for process requires change, and change, for
Parmenides, appears to mandate that “new” properties or things come into being, which
                                                 
80 The concept of substance usually allows for strictly relative changes, so, changes in position, which are
obviously not in any way “timeless”. It is not an empty question whether changes in position of a purported
substance, change the substance itself, and therefore make it a process. But we will not examine these here.
81 This quantitative promiscuity of identity is certainly something of a difficulty for process views, and one
which has been fixed upon by modern philosophers such as Strawson and Van Inwagen both to critique
categories of substance, and process, as shall be discussed further below. The special category of the
identity of persons defined as processes shall be a significant theme in Section Three below.
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he accounted to be impossible. For Parmenides all process was simply an illusion, a
mistaken perception of process- a misinterpretation of universal ontology. Taken at its
most radical, this doctrine can be stated as proposing that there is only one thing, and that
this thing, this ultimate substance, does not change. This conclusion follows from the idea
that in order to eradicate the concept of process altogether, one also must eradicate
change, for all change is essentially processual in nature. The stipulation that there was
only one thing, one ultimate substance appears less obvious, but may follow from a
concern that the acceptance that there are many single substances, which are not solitary
and may themselves both interact, or be aggregates, or cluster to form other aggregates,
allows for, and to some extent anticipates process. For to hold that there are many
unchanging things, whose arrangement shifts, allows process. But to state that there are
many unchanging things, whose arrangement is utterly static, appears to add the concept
of “many” in an unwarranted fashion, for if they are utterly static, what warrants the
ascription of “many” as opposed to “one”, since part of the definition of a substance
appears to be that it does not admit of internal change. Even a division, in a sense, is
change, since it involves conceptual movement across aspects of universal ontology. A
single, unchanging matrix of “things” may thus be accounted to be one singular thing.
Such a conclusion offers ontological, descriptive and explanatory economy, so satisfying
a pre-Occam Occam’s razor, and appears the best strategy in any case for eradicating the
ontology of change or flux, and therefore process. To the modern mind, and to a
“commonsense” view of the world, so often vaunted in philosophy, such a conclusion
might seem self-evidently absurd. But it is not without some modern succour. After all,
the deeper physics inquires into the ontology of “that which is”, the more it appears that,
after all, the ultimate substrate of the universe, the final universal “stuff” of which all is
composed, may indeed be unitary and unified- “strings” in string theory, composing a
unified “brane” or “branes”, or else simply “energy”. Further, there are some approaches
to the recognition of the time-symmetry of physics equations82, and the problem of the
ontology of time, which “bite the bullet” and state that time is either wholly illusory, or
else is entirely an aspect of, and subsumed within, spatial ontology in a wholly
                                                 
82  With the putative counterexamples, radiation/absorption, and entropy, or the second law of
thermodynamics, being explicable in terms of simply the shape of the block universe itself, or else, as with
Huw Price’s conception, being agent-relative illusions. For reference, see subsequent note.
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deterministic universe. The outcome of such conclusions is traditionally called a “block
universe”, wherein the past, present, and future are all wholly extant, and the “passage of
time” is simply an illusion. One modern exponent of a view like this is the Australian
philosopher Huw Price83, who holds that the illusion is an artefact of the kind of being
which constitutes what we call “agents”. Such a universe is not merely deterministic, but
utterly and eternally, or atemporally determined, and I would argue has some claim to the
credential of vindicating the extreme Parmenidean view, though this may perhaps not be
recognised by its main exponents.
I am personally sceptical of such an extreme position, and, as we shall see, of the whole
Parmenidean conception, because it seems hopelessly “ad hoc” and stipulative to simply
throw inexplicable, awkward, or disdained phenomena into the box of “illusion”. Further,
such an ascription simply begs the question: if time, along with all flux and change at all
are simply “illusions”, then what, we may ask, motivates the illusion itself? The attempt
to get around the problem here simply shifts it, and opens it again at another juncture. Far
easier, simpler, and indeed more intuitive and commonsensical, simply to accept that
there are indeed changes, and flux of a kind, and seek to explain or account for them on
their own terms.
Philosophers in the wake of Parmenides, such as Democritus, attempted to respond to
Parmenides’ problematic challenge that change mandated that something comes from
nothing.  Abandoning the “hard” substantialist position which seeks to deny any flux
whatever, but hoping to maintain the ontological primacy and fundamentality of
substance over process, while allowing conceptual space for the latter, Democritus
devised the concept of atomism, wherein processes were real, but were ontologically
wholly dependent, to the extent that they were quasi-illusory, being only interactions of
substances. In this model, there were only atoms, or utterly changeless, indivisible, basic
ontological units, which were eternal, with a range of features such as “sharpness” or
“roughness” etc., whose interactions in an absolute void was all that there was of process.
                                                 
83 Price H. 2001. Time’s Arrow and Archimedes Point: New Directions for the Physics of Time. Oxford
University Press.
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The atomistic view gained some initial succour from the investigations of modern
science, there having been discovered the basic particles of elements, and what appeared
for a time to be basic particles overall, these putative fundamental particles being
deliberately named after the Democritan concept. But this connection was itself shattered
by the discovery of the compound nature of these atomic structures, and then more
egregiously so by the advent of quantum mechanics, with its recognition that the
Rutherfordian model of electrons and protons being akin to “hard” or thing-like,
substantial planetary systems was simply an incorrect picture of reality. The atoms turned
out to be more akin to wave-systems, and the description their subatomic states
abandoned thoroughgoing talk even of causal determinacy. The wave-function as
described by the Schrodinger equation, while determinate overall, has the curious feature
of “collapsing” (on measurement) in an indeterminate fashion, by which it appears that as
the wave-particles of the subatomic world attain their most substance-like form,
achieving a measurable and measured fixed and determinate value of one sort or another,
they appear to do so at the cost of sacrificing causal determinacy in the process of this
“collapse”, and thus appear to be very un-substance-like in their overall state- since in
their most deterministic (unmeasured or non-collapsed) phase (as described by the S-
equation) they appear not possessed of constant characteristics, being neither one static
“thing” nor another, but all possible states of a “thing” at once. Such capricious
behaviour, exhibiting a heterogeneous and unpredictable (except by broad statistical
means) nature, is far more comfortably described as process, than as substance. Even
these particles appear to be process-manifestations of a still more basic process-subject-
and-enabler, most often referred to simply as “energy”.84 In this way the most basic
ontology of the universe looks rather more akin to one of process, than it does of
substance. Taking our cue from such observations, we might perhaps invert Parmenides’
claim that it is impossible that something comes from change, or that things become, or
are in a state of becoming at all, and postulate that, without the flux of becoming, there is
and can be no-thing.
                                                 
84 Since by Einstein’s relativity, they can and do change from “matter” states to energy, and back again. But
importantly, the “energy” can re-crystallise into differing forms of matter.
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Which brings us nicely to the views of Heraclitus of Ephesus. Most simply put, these
were expressed in his famous formula that “Panta Rhei”- “everything flows” or “nothing
stands still”. For Heraclitus, the primary -indeed very nearly the sole- ontology of the
universe was one of process, change, flux. This led him to assert that the universe was
ultimately composed of a single ultimate or paradigm process, which he termed “fire”, of
which all other processes are manifestations or variations. Once again, such a radical
concept appears to offend both commonsense and prima facie intuition, as well as pre-
philosophic empirical evidence.
Let us begin with the concept of “fire” and work upwards. Firstly, Heraclitus did not
mean it literally. It was intended, almost certainly, as a metaphor for flux itself, fire in
reality being a paradigm process, simply a manifestation of obvious process within a
world of less obvious ones. Despite this, the idea of an underlying, or unifying basic
universal process is also implicit in Heraclitus’ use of the term. Some of the implications
of quantum mechanical and the very much less well-evidenced (perhaps irrevocably
unempirical) “string” theory appear to bear out this view of the most fundamental layer of
the universe being one of a boiling, quasi-indeterministic flux of wavelike interactions.85
There remains, however, a bias in physics towards a substantialist viewpoint, as is
apparent with the frequent nomenclature of the Standard Model of “subatomic” physics,
being “particle” physics, with a focus upon finding the “most fundamental particle” or set
thereof. But matter-antimatter particle reactions at the subatomic level, wherein
“elementary” particles are destroyed and converted to gamma rays, as well as the
frequent transformations between these supposed “fundamental” particles, which come
into being, decay, and often have extremely short lifespans (e.g. the Tau lepton has a
lifespan of 0.3 picoseconds)86 suggest that such a search may be missing the point. The
search for the Higgs’ boson will likely result in the discovery of further, smaller
“particles” at lower levels, etc. and even these will be many orders of magnitude above
the deeply mysterious, unimaginably small and energetic Planck scale.87 Further, while I
do not myself subscribe to this view, and many do not, those most inclined to a
                                                 
85 Greene B. Op. Cit. note 18.
86 Quigg C. Feb 2008. The Coming Revolutions in Particle Physics. Scientific American. pp. 38-45
87 Quigg C. ibid.
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substantialist particle physics are often those most accepting of the idea that we are
approaching knowledge of a total set of basic physical laws. Prominent among these laws
is perhaps the most universal law in physics, that of the conservation of energy: energy
may neither be created, nor destroyed. Instead, energy simply passes from one state or
phase to another. Some of these states or phases are instantiated in what we call
“particles” or “atoms” and the like, what I will call apparent substances. These are not
“true” substances, since they fail to be either changeless, or truly fundamental, and
exhibit internal flux. A formal defence of these latter claims would require a doctoral-
level dissertation in physics, and is obviously beyond the scope of the present focus of
this thesis, but suffice at this point to notice that there is no law of conservation of
particles or substances at any level. Lavoisier’s 1785 law of conservation of matter was
later abandoned in physics, precisely because Einstein’s relativity shows that matter and
energy are interchangeable. Particular forms of matter are not themselves eternal, and
may be converted into energy, and back again. This interchange is one of process. While
some may hope to find an ultimate particle that is truly fundamental, changeless, and
indivisible, this remains merely a hope, and one which crucially must be accounted to be
founded on nothing other than a philosophical prejudice. The law of conservation of
energy, meanwhile, is pervasive and established by every observation at every level of
the universe known. I consider this sufficient to establish, at least in principle, the
primacy and fundamentality of energy over particular substantial form, with the
exception, arguably, of the form of the totality of universal energy itself, which, by the
first law of thermodynamics, a corollary of the law of conservation of energy, can neither
be created nor destroyed, added to or subtracted from, and encompasses all possible
forms generated by the flux of aspects of this universal Substance. We may in this way
attempt to ground the Spinozist claim of singular Substance (being the total sum of
indestructible universal energy) and universal modal flux (of that energy), governed by
principles conceivable as “adequate ideas” or in physics terms “laws”, as well as
grounding the Heraclitan claim of flux and logos, with flux being represented as an ever-
changing fire, corresponding to what in modern terms is conceived as energy, whose
changes obey (or perhaps even constitute) certain changeless principles. There is, in this
way, a certain tension in process ontology, between the changeless and the changeful. But
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this need not amount to a contradiction, for what is change, unless measured against some
other thing which is changing less, or is changeless, and what promotes or drives change,
other than tension and instability of opposing principles or forces? And laws or forces are
not “substances” in any accepted conception of that term, but rather are derived from, and
can only be described in terms of the changes whose behaviour they mandate. In this
way, the Standard Model of physics is actually, perhaps surprisingly, more Heraclitan
than it is Parmenidean, merely appearing Parmenidean because of conventions of
language, arising from a heritage of philosophical bias towards substance-concepts.
I will not enter into or attempt a complex analysis of Heraclitan metaphysics, even if such
were possible (very little of his actual writing remains), other than to say that he
considered that all was created by the dialectical process of opposing forces, with each
apparent thing or body or situation necessarily giving way to others, from the agon or
strife of opposites (presumably not diametric, balanced opposites, however, else there
would be no process!). Further, he answered the logical criticism that his system was self-
defeating, since if all was change even the principle that all was change would itself
change, by postulating a unitary predicator of all change, which appears to have been
either or both the principles of change themselves, or else the totality of the universe.
Certainly he stated that the universe itself was permanent, and unitary:
"This universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any god or man,
but it always has been, is, and will be an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular
measures and going out by regular measures"88
Spinoza, many centuries later, appears to have accepted some version of this by stating
that there was only one ultimate Substance, of which all else were simply modes, existing
through attributes of the one Substance and created by the principles or potentials
inherent in it, coming into being, and passing away. In this way, all apparent “things” in
the universe, including solid inanimate objects, as well as living things and persons are in
some sense, processes of the one substance. It is clear that he was not proposing any sort
of Parmenidean block or static universe, since he speaks of the developmental potential
                                                 
88 Heraclitus. In: Wimbush VL. Valantasis R. 2002. Asceticism. Oxford University Press.  p.21
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of modes towards self-inherence, and (in the case of persons) “adequate ideas”, being
conceptual reflections of the true nature of Nature, the Substance itself. These latter may
be said to be approximations to, or apprehensions of an analogue to the “logos” of
Heraclitus. In this way, the apparent paradox of all changing save the logos, but the logos
being all, is resolved, since the logos is both the principles of change, and also the
ontological underwriter of all that is changing. But since it is the totality in the extension
of what Spinoza would call its “infinite attributes” and “infinite modes”, of all such
attributes and modes, or states of being, the logos, in its totality, does not change. I will
return to discussion of Spinozistic Substance and the concept of self-inherence in later
sections in Section 2 below, but suffice to say at this point that, provided it is accepted
that modes are indeed processual, I find it a broadly satisfying view of Nature (which he
used interchangeably with Substance and God), and the nature (D3) of Nature
(understood as a singular totality), which does indeed, according to the best physics,
resemble a hierarchical system of processes governed by “laws” which appear to be sui-
generis both of the basic, singular totality and its self-expressions, or processes, at each
level of the hierarchical continuum.89 There remains, of course, a problem in this view,
which is that to be called truly processual it may perhaps be argued that the Spinozistic
Substance itself is not substance, but process. While this is true, since it is the case that
the totality of Nature is expressed in processual terms, such that the whole is indeed in
flux, it may be argued that process remains ontologically basic even if the totality is
singular and unchanging (in a Spinozistic sense) insofar as it never loses its full potential
range of infinite modes. However we need not go so far as Spinozas grand balancing act
in any case, to defend a thoroughly processual account of all sub-universal-totality events
and processes, it suffices for the purposes of this thesis, and indeed the metaphysical view
it espouses more generally, that substances are not among the existences ever
encountered or explored by agents or science.
So what of the “things” encountered by ourselves as agents in the everyday world, or as
scientific explorers of the cosmos? Nicholas Rescher, a modern process philosopher,
complains of and documents what he describes as the “revolt against process” in modern
                                                 
89 The importance of the specificity of such emergent levels will be further discussed below.
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analytic philosophy, spearheaded by the likes of Quine, Goodman, Schwayder, Dummett,
and Strawson.90 He complains that the language of modern philosophy has become
“thoroughly thingified”,91 where paradigm substances are conceived of as “things”, the
definite objects we encounter as agents, and in the empirical sciences, such as cars, rocks,
lampposts, stars, etc. In his defence of the ontological primacy of process in the face of
this “revolt”, he buys thoroughly, and perhaps somewhat inadvertently, into the language
of substantialist ontology, using “things” to represent substances in the manner against
which he should be arguing. A more thoroughgoing process account would, however,
discount the idea that any “things” are substances at all. This may seem counterintuitive,
and uncommonsensical, but I see it as being the inevitable result of thorough analysis.  A
good starting point for a discussion on things in this context might be the Heideggerian
observation92 of the etymology of the word “thing”, that its meaning derives not from the
description of a unity, but indeed a process. A thing, in the Germanic languages from
which it emerges, is not a definite, single entity, but rather means a “gathering”. We see
this usage, for example, in the Icelandic term for parliament, the “Thing”, which was a
gathering of leaders held in the “Thingvallir”, or valley of gathering. How can we see
ordinary “things”, such as teacups, rocks, stars and mountains as processes? The key is to
add temporal perspective. Heraclitus’ asserted that “we both step and do not step in the
same rivers”, usually expressed and interpreted by the famous dictum that “it is not
possible to step into the same river twice”. 93  Can we walk on the same mountain twice?
A thorough consideration of geological processes reveals that we cannot. The mountain,
despite casual observation, is in effect a constantly changing process, and furthermore, is
not bounded, except by convention. It is rooted to the planet, and its extent is arbitrary, it
is covered by vegetation, snow, and other such, constantly in flux, which may be
accounted as being a part of the “mountain”, as well as processes of erosion of the
mountain, or deposition of further layers upon it. Seeking a definition of the particular
mountain in its essence, in the Aristotelian sense of essence as substance, is therefore
vain. The same applies to stars, wedding rings, and all other aspects of the physical
                                                 
90 Rescher N. 2000. Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Pittsburgh PA. pp. 33-47
91 Rescher N. Ibid. page 35.
92 Eiland H. 1982. “Heidegger’s Etymological Web.” boundary 2, Vol. 10, No. 2. pp. 39-58
93  Barnes J. 1979. The Presoctratic Philosophers. Routledge, London. p. 66
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world. What these are are manifolds of process constantly in flux, but with some time-
relatively stable aspects, which allows for conventions of naming, and particularisation.
Stars are obviously processes, but also obviously “things”. My wedding ring is the
accidental conjunction, principally, of platinum atoms, themselves wave-processes, and
formed in a Supernova event (or several separate such) in the region of some 5-10 billion
years ago. It gradually changes shape and weight, becomes duller and more scarred, as it
is worn, changes size, however slightly, as it is heated and cooled. It is a “thing” but it is
also, and thoroughly, a comparatively stable stage of many conjoined processes, and
looking to the future, will eventually be wholly deformed, its atoms blending back into
the general flux of processes.
A nice contemporary example may be used to help illustrate this.94 In the 1880s, the
absolute standard measure of the kilogram was forged as a solid object, indubitably a
“thing”. It is known as “Le Grand K”, and has since been kept in a guarded underground
vault in Paris, at the headquarters of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures,
housed inside two sealed glass bell-cases, in turn inside an evacuated chamber. It is
composed of an alloy of 90% platinum and 10% iridium. It was forged as the ultimate
singular reference object for the measure of a kilogram, and remains, at the time of
writing, the only object known to science with a mass of precisely 1 kilogram. As such it
is the arbiter of the precise metric mass of every other measured object in the human
universe. A number of other copy cylinders were made, which originally had exactly the
same mass. These were distributed to countries that had adopted the metric system, to use
as local arbiters of the true kilogram. Every so often the clones of  “Le Grand K” (LGK)
are brought to Paris to make certain that they indeed continue to correspond precisely.
These objects are among the most intensely monitored and heavily guarded things in the
world, but are certainly the most so with regard to the specific criterion of flux in their
composition or their mass. If anything should be stable and constant in this way, these
should. But starting 30 years ago, it has been clear that there has been drift in the mass
either of LGK, or else the clone cylinders, or possibly all of them. Since they are
                                                 
94 See BBC article: “Getting the Measure of a kilogram.” Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/7084099.stm [Accessed 12th November 2007]
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measured against each other, there appears in principle no way of arbitrating this
question. The drift may not seem especially great, equivalent to a little less than the mass
of around a grain of sugar in a kilogram of the same, but since scientific instruments
measuring masses far below this are calibrated from LGK, it is very significant. But the
point here is that even in such an apparently stable, guarded and controlled object, over
the duration of what is an eyeblink in even human history let alone earthly geological
time, let alone cosmic time, there is flux. At the time of writing, there is currently
underway a meeting to attempt a resolution of the problem. The intention is to try to find
a method of doing away with any such instantiations of the ultimate measure, as in
themselves being that ultimate measure itself, and instead to rely upon measures which
appeal to what are believed to be universal physical constants (so, conceivable as aspects
of the logos). For example, whereas the ultimate reference meter was once an object, a
bar of brass, the present reference is the time it takes for light to travel a certain distance
(1 meter, of course!) in a vacuum.  In this case, it is the temporal measure of the velocity
of a process that remains constant. Of course time itself is capable of flux, so further
stipulations must be made, concerning the relative frames of reference of the measured
light and the measuring instrumentation, but the core idea is clear. The point is that the
scientists are conceding that no object, or “thing” no matter what its construction, is
immune to change, or flux, and that only the principles of flux themselves are so immune.
There is no point in simply embarking on the construction of another LGK, since
whatever is constructed is liable to change over time. What is appealed to, however, is
that while these instantiations of matter, or what Spinoza would have called singular
modes, are indeed inevitably in flux, the principles by which they are ultimately
constructed, and by which they have reality, the laws of physics, logic, and mathematics
by which they have reality, are perceived as being constant and fixed. In regards to the
kilogram, a balance which is calibrated according to the universal constant known as the
Planck constant is one of the proposed methods to be discussed, but there are competing
views as to how the ultimate measure will forever be calculated. However again, it is not
a particular balance which is to be the arbiter, but rather the fundamental principles which
govern the function of its processes, in themselves.
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The example here is of course quite nicely analogous to the Heraclitan rhea and logos.
All is in flux, except for the constant measures and principles of flux themselves.
Whether there are indeed such constants, and whether the logos itself may be considered,
therefore, to be in flux (perhaps just very very slowly indeed) is a discussion which is
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
P.F. Strawson’s critique of process found in his famous “Individuals” is based upon the
purported requirement for things to be substances in order to secure their re-
identification, such that we may rationally conduct ourselves in commerce with the
universe. He reifies this requirement to the level of asserting that it is a test of ontological
primacy itself, asserting that we need things as substances in order to be able to identify
processes at all.95 Rescher correctly critiques this approach by questioning the identifiably
criterion that Strawson uses, saying that it is no guide in any case to “primacy” in
ontology.96 He also notes that identification is itself processual in nature, but he could
have gone further in his critique. The further step that can be taken is that for
reidentification to take place it is not required that there should be unchanging particular
substances, but rather that there should be reidentifiable “things”, but it is not necessary
that these things should be intrinsically changeless in some way in themselves as material
beings, but merely that they should be reidentifiable. It has already been argued that
“things” are likely, on close and thorough analysis, to turn out to be processes in any
case. It is, I would argue, indisputable that the sun, the river Nile, and even the continent
of Africa are intrinsically changeful processes (Africa being a geological process and a
manifold of many sub-processes to see which it is simply required to consider the
changes it undergoes on a geological time-scale), but yet it is equally indisputable that
they are reidentifiable to the extent and for the purposes of ordinary rational processes
engage with them in conceptual navigation of the world. What is key here is that there are
sufficient stable elements in any processual manifold to render it identifiable as a
particular process.
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Section Two: Personhood as Process: 
The Value of Life and the 
Value of Life Extension
2.1 The fallacy of immortality
Immortality, with all its echoes, resonances, and baggage, is a term nearly ubiquitous in
modern discussions concerning the ethical and social implications of age retardation or
life extension.  It is used both by the advocates and the critics of these endeavours. It is
also a term used in the standard biology that underwrites the present debate, with
reference to certain cell lines. For all that, I contend that its usage is entirely illegitimate
and misleading with regard to biological organisms or in context of biological or
technological interventions made with a view to combating aging and/or else to extend
the lives of physically-instantiated persons, no matter how radical such an intervention,
and no matter what physical remedy is proposed or what physical form in which it is
speculated that such ‘lives’ may one day be manifest.
The reason for this is simple: immortality is the state of not being subject to mortality.
Any being that is dependent upon, or subject to conditions, no matter how robust or
fragile these might be, for its continuance in a living state, is mortal. Even a being, in a
possible world, that is not invulnerable but which actually does happen to live for an
infinite period is nonetheless not immortal. Provided that, had some circumstance been
different at any time in that history, it might have died, then through every moment of its
existence it remains mortal. I am, as I write this, alive. But I am, as I write this, mortal.
The same is and would be true even if the most radical dreams of life-extensionists were
to come true, and I were to be subject to some interventions which, in future, meant that I
ended up living for an infinite period.  Mortality is the condition of any living being
within the natural realm. Immortality is a supernatural state of being.
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The same may thus be said of so-called ‘immortal’ cell-lines, such as cancers or germ-
lines. No individual in such a line is immortal, and indeed each line is, in its own right,
subject to mortality. The vast majority of species or lines of organisms that have ever
existed are extinct. Those that are not extinct may become so at any time.
Perhaps I may be accused of pedantry at this point, but I believe that clarity and rigour
are urgently needed on this issue for the debate concerning aging intervention and life
extension properly to proceed, and clearly to be understood by the public and by
policymakers. There is a tendency by thinkers on all sides of the issue to muddy this
point, and the consequences of this lack of clarity can be seriously damaging in view of
the urgent need for such clarity prior to the emergence of actual life-extending
technologies. This is symptomatic of a generalised tendency to blur the lines between the
natural and the supernatural, when it comes to discussing enhancement technologies. The
PCBE report ‘Ageless Bodies’ raises this issue explicitly:
Different human societies have had very different conceptions of the divine, but
one attribute has almost universally been attached to the gods: immortality. Our
subjugation to death – and our awareness of this fact – is central to what makes us
human (‘mortals’) rather than divine, and it makes us fearful and weak and
constrained. The scientific quest to slow the aging process is not explicitly aimed
at conquering death. But in taking the aging of the body as itself a kind of
disorder to be corrected, it treats man’s mortal condition as a target for medicine
as if death were indeed rather like one of the specific (fatal) diseases... In
principle, the quest for any age-retardation suggests no inherent stopping-point
and therefore, in the extreme case, it is difficult to distinguish it from a quest for
endless life … It is, at its core, a desire to overcome the most fundamental bounds
of humanity, and to redefine our bodily relationship with time and with the
physical world. Life-extension does not mean immortality, to be sure—if for no
other reason than that the attainment of immortality is scientifically implausible.
But the impulse to extend our lives in general, rather than to combat particular
diseases or ailments that shorten our lives, is a declaration of opposition to death
as such. 97
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It is not an unfair accusation against some of the more prominent advocates of aging
intervention and life extension, that they do in fact blur the line between the latter and the
quest for immortality, and indeed in some cases appear to see their project explicitly as a
quest against death. The literature is littered with examples of rhetoric which proclaim
that ‘Death is an Outrage’,98 or else declare, as noted in a footnote of ‘Ageless Bodies’,
that ‘the real goal is to keep people alive forever’,99 or else herald ‘The Scientific
Conquest of Death’100 or explicitly define the ethical discourse about life extension as
‘Immortal Ethics’.101 Some of the more extreme of these verge on making the error which
is the central joke of Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale, echoing the call: ‘let us join hands as
brothers, and kill this traitor death!’102 But as the passages quoted below illustrate, it is an
error committed in loose talk on both sides of the discourse. There are several reasons
why this might be true.  One is that, as John Harris notes in his essay ‘Immortal Ethics’,
we have been familiar with immortals, or talk of them, from time immemorial, precisely
from religion and the tales of the supernatural. In this he is absolutely on the money, but
far from being helpful, I contend this is precisely why all involved in this discourse must
more carefully observe the strict delineation between the possibilities afforded by the
natural sciences and those exclusively belonging to the category of the supernatural.
Harris then goes on to state in the clearest possible terms what I am here explicitly
denying:
Note that immortality is not the same as invulnerability, and even ‘immortals’
could die or be killed.103
But this is simply to say that the ‘immortals’ are ‘mortal’! To suggest that aging
intervention could render us immortal is simply to state that the definition of immortality
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rests solely upon its being the antonym of senescence, which it surely does not. Clarity is
urgently required. The reason is that such talk inspires deep confusion about the nature
and motivations of the project of aging intervention or extension of personal life, and
allows for illegitimate, or misdirected argument to be applied on all sides. This allowance
is, I believe, a significant factor in the antagonists of aging intervention’s refusal simply
to reject all such talk as being nonsense, since they find, in such blurring, convenient
areas of conceptual vulnerability. They seek to exploit a perceived weakness on the part
of some of the opposition in terms of their motivation- that this motivation in some cases
boils down to a yearning for an altered metaphysical relationship with the universe.
Consider this, from Kass’s essay, ‘L’Chaim and its Limits: Why Not Immortality?’:
Homer’s immortals, Zeus and Hera, Apollo and Athena – for all their eternal
beauty and youthfulness, live shallow and rather frivolous lives, their passions
only transiently engaged, in first this and then that. They live as spectators of the
mortals, who by comparison have depth, aspiration, genuine feeling, and hence a
real center to their lives. Mortality makes life matter.104
This passage is typical of the species of argument posited by critics of life extension that
seeks to use the purported benefits of mortality and the horrors of the ‘menacing spectre
of immortality’105 as its motivating principle. But the confusion here is obvious, and
while Kass, in common with some others who use the term, clearly acknowledges
elsewhere that whatever physical interventions may be taken, physical persons will
remain mortal and strictly distinct from supernatural ‘immortals’, he appears, in common
with other commentators, to forget or to blur this distinction when the occasion suits. So
long as we are mortal, even were we not subject to senescence, which is a very tall order
to begin with, we will be subject to extrinsic disease, cancers, radiation, accident, war,
meteorites, unhealthy habits and addictions, obesity, depression, suicide, famine, murder,
stochastic events and all the other ‘slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’ and we will
never know with any certainty when the ‘midnight hour’ might strike, right up until the
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heat death of the universe106 itself! It is a central observation, which the argument from
indefiniteness glosses over, that our life spans are presently indefinite, and if senescence
were to be ‘cured’ then our life spans would remain indefinite. Furthermore, so long as
we remain subject to the second law of thermodynamics,107 we will never have to worry
about not having to worry, or for that matter, ceasing to strive! It is precisely these
features that distinguish us forever from ‘immortals’.
Canonical conservatives who offer critiques of a motivation towards an altered
metaphysical state, namely immortality, from the point of view either that it is bad in
some way in itself, or dehumanising, or other similar, should be careful to note that while
their fire has no significant effect upon the project of life extension in the natural realm, it
may well rain down destruction upon the motivation to seek its true target: supernatural
immortality itself!  On this note, there is a fascinating symmetry to be observed between
the viewpoints of the canonical conservatives, and those of the secular liberals who
declare aging intervention to be a project towards immortality: they betray, each in their
own way, the very fundamental aspect of specifically human nature that is the longing for
immortality itself. Could it be that in seeking an answer to the riddle of the value of life
extension to persons, simpliciter, we may uncover its source?
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2.2 The disvalue of death
Can death in itself be argued to be something so negative that its very occurrence may be
used as a justification for life extension? If biogerontologists seek to extend life, are they
mainly, as well, or at all seeking to stave off death itself? It has been argued, in particular
by John Harris, that life extension is death postponement.108 While the postponement of
death may explain a particular person’s motives in seeking to extend a life it is not
necessarily the case that this motivation is well founded, nor that “life extension” and
“death postponement” are one and the same concept. I may feel tired of life, and find no
instrumental nor perhaps accept any intrinsic109 value in its extension, but nevertheless
wish to postpone my death. Such a desire may, in turn, appear not be motivated by a
wish to extend life but rather from some notion of the disvalue of death. Perhaps death in
such a case is feared as something negative in itself - as a kind of anti-life, just as
darkness is conceived in Milton as a kind of anti-light, or “darkness visible.”110 Or else
perhaps it is feared, as in the case of Hamlet, simply because it is an unknown quantity:
To die- to sleep-
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heartache, and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to. 'Tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish'd. To die- to sleep.
To sleep- perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub!
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause. There's the respect
That makes calamity of so long life.111
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Equally but very differently, I may conceive of death as being nothing to be feared at all.
This may be so if I come to believe, based on available empirical evidence, that death is
not even comparable to the unconsciousness of dreamless sleep, but rather is a total
oblivion and non-existence in which there is no longer an “I” upon whom suffering or
disvalue may alight. The Greek philosopher Epicurus argued for just this conclusion:
Make yourself familiar with the belief that death is nothing to us, since everything
good and bad lies in sensation and death is to be deprived of sensation… For there
is nothing to be feared in living for one who has truly comprehended that there is
nothing to be feared in not living… So [death] is nothing to the living and nothing
to the dead, since with regard to the former, death is not, and as to the latter, they
themselves no longer are.112
In the latter case, postponing my death would appear to have no particular import from
the perspective that death is a bad thing in itself, since death is no thing in itself. So in the
case of a person who accepts this view, action taken which happens to postpone death
could only be fairly said to be motivated by the intention to extend life, since motivation
to postpone death on its own would be unintelligible.
We do not have, and probably will never have, evidence as to the possibility or nature of
death (as opposed to dying) as an experienced state of being. Because of this, I argue that
we should bracket any concerns along these lines, and go with Epicurus’ view on the
badness of death,113 instead concentrating upon what is valuable in life, as the only
reasonable justification for efforts to extend it. In doing so, it should be noted that it is not
necessary that one should accept the entirety of the implications of the Epicurean
position. It is not necessary that one accepts that death is indeed utter annihilation,
although one might, but only that one accepts that there is no current indication whatever
(pace spiritualist claims of communication with the dead!) concerning death as an
experienced state of being, and so no reason to favour one view over another. The
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adoption of the consequences of the Epicurean view remains fully justified by such an
agnostic position.
If the above analysis is accepted, of course, a significant question remains: can be that
death is not bad in any way. How can that be? Are all our fears about and distaste for
death unfounded? And what of prohibitions concerning death? If death is not bad in
itself, could such a view not remove the badness from murder, provided it is conducted
suddenly, and without expectation or pain? More relevantly here, if death is not bad, then
why make special efforts to prolong life?
Well, of course, there is a way in which death may still be accounted as bad. On this view
death is not bad in itself, but rather the badness of death depends upon and becomes
relative to what it negates, namely the continuance of life. Death is bad because of what
we lose by it. So if we want to assess the ethics of life extension, we must consider the
value of life, and most particularly, the value of life’s continuance, rather than concern
ourselves with any purported disvalue of death as a thing or state in itself.
The badness or disvalue of death for our purposes, then, inheres solely in what it negates,
which is the continuance of life. If death is bad it is so because of what we lose by it, and
if what we lose by it is the continuance of our persons, and in particular what we as
persons desire, wish, have plans for, hope for etc., then this picture remains ungrounded
without an account of what fundamentally motivates such desires, wishes, plans and
hopes. For without such motivation, there can be no loss in their unfulfillment.
Underlying and motivating these future-good-directed aspects of ourselves is some more
fundamental aspect from which they arise, and without which they become meaningless.
To put it in terms of the thesis outlined below, death is bad insofar as it frustrates, or
cancels the actualisation of the categoric future-directed desire, nisus, or conation, and in
so doing, ceases the process of personhood, from which all particular desires arise, and in
relation to which they have value.
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2.3 The value of life: sanctity and life plans: crossing the
liberal/conservative divide
The emerging discourse has some familiar and some very unfamiliar features.  Over the
past few decades, we have come to be familiar with what has been termed the
conservative/liberal divide in bioethics over matters specifically relating to the end of
life, and of life’s continuance. Traditionally, the primary areas of conflict have been those
of suicide, abortion, and euthanasia. Broadly speaking on these issues, conservatives have
tended to adopt more negative, prohibitive stances towards all of these practices,114
stances that have generally been characterised, especially in the politicised popular areas
of the discourse as ‘pro-life’.  Equally broadly speaking, liberals have tended to adopt
more permissive positive stances towards these same, in a mode that has generally
likewise been characterised as ‘pro-choice’.115
Broadly speaking once again, those of the conservative persuasion are usually adherents
to canonical, content-full interpretations of what has been termed the value of life,
arising, to a large extent, from religious tradition, focussing on such concepts as the
sanctity of life, or the intrinsic value of life particularly to humans as a distinct and
arguably unique category and condition of being. Equally, those of the liberal persuasion
are usually more secular, rejecting such canonical, content-full interpretations in favour
of those that focus upon the subjective and instrumental value of life to persons, a
concept which importantly is decoupled from the necessary association with the category
and condition of being human.
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The lines of the emerging discourse concerning radical life extension thus far have rather
blurred the classic liberal/conservative divide on life ending or extending issues. For
example, some of those in the conservative category appear to have taken a line that
might be thought of as an inversion of their usual position on life and death issues: in this
case, they appear broadly to be opposed to life extension.116 Equally, some of those in the
liberal category have taken an almost evangelically strong supportive stance towards
radical life extension.117 Other liberals, perhaps equally surprisingly, have taken
cautionary or negative stances, but ones whose bases appear to have strikingly
conservative features, advocating a limitation of human prerogative to intervene in
‘nature’.118
What I propose, briefly, is as follows. In the face of the arguably new question of whether
we should, ceteris paribus, seek to extend healthy life span, and given the blurring of the
classic lines between the liberal and conservative positions on this kind of question, a re-
evaluation of the fundamental motivating principles is in order. Given the common claim
that traditional ‘pro-life’ conservative positions have been motivated by concepts of the
intrinsic value of life, what is implied by the conservative resistance to radical life
extension? Equally, what of the liberals who appear to be adopting an apparently ‘anti-
choice’ stance on this? Also, in view of the classically secular and fairly sanguine liberal
approach to the extinction of both human ‘non-personal’ and human ‘personal’ life,
whence comes the apparent temptation for some liberals to argue for an all-out drive
towards what is described, in the more extreme cases, as ‘immortality’? I will address
these issues in turn, and will seek to show that in each case this apparent inversion or
shift in attitude betrays either weaknesses in the parties’ commitments to their own more
generally stated principled positions on the value of life, or else in the construction of the
same. I will then seek to address this situation by suggesting that what is missing from
the picture on both sides is a specific acknowledgement of and engagement with the issue
of the value of extension in time to persons as processes119 rather than as fixed beings of a
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fixed substance and changeless identity. It is not, however, that such a position has long
existed within the discourse, is widely recognised and is being ignored. It is rather that
such a concept has not, hitherto, formed a clearly identifiable part of the discourse
concerning life extension at all. I will argue that not only is it a useful idea in elucidating
the deficiencies of the discourse as it stands, and of the various classical positions and
assumptions which underpin it, but that it is indeed the correct view, and that a proper
understanding of this view furnishes significant advances in both the elucidation of the
questions at hand in the discourse concerning life extension for persons, and also more
widely in the metaethical discourse concerning the naturalisation of norms and of the
persons who predicate them.  In this manner, in view of the blurring of classical positions
on this issue, and the deficiencies I argue this reveals in them, it is possible that the model
I propose of personhood may, if accepted, offer some opportunity of reconciliation
between conservatives and liberals on the issues of life extension, the death of persons, as
well, perhaps, as helping to clarify both the ontology of persons and the nature of ethics
itself.
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2.4 The conservative position on life extension: the sanctity of
life, nature, and the role of prerogative
In the canonical schema from which classic and modern conservative positions regarding
the value of life and attitudes to life and death issues generally arise, the values of the
bodily and fleshly life have traditionally been held to be of secondary importance,
worldly concerns which obscure and abstract away from the true and underlying value of
existence: the life of the immortal soul in its eternal relationship with the Divine.
Adherence to such a schema alone would appear to be obviously impractical and self-
limiting, as it would be inimical to the maintenance of a functioning ethics of the bodily
living world. Such a radical position has historically led to the establishment of suicide
cults or sects, and arguably may be said to underpin the present scourge of suicide
attacks, such as those against the US in 2001, and in innumerable other cases in Iraq, and
elsewhere in the world. Religious and socially conservative movements have therefore
formulated various strategies to defend more ‘pro- (bodily) life’ positions. These
additional schemas for grounding the ethics of bodily life and death may generally be
described as concepts of the sanctity of life.120
Essentially, the doctrine is that life is a gift to the person who is alive, and the wilful
rejection of this gift (so, suicide) or else the taking under whatever circumstances of it
away from another (so, murder and also abortion and euthanasia) are infringements of the
divine prerogatives which the giver (traditionally God) is held to retain over this gift.
It is noteworthy that the retention of prerogatives by the ‘giver’ here already abstracts
away from any ordinary definition of ‘gift’. Ordinarily one conceives of a gift as being an
absolute rendition of a thing from one person or subjective being to another person or
subjective being, which relinquishes control or prerogative entirely on the part of the
                                                 
120 Kuhse H. 1987. The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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giver. The idea of the ‘gift’ of life being one in which prerogatives are retained by the
giver, such that obligations are owed by the possessor to that giver throughout the
duration of that gift appears very much more like a leasehold contract. One may perhaps
think of circumstances wherein it is accepted that one has been, say, ‘given’ a few weeks
stay at the villa of a wealthy acquaintance. Such a ‘gift’ would represent, to some degree,
this kind of a leasehold. The ‘giver’ does not ‘give’ such a gift unconditionally, but rather
in a time-limited framework, and no doubt within certain restrictions. For example it is
usually understood, but may be stated explicitly, that the recipient of this benefice may
only use certain rooms or elements of the property, and may only stay for a very
particular limited period, and may also not abuse the privilege of the ‘gift’ by damaging
the property, or otherwise misbehaving. I think that something like this is likely what the
framers of the ‘gift of life’ idea had in mind. Surely, however, such a gift is indeed more
in the form of a lease, even if no token value is exchanged for its purchase, since it is
given in exchange for restrictions, both temporal and otherwise, which must be abided
by. In this way the right of stay in the property is not given wholesale, but given
conditionally, and to some extent in the form of a lease, which may be revoked at any
time. It is common, after all, to describe a newly optimistic, or rejuvenated person, or
more relevantly one who has been given a reprieve from an expected death within a
particular time-frame, to have been “given a new lease of life”.  But what sort of
leasehold is this? It is not a leasehold for the holder to spend some lifetime in a place,
rather it is a leasehold for the very life of the leaseholder. The picture is of course
significantly complicated by the idea of the immortal soul. In this case, the most
fundamental part of the leaseholder cannot die in any case. This results in something of a
dilemma for the view, since if what is spoken of does not take account of the immortal
soul, or discounts it, then the lease is also for the leaseholder’s existence at all, but if
what is accounted to be most important is the soul, then the leasehold itself appears to
become rather meaningless, as the leaseholder cannot die in any case.
I consider that this dilemma is serious but will not seek further to discuss the issues
concerning the “immortal soul” as these are primarily theological concerns whose subject
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matter is to a large extent outwith the scope of this dissertation, which certainly does not
seek to discuss increases to the longevity of immortal souls! This is not in any way,
however, to accede to a lessening of the severity of this second horn of the dilemma for
those who wish to accept such a concept. Rather, I consider that the immortality of the
soul renders the sanctity concept, to a large extent, unintelligible.
As to the former horn of the dilemma, we may say that the lease of bodily life alone, to
one whose existence depends upon the “lease”, is a lease without mutual contract, or with
a contract which is entirely one-sided, its terms never having being acceded to by the
recipient. Consideration of the reason for this leads to another very serious problem for
this conception of life’s “value”: the idea that a basic predicate of existence may be
‘given’ or more accurately ‘leased’ to the one who then exists is philosophically dubious.
If life is a gift, to whom is it a gift? How can my life be a gift, to me? If a leasehold,
between whom and whom is the contract, if the contract itself is the structure by which
the leaseholder themselves comes into being? Such a “contract” is not, by ordinary
concepts, a contract at all, but rather, given its restrictions and the traditionally extremely
stern consequences for their breach, it is an imposition. Of course, the enactment of such
consequences entails acceptance of the immortality of the soul, which throws us back to
the second horn of the dilemma.  But if we accept only the first horn, in context of the
debate concerning life extension, if this “sanctity” principle has anything whatever to tell
us concerning our lack of prerogative to extend life (see below for clarification), what
motivation could the contractee possibly have to respect the terms of a contract whose
fulfilment mandates their own annihilation? Can such a contract be said to represent
“value” for the life in question, qua that life itself? Certainly it becomes very difficult to
defend the view that on this construction the value of life has any intrinsic in the sense of
internalist foundations whatever. Such a value of life does not regard the interests of the
one who is alive, nor does it describe or represent an elucidation of the value of life, qua
life or living itself, or the particular life that is lived, but solely those of the conjectural
external constructor of life in general and that life in particular. Insofar as this is true, it
might be said that on this account there is no internal account given of the value of life
whatever, and that in absence of some further story or account, life has no intrinsic value
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whatever, but only an extrinsic value, which is predicated by an external valuing agent,
apparently capable of subjective choices. Consider the following from John Haldane and
Patrick Lee:
In short, for John Paul II to say that human life is of incomparable value is not to
‘place human beings at the center of the moral universe’. On the contrary, it is to
say that human beings have this special and inestimable value inasmuch as they
are created in the image of God (imago dei) and in order to come to participate
supernaturally and eternally in the life of God. That beings should be created with
this nature and for this end is indeed a manifestation of God’s goodness. It also
explains why even on earth human life is a ‘sacred reality entrusted to us’ and
why intentionally to take innocent121 human life is ‘a negation of the honour due
to the Creator’. Far from there being a difference between John Paul and Aquinas
on this matter the former frequently cites the latter and uses formulations drawn
from the Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae – such as that ‘all that man is, or
has, or can be is ordered to God.’ 122123
Certainly, the traditional Catholic view (in line with any Christian views of Christ as a
person, and God) is that the godhead is most certainly a person.124 Given this, apart from
the obvious differences between divine and mortal personages, there seems no particular
structural difference between the theistic conservative account, and the secular liberal
account, at least insofar as neither one recognises an absolute or non-contingent value for
life of the living organism, qua organismic life itself, or an internalist, non-person
predicated, and truly objective value.
Leaving these rather serious difficulties to one side for the moment, in view of this
classical picture of life’s value which appears to underpin the conservative attitude
                                                 
121 The use of the term “innocent” as a qualification of the prohibition against killing is common, even
pervasive in Catholic writing on the subject. This represents itself an exemplar of the reduction in status of
the value of personal life in this schema, such that only “good” life is worthy of protection. The many
instances of commanded killing in the Bible are often justified by this means. Life is not intrinsically good,
its goodness is entirely contingent, and depends upon a separate standard, which is wholly extrinsic and
represented by the will of the Lord.
122 Haldane, J. Lee, P. 2003. “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life.” Philosophy
78: 255-278
123 Notice the equivocation on the meaning of the word “life” which is both “eternal” and something that
we can “take” away.
124 See e.g. the online Catholic Encyclopedia at: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07706b.htm [Accessed
January 2008]
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towards radical life extension, the inversion referred to above focuses upon the notion of
prerogative in this schema of the value of life and an intuition concerning the
implications of this as regards endogenous longevity. If it is the case that life itself is
fundamentally a gift (or leasehold or whatever) ‘designed’ and ‘ordained’ by God, then
the fundamental circumstances that attend it, such as the endogenous span of the lives of
humans, will be held to be similarly part of the ordained design, which may be thought of
as constituting the frame of the gift itself, intrinsic to its structure. Given the above-
described commitments of this schema, it is possible to see how it is thought that this
frame, the given structure (and so endogenously-predicated length) of biological human
life, therefore falls within divine prerogative. The idea that humans in particular, and
exclusive of all other living things, are made in the ‘image’ of God, and also that death
through aging arises from Original Sin form key aspects of this schema. With regard to
the latter concept, the originating passages are to be found in Genesis:
Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception;  in
sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and
he shall rule over thee.
And unto Adam he said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife,
and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee saying, Thou shalt not eat
of it; cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of
thy life;
Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of
the field;
In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for
out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.
…
And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good
and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and
eat, and live for ever:
Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground
from whence he was taken.
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So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden
Cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the
tree of life.125
The standard (chiefly Christian) interpretation of these passages is that, for the apparent
crime of disobedience, and saliently for the crime of disobedience involving the gaining
of knowledge of good and evil, by which must surely be meant, moral judgement126,
Adam and Eve and all their descendants are condemned to death, meaning not that they
would have died previously, and were prematurely precipitated into death at this point or
had their expectancies curtailed, but rather that that death as a principal and defining
condition of life, entered the world at this point. The implication is that Adam and Eve,
together, perhaps, with the rest of the biological realm, were essentially deathless, until
the Fall. They were not, after all, forbidden expressly up until this point from eating of
fruit of that other magical tree in the garden, the tree of Life, and from Genesis 2; 16-17 it
appears perhaps that permission was in fact implicitly given so to do. It is unclear
whether the eating of such fruit would be a single dose passage to eternal life, or whether
continual eating of it would be required, but perhaps speculation here is taking things too
far in any case. However it is most clear that according to this story God intends that
they, and their descendants should not so eat, and should not thereby elude the
punishment, which was the judgment upon Adam and Eve for their transgression. From
this it may perhaps be argued that the extension of lifespan by endogenous reframing of
the predicates of aging, and therefore the ordained frame of life may represent a
blasphemous attempt to storm the gates of Eden. The whole picture is very murky,
however, and is complicated, as has been noted by Arthur Caplan127 in reference
precisely to the conservative opposition to endogenous life extension, by the fact that
immediately following this episode we are told that Adam lived to the age of 930 years,
his son living likewise to a strikingly great age, and so on:
                                                 
125 Genesis 3; 16-19 and 22-24, KJV.
126 One of the very many problems with this story is that it seems reasonable to suppose that, prior to
having eaten of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would not have been possible for either Eve or
Adam, or for that matter the Serpent, to know that disobedience, in itself, was against the good!
127 Caplan A. 1992. “Is aging a disease?” In: Caplan A., If I were a Rich Man Could I buy a Pancreas? And
Other Essays on the Ethics of Health Care. Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
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This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that God created man, in
the likeness of God made he him;
…
And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness,
after his image; and called his name Seth:
And the days of Adam after he had begotten Seth were eight hundred years: and 
he died.
And Seth lived an hundred and five years, and begat Enos:
And Seth lived after he begat Enos eight hundred and seven years, and begat sons
and daughters;
And all the days of Seth were nine hundred and twelve years: and he died.128
And so on. Now it has to be said that I do not myself take this story seriously, and
consider that it is essentially mythology, but it is important to recognise that whatever
one’s attitude towards it, this story forms the basis or else the touchstone of much
conservative argument against life extension by endogenous intervention, and so it must
be dealt with in this context. It is important, for example, to recognise that this story is the
root of the nexus of ideas that motivate and ground the conservative conception that
biological humanity is co-extensive with personhood, and thus moral respect. The
concept relies upon the ordination of man (humanity) by God, at this juncture of theistic
universal history, in a special place of dominion over the rest of the natural world, and in
particular the rest of the biological realm. This dominion is considered to be granted in
view of humanity’s being created in the “image” of the divine ordinator. The most
prevalent hermeneutical position on what this means in turn is not that God may be seen
as a kind of primate, with ten fingers and ten toes etc. Despite the frequent depiction of
the godhead in this mode, it is rather that humanity shares with God access to the Logos,
or the rational structure of the universe.129 Humanity is rational, and therefore participates
in, or at least reflects the divine “image”.130 However, if it is the capacity for rationality,
or in the Thomist conception, the capacity for a being to accommodate a rational soul,
which matters, then not even the most radical ambitions of the transhumanists will cause
us to deviate from this view of personhood, since none intends that we shall deliberately
                                                 
128 Genesis 5; 1 and 3-8. KJV.
129 The gospel of John is most explicit in this way, and is obviously heavily influenced by Greek thinking in
this area.
130 Altmann A. 1968. "Homo Imago Dei in Jewish and Christian Theology."
Journal of Religion, XLVIII p. 254
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engineer rational capacity out of the constitution of the future descendants of humanity.
Positions which attempt to defend the idea that biological humanity is co-extensive with
personhood on other grounds are subject to what I consider to be devastating
counterexamples, such as that of anencephalic foetuses, or foetuses which develop to
term without any brain matter above the stem, and in some cases, with none at all, and
teratocarcinomas, which possess the genetic and physiological characteristics of humans,
are the products of reproductive conjunctions, and develop in the womb, but do so in a
manner which is thoroughly disorganised, with nervous, muscular, bone and other tissue
growing in a jumbled mass. Such prodigies are undoubtedly human in terms of their
genetic identity, gross matter, and origin, but they are surely not in any way whatever,
persons. The typical manner in which conservatives seek to ground arguments against
early-term abortion, for example, a case wherein no rational capacity is present, (in which
Aquinas himself, following Aristotle, appeared to recognise that there were insufficient
biological substrates to support a “rational soul”) is one involving the concept of
potentiality. This defence raises issues of substantial identity, chiefly against potentiality,
from actuality, by staunch substantialists, as we shall see. I will deal further with the
issues raised by the idea that humans and persons are coextensive when discussing the
idea of persons as substances in section 2.5 below.
There are further significant problems with the sanctity picture of life’s value. The first is
that, in absence of a belief in or warrant for the particular concept of the divine which
underwrites it, or in the presence of wholly secular convictions, this conception gives no
grounds or explanation whatever for the value of bodily, or more pointedly, of personal
life. It is perhaps for this reason that many among the religiously-committed public
consider that, in absence of a faith in the Divine, there will be no morality. This idea
reached perhaps its clearest formal expression in the words of Dostoevsky: “If God is
dead, then all is permitted.” An utter absence of a secular morality in the fabric of a
society may therefore be seen to be a perilous deficiency, especially in view of the further
problem of doctrinal interpretation regarding a strictly religiously constituted ethics.
Since the above conception requires a very particular interpretation or construction of the
additional conception of Divine prerogative, in order to underpin a functional ethics of
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the living world, conflicts between interpretations, especially as when they amount to
inflexible dogma, can result in ethical gridlock, and profound, indeed intractable
sociological division. Quite apart from the more extreme cases of rejection of the sanctity
schema altogether by suicide sects and the like, such conflicts of interpretation are not
difficult to find. As David Hume pointed out,131 if it is claimed that we may infringe
God’s prerogative by the taking of life and so altering the divine timing of death, by this
same token we may apparently likewise infringe the divine prerogative by intervening to
save a life as well. Something like this idea is appealed to, for example, by significant
religious groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who consider that medical
intervention, especially of particular forms which alter the construction of the body or
blur lines between bodies, such as blood transfusion, is explicitly contrary to God’s
prerogative in life and death matters. More generally, in Christian funeral services
throughout the world, it is common to quote the Biblical text: “The Lord giveth, and the
Lord taketh away”.132 By this it must be meant (or intended doctrinally) that the actual
instantiation of the event of death, even at an early age, or in defiance of every medical
effort to save the life, say, of a young accident victim, does indeed fall within that Divine
prerogative. Very significant consequences flow from exactly how this prerogative is
interpreted, and where the line between the prerogative of the Divine, and that of human
persons, is drawn. But there appears no generalised consensus upon where such a line
might be drawn, as well as no particular prospect of there being such a clear line in
future, as technologies evolve which throw up possibilities for intervention wholly
undreamt-of by the writers of Biblical scripture, with the concomitant fact that no text
exists which may unambiguously (or in many cases, at all) deal with such issues.
Further, the fact that there have historically been disagreements in the interpretation of
the extent of significance of the concept of the Sanctity of Life, shaky guarantor of the
brief, ephemeral span on earth, often denigrated in Memento Mori and Vanitas art and
literature, but more general consensus that the true and ultimate value lies in the
attainment of the eternal relationship with the divine in the afterlife, constitutes a
                                                 
131   Hume D. 1978. “On Suicide.” In: Ethical Issues In Death and Dying. T.L. Beauchamp & S. Perlin
eds.: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. pp.105-10.
132 Actually, despite its common use, this is probably a grammatical corruption of KJV Job 1: 20-21
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dangerous disbalance. Life’s value, for believers, the value of this world, lies at the short
end of a vast lever, whose fulcrum is death, and whose other end is both infinite in extent,
and infinitely weighty. Whether in each case it is true that some sanctity principle or
other succeeds in counterbalancing this lever, it remains true for all cases that the relation
is desperately precarious, and weighted always in favour of the purported world beyond
death, seen as a portal and not an end, and this situation cannot fail to reduce interest in
and emphasis upon the values of this world. The concept of the realm of the living world
as expressed by C.S. Lewis’, as a kind of “shadowland”133 perfectly expresses this
relation. The transformation, the end of the world seen in the climax of his children’s
book, The Last Battle, directly mirrors the Apocalyptic vision of John of Patmos, and
betrays the yearning for the destruction of this world, and the end of not only of this life
for particular individuals in this world, but rather for the world itself, and all worldly life.
This denigration of the values of this world nestles close to the breast of any religion
which accepts this metaphysical view of reality.
It would appear that a generalised and wholly secular ethics concerning such issues is
required to deal with these risks and possibilities, at the very least as a kind of fall-back,
or safety net, both in order to resolve conflicts between such positions, if not
conceptually, then de-facto, and in law, and more positively in order to constitute a
dynamic and evolving arena of independent ethical evaluation, capable of dealing with
both conflicts between these on classical grounds, and also with novel situations and
questions as they arise from technological, cultural, and sociological innovation. Further,
such a secular ethics is absolutely required to fulfil the needs of the secular generality.
Of course such an ethics is not merely required, but extant and functional, and ethical
thinking in no way intrinsically depends upon religious concept in any case. But if such a
secular ethics is indeed required, extant, and functional, then the question inevitably
arises as to whether a religious ethics is in fact necessary in such cases, at all, and indeed
whether it may, instead, be positively harmful. 134
                                                 
133 From the title of the final chapter of the final book in the Narnia series, The Last Battle: “Farewell to the
Shadow-Lands”.
134  Holloway R. 1999. Godless Morality: Keeping Religion Out of Ethics. Cannongate, Edinburgh.
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There are significant further problems for the concept of sanctity as constituting an
intrinsic value, specifically as it refers to the ethics of life extension, which will be dealt
with in the subsequent subsection but first I will make a connection between this concept
and the subject matter of Section One above, which will also be further dealt with below,
in subsection 2.6.
There is a nexus between arguments concerning the prerogative of humans versus the
prerogative of God, and those concerning the prerogative of humans versus the province
of the ‘natural’, which is somehow held to be morally prime. The latter is commonly used
as a fall-back position in an attempt to secularize what is essentially a religious schema,
which involves the idea that nature in both the senses of physical and biological nature,
including our own, is given to us by Divine creation and in that way is framed and
‘ordained’ by God, and should be respected for that reason. That this is intuitively widely
accepted is evidenced by the common acceptance of at least the sense of the notion that
human interference, say, in the human genome, would constitute a clear case of ‘playing
God’ as well as being ‘against nature’. It seems likely that the origins of this nexus lie in
the idea of nature itself as being a Divine creation, such that its principles are subject to
Divine ordination. What remains unclear, however, is once again the extent to which, on
this schema, human interventions in the “natural” are permissible.
In view of this we may clearly see why, in conservative canonical religious or content-
full bioethics, the inversion of attitude in respect of the usual position takes place in
context of the question of radical life extension. What is fundamentally objected to is not
that persons shall enjoy more life.  Rather it is an expansion of the area of human
influence, and thus prerogative that is so uncomfortable for this view. The supposedly
‘pro-life’ positions are not, then, ‘pro-life’ at all, as the conservative opposition to radical
life extension uncomfortably reveals. Rather, they are ‘anti-prerogative’ or ‘anti-choice’
as regards human agency over fundamental biological predicates.
Among others, I have above and elsewhere rejected the idea that humans can intervene in
nature in a way that is beyond the scope of and so harms the natural, and should therefore
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have limited prerogative so to intervene.135 In a general sense applicable in particular to
biological interventions, the total set of the ‘natural’, can only rationally be understood to
be that set of things which is within the physical universe which is to say within a single
space-time manifold, which obviously includes the entire biological realm, humans
themselves, and the product of all human agency. Hume basically agrees with this and
denies that we may infringe God’s prerogative in any case, since if extant at all, it is
pervasive as nature itself and applies to all our possible acts.136 With regard to the
“natures” of human persons themselves, or other organisms, the intervention of humans is
to a large extent morally neutral. It may become positive, or negative, depending upon the
natures of those beings, but the question is not to be decided beforehand by a kind of
general prejudice, and there is no prima facie general restriction on action, any more than
there is a luxury to be in all situations inactive.
Further, conservative ethicists commonly accept the reasonableness and indeed the
imperative of the human prerogative to combat diseases both exogenous and endogenous,
through both exogenous and endogenous means. In absence of a clear reason why
exogenous interventions in human lifespan are fundamentally, and relevantly different
from endogenous ones, and why the decline which is definitive of senescence itself is
distinct from its associated infirmities, a position which denies our prerogative to extend
healthy life by endogenous means appears seriously inconsistent. Can some other
definition of the ‘natural’ be defended which makes the case for this distinction? One
relevant possibility is of course in the mode of meaning that refers to ‘human nature’. I
will deal with this aspect of the discourse further in section 2.6 below.
                                                 
135  Mill JS. and Millar A.  Op. Cit. note 2
136  D. Hume, Op. Cit. note 131.
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2.5 The value of life to persons as substances, and the
extreme subjectivist viewpoint
Before we embark upon an examination of a candidate for the concept of human “nature”
which has been suggested as the possible grounding for a counterargument against the
radical extension of human or personal life, it is important to clarify the groundwork
upon which this conception of nature, in the form argued, depends. I suggest that the
concept of “human nature” which underpins the arguments against life extension as
outlined in the subsequent section, depends upon (a peculiarly Aristotelian) view of
persons as substances.
Aristotle was the substance ontologist who arguably had the greatest influence upon the
subsequent history of the status of substance in Western philosophy. In his Categories, he
defines an ultimate substance as something which is neither “in” a subject, nor is that
which may be “said of” a subject.137 Rather a substance is the subject of such
predications. By this he asserts that particular substances are the foundations upon which
all other categories of existence are built, such that genus is dependent upon species
which is dependent upon particularised exemplars of the species, such as this horse, or
that man. Without any examples of the latter, there would be nothing of which the former
categories could be said, and nothing in which they are instantiated. One cannot have the
category of “horse” in the complete absence of any particular horse whatever for such a
category would then pick out nothing in particular. In this way, it could be asserted that
without such individuated substances, the other categories become meaningless. Indeed,
by this negative criterion of substance (what is not a substance), he arrives at the category
of particular living beings as that which he considers the most fundamental, and most
archetypal of substance. So then, particular living beings are primary substances, or
prôtai ousiai. In book Z of his Metaphysics, Aristotle asserts that the question of being
resolves upon the question of substance, such that to ask “what is being?” is simply to ask
                                                 
137 Aristotle, Categories 2a10
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“what is substance?”138 In stating this he clearly marks substance as the ontologically
prior archetype of being. All else depends upon it.
There is some tension between the Physics, the Categories, and the Metaphysics when it
comes to the subtleties of the definitions of just exactly what it is that Aristotle means
when he refers to particular living beings as substance. These tensions are a matter of
longstanding and continuing scholarly debate, and a long discussion of them therefore
lies outside the scope of this thesis. For present purposes, it will suffice to note that
Aristotle considers that particular living beings are primary predicative subjects such that
there is something simple and un-analysable about the statement that “there is a man”.
While he certainly accepts in the Categories that such substances can change in some
way, such that they become hot or cold, pale or dark, good or bad, they nonetheless must
be viewed as being substantial in the sense that such changes are secondary to their
essence139. There appears in Aristotle to be a hierarchy of essences, such that secondary
substances, such as species (so described in the Categories) are said to correspond to
secondary essences, as stated in the Metaphysics.140 In this way it is arguable that
Aristotle indeed has an unchanging or changeless essential character in mind when he
discusses species in general, but most especially the particular individual living
organisms to which these species refer.
Modern commentators in the bioethical discourse who are of an Aristotelian view as
concerns substantial form, or essence have often taken from this what amounts to an
absolutist view of persons as substantial entities with unchanging and essentially timeless
natures or essences. This amounts to the core of what I have called the “conservative”
bioethical viewpoint, and it is consonant with views of the value of life as depending
upon a particular frame of being, a substantial thingness upon which the category of
being both human in general, and a particular humans depend, and from which they
derive their “intrinsic” value. This unchanging, fixed or substantial essence is analogous
with, or identical to the “frame of the gift” of life, upon which the sanctity, and therefore
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139 Aristotle Metaphyisics Z.6
140 Aristotle Metaphysics Z.4 1030a11-12
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the value of that life, as personal life or life instantiated within the category of
personhood, are said to depend. Consider the following from a recent paper by Patrick
Lee on the subject of substantial identity:
The comparison between voting rights and the right to life is relevant only if one
assumes that all rights are of the same sort, which is simply not true. Some rights
vary with respect to place, circumstances, and talents; other rights do not. We
recognise that one’s right to life does not vary with place, as does one’s right to
vote. …The basic right to life is the same as having moral status at all, that is,
being the sort of entity that can have rights or entitlements to begin with. And so
it is to be expected that this right would differ in further and more fundamental
ways, from other rights, such as a right to vote. In particular, it is reasonable to
expect that having moral status at all, as opposed to having a right to perform this
or that type of action in this or that type of situation, should be based on the type
of thing (or substantial entity) something is. And so, just as this right does not
vary with respect to place or situation, so it does not accrue to someone because
of an acquired skill or disposition. Rather this right belongs to a person, a
substantial entity, at all times that she exists, not just during certain stages of her
existence, or in certain circumstances, or in virtue of additional, accidental
attributes. Thompson is right when she says that to show that something now has
rights one must produce some fact about its present, not its future. But this is
easily done. Right now the human embryo is an entity with the same substantial
nature as, and so equal dignity with, you or me. The pro-life position is not that
unborn human beings are potential persons and therefore have a right to life.
Rather, potentiality is important only because it is an indicator of what kind of
thing is already present. From conception on, the unborn human being is a
developing substantial entity with the basic, natural capacities to reason and make
free choices. She right now is that type of thing or substantial entity. And it is the
type of thing that matters, not the condition that thing is in, which may or may not
allow her immediately to exercise all of her basic capacities. [Emphases
original.]141
Now, it may be prima facie thought that what was being argued here is a kind of
processual argument, such that a “thing” is interpretable as a “process” or the character
of a process but this is not what is in fact meant, as is made clear by the use of the
Aristotelian language of “accidental attributes” to describe the processual elements of the
thing in question. Further it is asserted that:
                                                 
141 Lee P. The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity. Bioethics 18;3 2004. pp249-63
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Human beings with brain damage still have the basic constitution oriented to
developing the immediately exercisable capacity for such acts, which is why they
are rightly recognised as human beings and persons. An organic defect may
prevent them from ever (in this life) developing the capacities they do have in
virtue of the kind of entity they are.142
It is key that this qualification encompasses “organic defects” which are fatal to the
possibility of self-consciousness or similar but yet nonetheless held not to alter the
fundamental kind of being a “person” is. This clearly distances such a view from any
functionalist view that simply references the inherent potential of an organic process to
develop into a functioning person, which is critiqued as being necessarily some conscious
psychological process. However it is also important to recognise that it is not an appeal to
the substance of the body, which crucially in this case is clearly damaged in important
ways which themselves preclude the relevant psychological processes from manifesting.
These views are echoed by like-minded ethicists throughout the literature, particularly
those of religious persuasion as in this example from explicitly Catholic philosopher
Peter Kreeft:
How is a person to be defined? The crucial point for our argument is not which
acts are to count as defining a person (is it speaking, or reasoning, or loving?) but
the relation of these personal acts to the person-actor. Is a person one who is
consciously performing personal acts? If so, people who are asleep are not people,
and we may kill them. Is it one with a present capacity to perform personal acts?
That would include sleepers, but not people in a coma. How about one with a
history of performing personal acts? That would mean that a 17-year-old who was
born in a coma 17 years ago and is just now coming out of it is not a person. Also,
by this definition there can be no first personal act, no personal acts without a
history of past personal acts. What about one with a future capacity for
performing personal acts? That would mean that dying persons are not persons.
Surely the correct answer is that a person is one with a natural, inherent capacity
for performing personal acts. Why is one able to perform personal acts, under
proper conditions? Only because one is a person. One grows into the ability to
perform personal acts only because one already is the kind of thing that grows
into the ability to perform personal acts, i.e. a person. 143
                                                 
142 Ibid. footnote p.262
143 Kreeft P. 1997. “Human Personhood Begins at Conception.” Catholic Education Resource Center.
Available at: http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/abortion/ab0004.html [Accessed January 2008]
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Kreeft here subtly but clearly distances, without particular warrant, the processes of
psychology and action from the person concerning whom a definition is sought. The
function of this distancing is to secure the concept of a “substance” for what are
otherwise best described in processual terms. But such distancing presupposes, of course,
that there must be such a distance, and that the person must be in some sense separate
from all of these things or processes. A person is conceived as a perduring entity who
bears the relation of both author and subject of actions, intentions, and other
psychological and physical states, but who is not identical to them, and whose identity is
in no way fundamentally composed of them. But such an entity would be strange indeed,
and its causal and subjective status seriously in question. After all, if it in itself does not
change, how can it have any causal input into the processes we commonly associate with
persons? In Kreeft’s picture and similar ones, what we are left with amounts to an
essentially disconnected essence. So disconnected is this essence, in its changelessness,
indeed, that one might almost call it entirely empty, insubstantial even, for if it is
thoroughly disconnected from all of the psychological and physical processes, properties,
qualities, and states of a body and mind, or an embodied mind,144 it is open to us to
question what is left of the concept of a person? Kreeft himself explicitly references the
idea of soul, as the candidate for this substantial form:
…it must be said that “human being” is not a merely biological term because the
reality it designates is not a merely biological reality, though it is a biological
reality. To identify human beings and persons is not biologism; in fact, it is just
the opposite: it is the implicit claim that persons, i.e., human beings, have a
human biological body and a human spiritual soul; that human souls inhabit
human bodies. The reason we should love, respect, and not kill humans is because
they are persons, i.e., subjects, souls, “I’s” made in the image of God Who is I
AM. We revere the person, not the functioning; the doer, not the doing. If robots
could do all that persons could do culturally, they would still not be persons. Mere
machines cannot be persons. They may function as persons, but they do not
understand that they do not have freedom, or free will to choose what they do.
They obey their programming without free choice. They are artefacts, and
artefacts are not persons. Persons are natural, not artificial. They develop from
within (like fetuses!); artefacts are made from without.145
                                                 
144 As I would prefer, or even “bodied mind” to signify the lack of deep duality, though there might be
some layeredness of emergent reality, as will be discussed later.
145 Kreeft P. Op. Cit. note 143.
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Now we see clearly that Kreeft accepts a trichotomy: human body, human psychology,
human soul. It is the third of these that in his schema supplies the “substantial” part of
personhood, as is likewise implicit in Lee’s case, and in that of other Catholically-
influenced or committed thinkers. Further, I hold that any position which appeals to a
substantialist view of personhood must inevitably postulate, if not a soul per se, then
some similar “thing” on which to hang the concept. But here is a major problem. What
work does such a concept do in the idea of personhood? I will deal with the soul
candidate first, and then move on to other possible candidates.
As regards souls, if persons may have either any psychology, or none at all (as must be
the case to qualify these responses as candidates to establish the irrecoverably comatose
or PVS patients, or indeed embryos, as persons), and if they may have any kind of body
(whether severely brain damaged, or no) or none at all, as is suggested by the non-
dependence of personhood in itself on the body with its ever shifting structures, fortunes,
and predicates, but on a non-physical, non-biological perduring entity, then how do
persons interact with either psychology or the body? Do any of the changes of the body
or mind have any influence upon it? Does even the death of the body? If not, then of
course we are confronted with a complete lack of explanation, from the “pro-life”
position, for the “sanctity of life” position, since it is clearly held that this position does in
fact depend upon the criterion of the presence of personhood, which is identified with the
“image” that is the frame of the gift of life! If this substance is truly changeless, and in its
essence independent of both psychology and body, then it appears not to be part of the
causal reality of the physical world of the body/psychology, and consequently would
appear to be irrelevant to the concept of death, for it could not be subject to it in the
ordinary sense of bodily death. Of course, this is implicit in the concept of a “soul” but
whence, then, the traction of the soul-derived concept of personhood, upon the value of
the life of the body/psyche, from which it appears to be so logically disconnected?
Worse, what indeed can it then mean for a changeless substance to be “alive”? Now
Kreeft’s language above suggests that he wants some causal relation to subsist between
the soul and the body/mind. But if this is the case, what can that relation be? If, as is
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suggested by the ‘psychological person-function-bot’ example he uses, this relation is one
simply of adding “freedom of will” to the psychology, then how is it that the substance,
changeless as it is, can itself “act” freely, or actively initiate such causal streams in the
body and psychology? This suggests internal complexity, and capacity to interact with
the physical processes of the body/mind, and so renders the necessarily changeless and
causally independent entity of the soul both causally dependent (in the sense of being a
part of the causal system in question) and changeful, destroying the very concept it is
hoped this would support and rendering it identical with a concept of a causally
interacting natural process. His assertion that persons are “natural” in this light is rather
telling, for what in nature is an utterly changeless substance, and also causally efficient in
the active sense that is implied by the notion of freedom of will? What can both
participate in, and yet be wholly separate from, the causal economy of the natural
universe? Souls are explicitly supernatural and the causal question is here fudged in a
manner very much analogous to the fudging of Cartesian Dualism of mind and body.
Also, what is the relation of the ‘person-soul’ to the zygote? Is it affected by the
simplicity of the zygote? Can it exert “will” in an independently intelligent sense upon
the development of the embryo? If it is asserted that the psychology and the soul are
independent of one another, the former simply being a functional-process, but yet the
latter changeless, what work does the soul do in the psychology? If this causal relation
and internal changefulness is denied, then the presence or absence of the soul, in turn,
appears to have no effect whatever upon the processes or manifestations of the actual
body, or the psychology which is associated with that body and which emerges from that
body’s activities. There is no requirement (other than, perhaps, a wholly stipulative one)
even that the soul’s relation perdures through the bodily life of the being with which it is
supposedly associated. But if this is so, then what is the soul, to the body, or the
apparently psychologically-instantiated mind? What is this thinsubstantial “thin
particular” (to borrow a phrase from D.M. Armstrong146 though rather badly out of
context, as the soul is unlikely to conform to his concept, which appears matter-
dependent, though other ideas of “substantial personhood” may)? What remains of this
                                                 
146 Armstrong DM. 1978.  Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, vol.1. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
92
concept, which seems so disposable as to represent a very clear case of that which
William of Ockham warned us against: nothing more than an “entity beyond necessity”?
Nothing at all, I would suggest. John Locke had similar worries, and went so far as to
suggest that a person’s soul might be replaced without them even being aware of the
change.147
Locke’s attempt to rescue something of the concept of Aristotelian essence, at least
insofar as this was a candidate for substantial identity, depended upon some other concept
than the soul. He appears to have rejected the notion of a non-material essence in favour
of a material candidate to ground his concept of substance, which then served to ground
his categorisation of what he termed “sortals” or reidentifiable complex material bodies.
His concept appears to have pointed at some material substratum, perhaps a complex of
atoms, which provided the material basis for a continual, and non-processual substantial
identity. He did not specify what this was to be, but merely speculated that there was
some such thing, which might one day be known as the supplier or substantial identity.
Despite this, he adopted what might be termed a conventionalist approach to the bodies
of objects in general, noting that the conjunctions of bodily parts into a whole appeared
largely a matter of convention, rather than true essence or substantial identity. So, the
conjunction of these bricks into this or that house, or this or that pile, or bridge, appears
mostly a matter of how we view them, and what their function is, to us. This partial
scepticism led him to consider that living bodies are likely the best candidates for sortal
status in terms of substantial identity,148 since they do appear to manifest a unity that is in
some sense necessary, and not simply arbitrary or conventional:
That being then one plant which has such an organisation of parts in one coherent
body, partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it
partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of
matter vitally united to the living plant…149 150
                                                 
147 Robinson H. 2004. “Substance.” In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ [Accessed January 2008]
148 A position echoed (and thought novel by some) by Peter Van Inwagen, in his book Material Beings:
Van Inwagen P. 1995. Material Beings. Cornell Paperbacks, New York, NY.
149 Locke J. 2004. (f.p. 1689). Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Penguin Classics, London. Book
II.XXVII.4 p298
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In this way the most obvious modern candidate, for living bodies, for a Lockean
substratum might be thought to be the individual genome. However, of course, there are
numerous problems with this candidate. Firstly, it does not seem to guarantee the
condition of unity. In the case of clonal colonies of plants, is a Mangrove swamp
composed of many trees, or just one? Are bacteria each individuals, or else is a colony
one individual? In the most relevant case for persons, identical twins share a single
genome, but are non-identical persons. If one twin committed a murder, it would appear
to matter which of them was punished, and we would not think that both must be
punished in order that the crime be redressed. Also, of course, all my tissues (with the
exception of red blood and hard bone) contain a functioning genome, there being trillions
of them, and I do not commit mass-murder when deliberately scratching my arm, or
amputating my toe. But more tellingly than this, I cannot survive without the bacteria and
other organisms in my gut, and each have an utterly different genome to my own. It is
often said that a human body comprises approximately 100 trillion cells, but it is less
often noted that only around 10 trillion of these cells are possessed of a specifically
human genome. The remainder are largely possessed of bacterial plasmid (rather than
chromosomal) genomes. Even the cells are composites of historically separate genomes,
as discovered and noted by Lynn Margulis,151 with prokaryotic bacteria-like components
in the form of mitochondria, each with its own genome, inhabiting a eukaryotic cellular
body, with its separate, singular complement of chromosomally ordered genetic material,
contained within the nucleus. Nor are all of these individual genomes in any sort of
unchanging form either across generations, by chiasmata during sexual reproduction or
other processes (in the case of the prokaryotes), or even within the lives of the individuals
themselves. In the case of the prokaryotes this is most clear, from the process of Lateral
Gene Transfer between them, by which genetic material is exchanged and shared. In the
case of complex organisms such as humans, this instability is manifest in many ways, for
example by chiasmata in the meiotic division of the sex-cells (surely still to be classed as
                                                                                                                                                  
150 It should be noted that both Van Inwagen and Locke’s views, if simply adjusted to accept the
ontological primacy of process over substance, at least in the case of living organisms, tend rather than to
dispute, to support the core and general theses of this dissertation.
151 Margulis L. 2003. Acquiring Genomes: A Theory of the Origins of Species. Basic Books. New York,
NY.
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“part of” the whole individual human while harboured within the system), or more
pointedly by haphazard changes either by random mutations caused by radiation or
chemical instability, or else more powerfully by the action of retroviruses, which build
their own genome into the host’s genome, thus permanently transforming it. These
transformations may become hereditary, if they occur within the gametes, and it is
currently considered that roughly 8% of the human genome is retrovirally derived,152
though this may increase as our still nascent understanding of their evolutionary role
deepens.153 More generally, genome instability in individual somas is a well-established
fact of life. Much of this instability is ongoingly managed or mitigated by self-repair
mechanisms, but it is well understood, and germane to this thesis in particular, that
imperfect repair mechanisms resulting in serious genomic instability is “a major
stochastic mechanism of aging”.154
It might be thought that this latter in itself, particularly in context of the overarching
theme of this work, argued for a genetic candidate for a Lockean materialist substratum
for living beings. But even aside from the swarm of candidates above there are a number
of further serious problems with such a view. Firstly, it must be recognised that there is
no single identifiable “master copy” of the genome at work in any multicellular organism.
Even within the group of cells that share a parent genome, from, say, a zygote, (thus
ignoring 90 percent of the cellular units in the human body, for example) there is no
“master” genome copy persisting through time which serves as the ongoing prototype.
Further, as development occurs, the genome, in terms of what it “means” to each cell, and
to the body as a whole, changes. Cell differentiation ensures that different cellular
genome examples have differing functional states of the genome, such that some genes
are “on” and others “off”. These expression-states, which are of course represented in
physical differences, differ between cell types, and change across time within each cell.
Further, damage to nucleic acids which precipitate the changes associated with aging is
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mostly of a harmful variety, whereas many of the changes to DNA within cell lines is
non-harmful, and can be passed through the somatic cell lines, such that all of us, over
time, turn out to have mosaic, rather than universally specific DNA identities. If the
changes occur very early on in development, as well as further down the line, an
individual may wind up with fairly widely divergent genomes across cell-lines, and so be
a strongly mosaic genotype organism, without particular ill effect. Further still, the
example of chimeric organisms, whose chimeric fusion happened in the early stages of
development in the womb, provides a convincing reductio ad absurdam of any
proposition that the identity of an organism, let alone the identity of personhood, depends
upon the genome. So, a person with a chimeric genome is an organism resulting from the
early-stage fusion of cell lines from two (or rarely perhaps more) quite separate zygotes,
each with its own individual genome. If this occurs, the resulting person may end up with
cells with genomes of literally 2 (or perhaps in rare cases, more) types, as divergent from
one another as are those of ordinary brothers and sisters of the non-genetically-identical,
separate birth, variety. The resulting chimera, however, functions normally with this
admixture of cells with divergent DNA, and is usually indistinguishable in form and
function from any other person. In one remarkable case, a woman named Karen Keegan,
from Boston, suffering kidney failure, hoped that one of her three sons might be a match
for a transplant. The subsequent tests appeared conclusively to show that while all three
brothers were related fraternally, two of them were apparently not her sons at all. She was
found to be profoundly chimeric, even producing genetically wholly distinct sets of
gametes. Interestingly, the phenomenon of chimerism, once thought rare, may be
surprisingly more common, according to some experts possibly affecting as much as 12
percent of the whole human population!155,156 Whatever the rate of incidence, it is, in my
opinion a clear reductio for the idea of genomic substratum identity for persons.
However, we are left with a fairly strong intuition that there must be something that can
be said that leaves the self-identity of organisms as a viable concept. I think that there is,
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and certain of the remaining subsections of Section Two and especially Section Three of
this work will deal, among other things with the elucidation of just what this may amount
to.157
Returning to the issue of a substance account of the value of life to persons, in view of
the above failure of the best candidate for a particular physical substratum, and of the fact
that cellular and other tissue turnover and flux in living bodies replaces, or changes the
character of, essentially all of the physical material of the body in fairly rapid succession,
it does not seem that we will find a plausible physical candidate for “substantial identity”
of living organisms. As will be argued further below in the section on the value of life to
persons as processes, the psychological case is even more clearly lacking in a “substance”
identity.
But even if such a “thing” in the sense of perduring “substance” could indeed be found,
would it somehow guarantee the value of life in any case? The value of life as held to be
intrinsic in a substantialist mode has certain key features. Most saliently:
ISV1: The value of life is held to be unitary and absolute, which means that it
obtains entirely at all times that it is present at all, and is not subject to
increment or degree.
This absolutist position on intrinsic value is what is referred to when it is argued to
protect the human organism from zygote to grave, at every stage between and regardless
of any other facts whatever other than that the human organism is alive. A number of
consequences extend from this idea. Firstly, if it is thought that no other factor matters,
then either we have an absolutist value of all living organisms, after the Jain mode,
wherein there is moral equivalency across all life forms, or else there is some special
further condition of humanity which confers special status upon even severe PVS patients
wherein no functioning cortex remains, and zygotes. But this presents something of a
dilemma. If all life is equally valuable in absolute terms, then we have an unworkable
                                                 
157 This will turn on an analysis of the thermodynamics and biodynamics of living as separate from non-
living matter, and the processually transcendent stages which extend from and depend upon this remarkable
phenomenon.
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practical situation, and must reach the repugnant conclusion that we commit murder
incessantly and on a truly monumental scale. Such a conclusion appears counterintuitive,
counterproductive, and seems to leave something of literally supra-vital importance out
of the picture.158 If a further factor is postulated, this must needs be some additional
aspect beyond the mere biology, and outside psychology. The most common candidate,
as has been noted, is the “soul” made in the image of God. But the above arguments
suggest that this is a very difficult and dubious, if not wholly unworkable candidate in its
own right.
Even if such a value were somehow to be established, however, it would present a
further, and I feel defeating, problem. This is that for such a value to obtain, it must
obtain in whole, or not at all. Several things flow from this. Firstly, even if such a value
could gain some traction in the context of an organism composed apparently entirely of
physical biological and psychological processes, such that it might be attached to such an
organism in a manner which protects the physical biological life of the organism (which I
have already argued against), given its absolute nature, it must protect that life absolutely.
In this way, it seems contrary to the definition to suggest that it simply fails as persons
age towards death. Surely if it is unitary and non-incremental, and so obtains wholly at all
points while the organism is alive, then it must protect the organism without fail, and we
are driven to a conclusion that intervention in aging to prolong lifespan, and the
prolongation of lifespan of whatever form, provided that it has such a substance-value, is
an absolute imperative. It would appear that if any conservatives who accept a canonical
position on the sanctity/intrinsic value of life in a substance mode seek to argue against
radical life extension, they must explain why their view does not endorse or indeed
command such action, though it purports to be, in an absolute sense, ‘pro-life’, or else
they must accept that its fundamental function is not in fact an endorsement of life’s
continuance, but rather simply constitutes a denial of human prerogative.
                                                 
158 This will turn out to be a kind of supervenient or transcendent hierarchy of value extending from the
basic definition of life, and incrementally built by the driver of the process itself,
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Now this must be true, for if the absolute value has any hold or traction at all on the
requirement for prolongation, meaning if the value can in fact represent a value of life’s
continuance, it must command such a continuance without fail. But can it do so at all?
Does or can it have any such traction or any relation whatever to the value of life’s
continuance?
I would argue that it cannot.
This may seem to be a startling conclusion, but I think it is warranted by further analysis.
The continuance of life must be a temporal phenomenon. The key criterion is of course
extension in time. A value that guarantees such an extension must, therefore, have some
factor that is equally time-involved, time-critical, time-relative, or time-dependent.
Another way of putting this is that such a value must be time-incremental.159 If the value
is none of these, if it is truly timeless, then it fails to contain explanatory force for the
assertion that continuance in time is what is important. A value of life that is absolutely
timeless, therefore, appears to be applicable only to true (supernatural) immortals. But
even for them, it would appear to be, in a sense, a content-less and superfluous value, for
it would be redundant, since they cannot die. If such a value could somehow be said to
obtain for mortal beings, it remains to be seen what it might mean to them. Can it provide
an explanation for a time-incremental value? It would appear that it cannot, for a time-
incremental value must tell us, for example, why or how, or at the very least say
something about why it might be better to live a longer, rather than a shorter life. If a
value is absolute, non-relative, and obtains in whole or not at all, it is fundamentally
bivalent. A bivalent value of life, for sets of organisms that live respectively a single
hour, a single day, a single year, a hundred years, or a thousand years, must be exactly the
same in all cases. It exists at every moment of the life in question, and drops to nothing
on death, with no period of decrease. This of course provides the further problem of the
concept of the “moment” of death, for it does not appear that death is exactly a
“momentary” thing. Death in itself, is a process, with cells, even brain cells, dying not
                                                 
159 I here adapt a concept from Dworkin, as described in his “Life’s Dominion”, of values as either
absolute, or incremental. Dworkin R. 1993. Op. Cit. note 53. pp. 70, 73-4, 80
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instantaneously, but continuously such that the organism’s life diminishes towards a zero
point, which is reached at different times by different tissues, neurons, and neuronal
complexes. But the major issue here is that such a value apparently has no power to
explain why living a further minute, hour, day, year, decade etc. would be good. It
appears to yield a judgement that, provided an organism is mortal and will definitely die,
it does not matter how long the life is, qua the value itself, since it makes no difference
whatever to that value, and the value can tell us nothing about the time-incremental value
of the duration of the organism. An absolutist substantial entity is importantly time-
irrelevant, and an absolutist intrinsic value of life understood in substantialist terms must
also be so. This is why block-universe theorists, following the Parmenidean logic whether
consciously or not, are committed to the view that time is essentially illusory.  To
understand the value of life’s continuance, therefore, we must search for a value more
connected with time and therefore (necessarily time-incremental) process, which are
themselves inseparable concepts. Time, for Heraclitus, was real, and the modern process
philosopher Rescher holds as the first of his five basic propositions of process philosophy
that: “Time and change are among the principal categories of metaphysical
understanding”.160 I will propose a conception of value in subsequent subsections, which I
argue entirely fills the role thus necessitated.
These observations provide some measure of explanation of what is wrong with Mary
Ford’s analysis in a recent paper, of the value of personhood providing an absolutist
value. In this paper, she sets out what she considers to be the “personhood paradox”,
which is that for (she omits the term “liberal” but this is the kind she has in mind)
personhood theories of value, persons must themselves be of “ultimate” value, but yet
such theories, in lionising personhood, and especially the autonomy thereof, appear to
self-defeat, since it is usually considered by proponents of such liberal versions of the
theory that persons may decide voluntarily when their lives have ceased to have value. In
this paper, Ford displays significant confusions between absolute and instrumentalist
concepts of value, as can be seen by the following:
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If we accept that persons cannot exist outwith the context of their lives, then we
can proceed to ask: what are the implications of the ultimate value of the person
for the value of the life on which it depends for existence? I propose that if (as
personhood theory claims) the person has ultimate intrinsic value, then the life of
a person must have ultimate instrumental value, even if its intrinsic value is
minimal. Thus, although the circumstances of living may be painful, difficult,
unhappy or even miserable, the life itself must as a matter of logical consistency
be of ultimate value if the person is of ultimate value. Unless personhood
proponents accept this, they commit themselves to a scalar version of personhood
in which ‘person’ is not an all-or-nothing category, but a spectrum, so that one
individual may be more or less of a person than another.161
Her difficulty arises from the conflation of or illegitimate conjunction between absolutist,
or substantialist conceptions of personhood, which specify an absolute intrinsicality and
those which are instrumentalist, wherein value is strictly determined by the valuing agent
themselves, as is pointed out by John Harris in a paper given in reply:
Ford claims that ‘[t]he first contradiction can be summarised as follows: we can
say that if a being possesses criteria x,y, and z, it is of ultimate value and deserves
the utmost protection, yet simultaneously claim that we ought not to interfere if
such a being wishes to destroy itself?’162 Ford believes the answer to this
rhetorical question is ‘no’. She goes on to claim that this is a pitfall and that
voluntary euthanasia cannot avoid this pitfall. However, one problem for Ford is
that this is not the only way of avoiding the problem. Ford assumes, on no basis
whatsoever, that the ultimate value, or moral status, equates to inviolability or
equates to an obligation to persons to preserve their lives at all costs. Ford’s
account treats persons as if they were things and the obligation to them is not an
obligation to a ‘thinking intelligent being which has reason and reflection’163 but
simply to an instance of ultimate value. Ford treats the value of life as an
inalienable right but offers no argument as to why this must be so.164
Here Harris is right on the money. Ford’s assertion that “ultimate intrinsic” value, with its
absolute substantialist overtones, confers a necessary instrumental value is without
argument, and I would suggest is not capable of one. It is wholly stipulative and ad hoc.
For reasons explored above, there is a thoroughgoing disconnect between what Harris
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here correctly identifies as a “thing” substantialist view of perduring value, and the value
of life’s continuance to persons. Her proposition is therefore without merit, as far as her
own argument for its basis is concerned, since there is none at all at the key point. Indeed,
her confusion and lack of clear grasp at this point appears betrayed by her curious use of
the phrase “even if the intrinsic value is minimal”. This in itself appears flatly to
contradict her own assertion that the value of life to persons cannot be scalar and so
cannot be incremental in any way. It is rather explicitly absolute in a substance mode.
Her hoped-for connection is therefore both unsupported, illegitimate and here flatly
denied. Up to this point, Harris and I are in agreement. I do not, however, deny that there
can be any connection between a conception of some intrinsic value of life, and a value
of life to persons, but this relation demands an explanation which is not supplied. As this
work progresses through section two I will attempt to supply such an explanatory
relation. But the proposed candidate for intrinsic value I will suggest will turn out not to
be of an absolute substantialist variety, but indeed is scalar, and fully connects to and
explains the time-incremental nature of the value of life to persons as processes. We are
getting ahead of ourselves, here, though, and must return to the question in hand. But
there is one thing we can begin to say about it at this point, in context of the Harris paper,
which distances my view from the Harris view, which latter I take to be a nicely clear
exemplar of the generally accepted liberal view of exclusively agent-predicated value.165
Harris goes on to assert:
Ford identifies a second supposed contradiction which she characterises as ‘the
erroneous assumption of the conceptual separability of a subject and his or her
life’166 I do not believe that any of the accounts of personhood surveyed by Ford
exhibit this defect or make this assumption. It is true that Dianne Pretty and others
demonstrate their personhood by articulating their wish to die since … the very
same set of capacities required for valuing existence are also required for
disvaluing it. … She has failed to recognise that it is not life that is being valued,
it is existence of a particular sort. Indeed, on many accounts of personhood,
including that of myself, Singer, and others, persons need not be organic life
forms at all. It would be possible for very sophisticated computers which are not
alive in any sense to be persons, and the wrong of ending their existence would be
                                                 
165 Fan R. 2000. Can we have a general conception of personhood in bioethics? In: The Moral Status of
Persons. Perspectives in Bioethics. Becker GK. (ed.) Rodopi, Amsterdam/Atlanta GA.
166 Ford M. Op. Cit. note 161.  p. 94
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the same as the wrong of ending the life of an organic person but not because they
are alive. … Most personhood theorists, I think, treat personhood as a threshold.
… On personhood theory the value of life can be taken to be the value of
personhood and therefore the value of life separable from the personhood is zero.
Most personhood theorists think that once personhood has disappeared (as in
permanent vegetative state) or before it has arisen (as with the fetus and embryo),
the life has no value; it is the personhood that is valuable, embodied, in the case of
humans, in an organic living body but in the case of other possible forms which
persons might take, not necessarily so embodied. Once we see that this is an issue
of interests we can ask the question: what interest does this person have in
continued existence? And if the answer is ‘none’ then their interest in living, or
their right to life cannot be violated.  Since these interests can include an interest
in ceasing to exist, there is nothing paradoxical or inconsistent in recognising that
it can be in the interests of a person to die and hence that killing can constitute
respecting the personhood of individuals. In short, persons are creatures the value
of whose existence is constituted by their interests and preferences. To think of
the value of life as simply the value of maintaining an organic life form in the
form which happens to be the life form of a person is simply to misunderstand
what is being talked about when we talk about the value of life to persons.167
Three significant claims are made in this sequence:
HC1: The value of life to persons is wholly unconnected to any value of living
for organisms insofar as there is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
connection between these. So any value of life in itself is either non-
existent, or if extant is purely incidental (or accidental, in Aristotelian
terms) and irrelevant to the value that persons have for the continuance of
their lives.
HC2: The value of life’s continuance to persons is entirely self-dependent and of
a second-order nature, such that it depends not on their status as persons,
nor even upon their quotidian needs and basic desires, but solely upon
their second order volitions (to put it in Frankfurt’s terms).168 In this way
we may term it a “person-predicated” value as opposed to one necessarily
as a predicate of persons.
                                                 
167 Harris J. Op. Cit. note 164. pp.389-390
168 Frankfurt H. 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
68, No. 1, pp. 5-20
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HC3:  The status of persons as such signifies no value whatever except that
which is instantiated in the present169 conscious second-order preferences
of the person who bears the status in question.
Now while I agree with some of Harris’ critique of Ford, as well as its implicit critique of
substantialist positions in general, the radical (rather “bootstrapping”) subjectivism which
it exemplifies is several steps too far, I feel, and further, is likely not to be supportable
without any appeal to some more basic facts and theories of value-construction. In short,
it is likely to be hoist by its own petard of oversimplification, for it appears to take too
narrow a view of the realm of value, which appears rather arbitrarily isolated from the
context in which it obtains in the world. Further, it exalts to what I will argue to be an
implausible degree, the self-integrity and pure autonomy of second-order judgments, such
that they not only supervene upon, but utterly transcend and are wholly separated from
the processes which underlie them, and from which they arise. While it will be argued
that persons do indeed transcend their originating processes, this transcendence will be
shown to be incomplete, and the purely autonomous self-legislation which is hoped for in
such an idealised picture of absolute transcendence will be shown to be an incorrect
picture of reality for persons. Apart from anything else, it harbours no account of the
apparent radical discontinuity in nature which affords this wholly separate category of
being, and as such represents an ad hoc acceptance of such a discontinuity, which is at
odds with the naturalistic monism argued for in this thesis. However, I will furnish an
account of the nature D3 of Nature, further below, which will account for the partial
discontinuity which is indeed manifest in persons, while preserving the deep categoric
wholeness of nature writ large.  In short, the value of life to persons will turn out to be
not so wholly or exclusively dependent upon presently manifesting second-order
volitions, to the extent that these volitions alone may empty the life of a person of all
                                                 
169 The emphasis upon the presentness of the conscious elements is part of what is hoped to be the force of
the objections raised by Lee, Kreeft, and others from the supposed counterexamples of sleeping and
unconscious persons. The naturalistic processualist account of personhood below, dependent upon the self-
inherence of persons in the bodies of necessarily self-inherent organismic processes, given below, will
answer this objection by elucidating the nature of the necessity of bodies, as well as the non-exclusivity of
the presentness of persons.
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value. Rather, something closer to the Ford intuitions will be described, but which offers
explanatory force and demonstrated connectedness between the intrinsic value, which is
better to be described as an inherent value, derived from the self-inherence of living
beings themselves, and the value of the lives of persons to themselves, 170 as Harris hopes
is wholly disconnected from this former concept of value, which he holds to be null and
void.  The value of life of organisms simpliciter, will therefore also be argued to obtain,
and to be not only the originator, but a present and continuous (so, not wholly present-
bound) underwriter as well as driver and informer of the value of the higher-order valuing
activities themselves, which will be viewed as elaborations of, or deepening of the value
of life simpliciter, as supplied by the thermodynamic arrow which builds organismic self-
inherence. Further, the idea that persons are strictly psychological, and “non-physical”
and that their existence depends solely upon present psychological events or potentials,
such as the actualised capacity for memory (which extends from Locke, and what
Laurence Locke has described as his “simplistic” view of the subject)171, will be denied. I
will argue that subjects’ psychologies are not discontinuous with their bodies, and that
persons are not wholly present at any one time, in a literal psychological sense. And
further, that at any one time, the total person of even presently conscious persons is
largely latent, unconscious, and non-psychologically, but rather physically present. This
fact, that persons are partially conscious, but partially non-conscious beings, whose
totality can only be described in processual terms extended across significant periods of
time obviates the worry as to sleeping persons, though not necessarily as to that
concerning PVS patients with severe brain-damage. In this way I deny every one of the
claims HC1-HC3 above, and the elucidation of this denial will play out in subsequent
subsections of this work, with what I hope will be important consequences for the
increased compatibility with each other of the core intuitions of liberal and conservative
bioethical theorists.
                                                 
170 Persons will be viewed in a Spinozistic mode of particularly or especially self-inherent examples of the
self-inherent process-systems definitive of living organisms in general.
171 Cf. Robinson H. 2004 Op. Cit. note 147.
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2.6 Concepts of human nature and their implications for
radical life extension
There is a mode of the ‘natural’ that is of relevance here. This has been referenced and
discussed above and is best understood by reference to the notion of the ‘normal’. In this
mode, the hitherto de facto absolute frame of the human life span, as referenced by such
statements as ‘to have lived out his natural life’, may be described as being simply what
has been, and continues to be, normally the case. Indeed so universal and intractable has
the maximum span been, on account of the stability of the biological predicates of
lifespan within species, that it may be accounted to be not so much ‘normal’ as ‘given’,
and in that sense to be the foundation of many expectations that have come to be reflected
in and accommodated by our cultures, even to the extent of being able to be considered a
primary shaping influence thereof. Insofar as this is true, radical life extension may have
a profound effect upon the way we view our life span, in specifically cultural terms,
which in turn might affect the mode in which we derive meaning from specifically human
experience, and therefore, arguably, human nature. This issue is specifically raised in the
influential and much referenced ‘Ageless Bodies’ report of the President’s Council for
Bioethics:
Some proponents of age-retardation research use language that suggests an image
of life as a ‘time line,’ uniform and homogeneous, rather than as a forward-
moving drama, composing different acts or stages—infancy, childhood,
adolescence, coming-of-age, adulthood, parenthood, ripeness, decline. This would
imply an understanding of life as composed of interchangeable and essentially
identical units of time, rather than composing a whole with a meaningful form of
its own, its meaning derived in part from the stages of the life cycle and the fact
that we live as links in the chain of generations… Life as lived in time may be
more akin to a symphony, in which a certain temporal order—pacing and
procession, meter and momentum—governs the relationship between the parts
and the whole and, more important, gives a dynamic process its directed
character. Lived time is also shaped by memories of those who came before, and
of who we ourselves have been; it is informed by imagined future possibilities,
created by our hopes and plans for what we might yet become. The animated
shape of a whole life affects how we live every portion, and altering the shape of
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that whole might therefore have far greater consequences than merely giving us
more time.172
What are the subtexts of the message as presented by the President’s Council,
exemplified by the passage above? It appears clear from the metaphor of the symphony,
in context of the discipline imposed upon it by conventional limits as to length and
structure, that what is being held as important is not structure simpliciter but rather a
particular structure, since there is no warrant whatever to suppose that, once free of our
presently absolute life span constraints, then lives as lived would have no shape, no
drama, no form, no meaning! It seems that what is worried about is not that there will be
no variation, drama, form, or meaning, but rather that absent this particular structure, the
present meaning of ‘human nature’ will be fundamentally changed or lost. It appears
clear that beyond the particular structure alluded to, the author finds it difficult to see that
there are173 or may be other worthwhile interpretations of ‘human nature’ that presently
exist, or else will spontaneously arise. It is true that their form may appear alien to the
worrier, or else be difficult to foresee, but is a claim that such different life structures are
not, or would not be ‘human’ warranted? I will return to this question later but first I will
seek to flesh out the conservative worry a bit further. It is important to try to understand
the pedigree of this apparent prejudice. Consider the following, from Leon Kass:
Or is it perhaps better that there be a shape to life, everything in its due season,
the shape also written, as it were, into the wrinkles of our bodies that live it? …
the ‘lived time’ of our natural lives has a trajectory and a shape, its meaning
derived in part from the fact that we live as links in the chain of generations. For
this reason, our flourishing as individuals might depend, in large measure, on the
goodness of the natural human life cycle, roughly three multiples of a generation:
a time of coming of age; a time of flourishing, ruling, and replacing of self; and a
time of savoring and understanding, but still sufficiently and intimately linked to
one’s descendants to care about their future and to take a guiding, supporting, and
cheering role. 174
                                                 
172 President’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE) 2003: Op. Cit . note 97.
173 The reason for the use of the present tense here will become clear later in the subsection.
174  Kass LR.  2003. Op. Cit. note 24.
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Here we encounter a clear example of the idea, referenced above in subsection 1.6 above,
that the situation arising from natural history in the deep EEA in terms of our endogenous
biology, must be expected to accord beautifully, as in a pre-ordained harmony, with our
cultural adaptivity. This idea is, as argued in 1.6 above, patently trading on conflation and
false assumption. Quite apart from this false picture of the relationships of our
endogenous and cultural adaptivity, it appears clear that there is a powerful link in this
line of argumentation between what is, in the sense of what just happens to be the case,
and what is suggested ought to be the limitation of our prerogative to alter it, such that we
ought not to interfere with or change certain ‘given’ arrangements. Consider this from
Michael Sandel175:
To acknowledge the giftedness of life is to recognize that our talents and powers
are not wholly our own doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts we expend
to develop and to exercise them. It is also to recognize that not everything in the
world is open to any use we may desire or devise. An appreciation of the
giftedness of life constrains the Promethean project and conduces to a certain
humility. It is, in part, a religious sensibility. But its resonance reaches beyond
religion.176
Which is explicitly endorsed by Kass:
As a critique of the Promethean attitude of the enhancers, Sandel’s suggestion is
on target. For the manipulator, appreciating that the given world—including his
natural powers to alter it—is not of his own making could induce an attitude of
modesty, restraint, humility.177
These sentiments evince what I believe to be at the heart of this aspect of the case against
specifically endogenous life span extension: what is objected to, once again, is
specifically the expansion of human prerogative, or power of control, over our own
                                                 
175 Michael Sandel is a (usually quite liberal) communitarian philosopher, but his stance on this issue has
been described by Charles Krauthammer, during the 12th Sept. 2002 PCBE discussion of this paper, as ‘a
fairly radically conservative position’ to which Sandel himself replied that it is not a ‘thoroughgoing’
conservative position, but I agree with Krauthammer that it is conservative in spirit nonetheless. Available
at: http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/dec02/session4.html [Accessed January 2008].
176  Sandel M. 2003. Op. Cit. note 25.
177  Kass LR. 2003. Op. Cit. note 24.
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destinies and predicates. But the worry as here expressed appears deeply flawed in at
least two important respects, both concerning ideas of ‘nature’.
Firstly, in a move previously referred to above in section 1 above, there is an apparent
conflation of the notion of the ‘ordained’ in a religious sense - the idea that the world and
nature was designed by an all-powerful creator - and the idea of nature as being that
which is governed by the laws of physics, and has evolved through a combination of
morally neutral stochastic events and the evolution of biological processes as moderated
and shaped by natural selection. However, the two concepts of universal ontology are
absolutely distinct. Biological nature, as evolved and purely physical has no apparent
component of the ‘ordained’ whatsoever. Rather it is a sequence of frequently unstable
and uncomfortable relationships which have a positive dialectic. The motivator or driver
of this dialectic is a purely physically describable principle and will be further elucidated
below. But the relationship between cultural and endogenous biological adaptivity is not
simply a harmonius whole, pre-ordained in its “givenness” which we should seek to
preserve simply on those terms, but is rather, unsurprisingly and once again, a partly
harmonious, partly uncomfortable and tense interrelation, which is the subject of those
same kinds of dialectical dynamic, and has an inherent potential for instability and
therefore change. If it has a component which supplies an arrow of biological “value”
providing the basis for value in a moral sense, as I believe it does,178 there is nothing to
suggest that this component is ordained in a final causal manner, or ordained at all in the
sense intended by Abrahamic or other religionists. The particular structures that have
arisen from the thermodynamic and biodynamic processes of life could just as well have
not arisen at all, or else may have developed in some wholly other direction, such that no
species that presently exists would then have existed. The arrow I will later discuss does
not point to the existence of some preordained set of particular species and individuals.
To suggest otherwise is to illegitimately conflate the physical aspect of nature with an
entirely separate notion of supernatural ordination, in an attempt to perform an ‘end run’
around the purported problem of the naturalistic fallacy. If the naturalistic fallacy is to be
resolved as an issue, as it must be in a committed natural-monistic schema such as that
                                                 
178 This will be further expanded in later subsections.
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which I propose and accept, some argument that accounts for and accepts natural
processes for what they are is necessary. In other words an argument which is not
dependent upon some Deus Ex Machina device to solve the issue of ethical naturalism by
fiat with no appeal to explanation or elucidation whatever, apart from that it all extends
from outwith nature, as in Moore’s “non-natural properties” or the will of a deity
revealed in some ancient texts, but undetectable in nature by scientific or empirical
means, and therefore wholly outwith the scientific accounts and naturalistic explanations
of the world. These are not resolutions of the difficulty that Moore highlighted, so much
as intellectual cop-outs. It should not be overlooked that the theological account, at least
insofar as it accepts Biblical accounts, is very much committed to a static, non-
processualist species essentialist account, wherein there were a certain set of animals and
plants, created whole and at once. On such an account we may perhaps see where those
who argue for substantial nature, and the sanctity of the “givenness” thereof, are coming
from in their anxiety about alteration thereof. However this account is simply, and
absolutely a false account of the natural history of the universe, biological and non-living
alike. A conflation of an account which accepts ordination of a particular set of animals,
plants, species, genera etc. or the inviolable, ordained givenness of a particular and fixed
cultural-biological schema with that of the scientific account of dialectically evolving and
self-organising natural processes is therefore badly wrongheaded, and should be
discounted. There is evidence elsewhere in this same essay quoted above of Kass’s
commitments to the theological canon:
The importance of human effort in human achievement is here properly
acknowledged: the point is less the exertions of good character against hardship,
but the manifestation of an alert and self-experiencing agent making his deeds
flow intentionally from his willing, knowing, and embodied soul. 179
If argument is made from a theological standpoint, that argument should be explicitly
theological in nature or at least explicitly acknowledge its pedigree as such. In any case,
the theological variant of the giftedness argument, being the sanctity of life based upon
its “giftedness” from the divine, has been fairly thoroughly dealt with above. Elsewhere
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in the paper, Kass does seek to run a more or less secular version of the argument
concerning human nature, from a ‘natural kinds’ standpoint:
The word ‘given’ has two relevant meanings, the second of which Sandel’s
account omits: ‘given’, meaning ‘bestowed as a gift’, and ‘given’ (as in
mathematical proofs), something ‘granted’, definitely fixed and specified. Most of
the given bestowals of nature have their given species-specified natures: they are
each and all of a given sort. Cockroaches and humans are equally bestowed but
differently natured. To turn a man into a cockroach—as we don’t need Kafka to
show us—would be dehumanizing. To try to turn a man into more than a man
might be so as well. We need more than generalized appreciation for nature’s
gifts. We need a particular regard and respect for the special gift that is our own
given nature (and, by the way, also that of each of our fellow creatures).180
To the extent that the secular version of the approach to intrinsic value described above is
indeed predicated on a combination of respect for particular cultural together with
particular natural histories, it would appear that Kass is, consciously or not, endorsing a
view of sanctity or ‘intrinsic’ value that seems indistinguishable from that proposed in
Chapter 3 of the liberal philosopher Ronald Dworkin’s monograph, Life’s Dominion.181
If so, although I would describe such a view as ‘proto-conservative’, it ultimately makes
reference to the values of subjectively valuing persons, and not, as Hartogh182 pointed
out, to the absolute and impersonal classic conservative idea of ‘intrinsic’ human value.
If what is here being argued is not analogous to a Dworkinian account, it will then be
identifiable as a substance version of the account of “nature” as essence or character, as
referred to above in D3. If so, it falls under the critiques applied above to substance
accounts of identity, in this case simply one stage removed, and not of particular
organisms or persons, but of species. As Aristotle, who held that these substance
categories were of only secondary substantiality, realised, the substance account of
categories becomes less defensible the more general it becomes. In any case, if an
account of particular individuals in a species as substances fails, the more general account
                                                 
180  Kass LR. 2003. Op. Cit. note 1.
181  Dworkin R. 1993. Op. Cit. note 53.
182  Hartogh GD. 1997.  “The Values of Life.” Bioethics 11(1): 43-66.
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will fail as well, since the necessary unity and changelessness of the substantial element
will be called even more problematically into question.
I will not seek to deal at length with the idea of essential value of species from a purely
biological view here, other than to suggest that, absent any reference to subjective states,
or cultural values, even suspending reference to the naturalistic fallacy problem (or ad
hoc solutions thereof), it seems difficult to see what is valuable about a particular genetic
arrangement alone.
If one were to accept a “complete set of changeless species” substantialist approach, then
what is the moral status of the HIV virus? Need we preserve smallpox simply because it
once existed? Need we resurrect the dinosaurs? With human senescence in particular, to
the extent that those who reach extreme old age may differ in some important biological,
likely genetic, respects from the background population,183 such a rigid substance-
essentialist argument from nature D3 specifically in context of resistance to senescence
might appear to involve a suggestion that such persons are, in some way, not fully
human! If genetic structure alone is pointed at, does this mean that Down’s Syndrome
persons, who possess in their genome an entire extra chromosome, are not human? On a
substantialist view, are they not persons? Of course, we may also remember the critiques
of the genetic substratum account, given in the last subsection above. Also, there is
something rather monomaniacal about this approach, which has a strong whiff of the
perfectionist Aristotelian final causal approach to ontology. This will be further dealt
with in subsection 2.10.6 below. For now, however, suffice to say that once again I reject
such a substantialist viewpoint as simply representing an incorrect ontological
commitment.
The processualist account of natural biological value given later in section two does not
endorse a view of the value of absolutely changeless species, since it is a process-
account, whose telos, if such there is, is very much open-ended. Indeed it rejects the idea
                                                 
183  Olshansky S. Jay. “On the biodemography of aging: a review essay.” Popul Dev Rev: 1998; 24: 381-
393.
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that there absolutely are such things as species with a substance essential nature D3.
Also, of course, the evolutionary account of species lies in accord with this process view,
since all species that presently exist are descended from species now extinct, or else
whose form or nature D3 their descendents have abandoned, and the species which do
exist are constantly exploring the space of environmental possibility, and change, and are
therefore necessarily open to react to change, and therefore are open to change in
themselves. The existence of any one species, in the particular general form it now takes,
which may be described in a processualist view of nature D3 as being its present
character, does not depend upon changelessness, but rather upon changefulness and
process from one general character to the next, with few very specific requirements other
than the continuance of striving towards self-persistence. The very exigency of that
striving itself necessitates change, for a wholly changeless, rigid species will soon
become extinct (just as it will be seen that a wholly changeless organism is, at least, dead,
and no longer an organism, so is impossible).184 To see this we must merely ask whether
the set of species that presently exists depended, for their existence, upon the extinction
(by change) within each respective line of their ancestral general characters or forms?
The answer is yes. They do so depend, at least if one looks at the genetic line, or germline
of the species itself. It has become another and another and another, in a continual
cascade of process. The bias towards seeing organisms as exemplified by their
multicellular bodies (which are somatic series-organisms) rather than as germ-line series
organisms, understandably enough derived from our never having encountered the
concept of the germ-line until the last 150 years of our cultural history, may mean we
focus a little overmuch on the view that organisms themselves do not change their form
radically through time. If we look at the germline, we may see that it has a wholly
processual nature D3, continually shifting to accommodate the changes in the
environment that it encounters in the realm of the Red Queen.185 186
                                                 
184 Of course being a thoroughgoing processualist, I consider that even non-living “things” are processes,
but there is a unique category of process which belongs to organisms, with further complexities and
elaborations within this category, which definitively separates living from non-living processes, as shall be
seen further below.
185 Ridley M.  1995. The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature. Penguin, London.
186 Of course we do not need to go so far to demonstrate the absolute nature of process in organisms, but
this is a good example, in any case.
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I think it likely that the conservative arguments from nature D3 trade significantly on a
conflation between the substantialist essence version of this concept, and the
processualist character view. In the last quoted passage, it is made clear that what is
worried about is a kind of loss of essence, specifically, in this case, of species, but
elsewhere in the essay Kass shows that the worry also applies to the essence of human
nature as culturally defined. With respect to the latter the line taken appears to be that we
in fact do behave or lead our lives in some coherent, homogenous way as though we have
a single, particular human nature or essence that will be lost if only we extend our
lifespan. But is this a fair assessment of the essential in human nature? What of its
character nature D3? One may characterise some aspects of the latter as “essential”, being
of vital or core importance, without accepting an Aristotelian sense of essential nature
D3. Is this essential as in “core” or most importantly featured aspect of human nature
really so fragile, so ephemeral and evanescent that even in the course of worrying about it
the writers of the Ageless Bodies essay struggle to find terms to express what it is they
are so worried we will lose? Is culture, ultimately, possessed of a substantialist essential
nature D3? Surely if there were a pardigm case of a processualist nature D3 then it would
be that of culture, whose true nature is one of constant process and adaptation. An
attempt to define national cultural identity in substantialist terms, so, say “Englishness”
through the ages is famously doomed. Culture is predicated by humans in their
characteristic capacity as subjective valuing agents. At base the conservative substance
view of culture appears to involve a lack of acceptance of the essential (as in most
important) value of human persons as subjective valuing agents for whom it would be
rational, and in line with the very most fundamental and definitive aspect of their nature
to seek to extend their span of life, and therefore action and subjective experience, for
instrumental reasons, quite apart from any further underwriting or valuing biodynamic
drive towards individual or group self-persistence. To clarify the essential importance of
this characteristic of humans as persons, one might turn the question around, and ask:
what would be left of the concept of human nature be if we were, as a whole species or
class of being, entirely stripped of our status as subjective valuing agents? The answer
would appear clearly to be that our nature would be so different as to be impossible any
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longer to define it as human in even the sense hoped for by the conservatives! In other
words, the most important feature of humanity, as we commonly refer to it, is that
humans are persons. This necessary condition for human culture may perhaps be
accounted as at least approaching sufficient if consideration of the relation between
eidetic valuing activity and culture is considered. Culture is, after all, never complete. It is
rather, and absolutely, a process of becoming.
In this regard, the stance taken by the PCBE ignores some essential features of the way
this essentially187 human nature has created modernity itself. Although for many centuries
it was indeed the case that cultural nonconformists could be punished by burning at the
stake, it is no longer, and has not been for many decades, the case that all persons follow
what might be called the ‘Solomon Grundy’ life trajectory. In aspects of religion,
marriage, sexual orientation, imagination, art, philosophy, expressed and avowed belief,
lifestyle, reproduction and a multiplicity of other areas, even participation in an
unlimited, ‘virtual’ realm, millions of human persons already do live in a way that, for
many, directly contravenes the very traditional values and frame of life that critics of
aging intervention such as Leon Kass fear might be abandoned. To that extent, the game,
so to speak, is already up. If this is so, following the spirit of the symphony metaphor, but
translated to poetry, then the utter simplicity and uniformity of the child’s rhyme of the
life of Solomon Grundy may largely be a thing of the past, but the disciplines and
strictures of short life imposed upon the enormous range of human aspiration,
achievement, striving and engagement, of human becoming, while arguably good in some
respects, forcing Sonnet-like strictness of form in a few rare cases may unfairly and
unwarrantedly impose prohibitive strictures upon what lives, so to speak, might be
composed should these be removed. What of those who are not ‘natural’ (D3)
Sonneteers? What of those who live their short span in drudgery with little hope that they
may escape within the scope of that short space? What of other, truly epic life-composers,
cut short? What Aeneids and Odysseys would the guardians of the Sonnet-life have us
discard or forgo? Further, if, as the secular, proto-conservative, Dworkin-like argument
                                                 
187 The word is here used, of course, to mean “of fundamental importance to character” rather than in a
substantialist Aristotelian mode.
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here appears to be suggesting, that appropriate lifespan is, in some deep sense, culturally
predicated, could it not be argued, in these very terms, that given the enormous expansion
and liberalisation of human culture in the past few centuries, human lifespan relative to
the breadth of its cultural milieu has actually dramatically shortened? Consider the notion
and ideal of a Renaissance Man. A person fully integrated with their cultural milieu was
once at least possible. What hope now that a single person may within the scope of their
lifetime understand or know all concerning even the single discipline of biology, let alone
further and other realms of knowledge? The harsh and bitter rigours of the Procrustean
lifespan cut us off, increasingly, from the possibility of integrated experience and
understanding of our own created realm of culture and of knowledge. Is it an act of piety
or humility towards the sacred in human culture as a projection and receptacle of human
essence (in the sense of most vital or distinctive characteristics) to choose through brevity
of span enforced by voluntary decay188 to lose the ability properly to comprehend our
own created world?
Further, the argument against radical life extension based on the secular, proto-
conservative Dworkin-like intrinsic value of human life fails, since it does not respect
what in its own view, as clarified above, must be humanity’s own most essential feature.
An argument, which seeks to use this processualist nature D3 as character basis as if it
justified conclusions that are properly drawn from a substantialist view of nature D3, is
an illegitimate conflation.
A residual and possibly serious concern remains, which is at the core of the worries about
human nature canvassed in this subsection. This concern is well expressed by Robin
Attfield:
Without the concept of “nature” in the sense of the inherited (probably
evolutionary) constitution or make-up of human beings, human nature and needs
are liable to be treated as infinitely flexible, and thus as adjustable to the pattern
                                                 
188 If no act/omission distinction is allowed, this appears rather like a slow form of suicide or, in the mode
of Montaigne that Kass has often referred to (e.g. Kass LR 2003 Op. Cit. note 1), with decay of senescence
as a kind of macabre palliative similar to torture prior to execution: a terrible, slow euthanasia. This theme
will be more fully explored in the final section of this thesis.
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intended by the local political authorities, and to be treated accordingly. (This
point is due to Mary Midgley, in Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature189)
But, as the late Geoffrey Warnock remarked, it is not good for people to be
starved or tortured. Indeed Warnock went further: “That it is a bad thing to be
tortured or starved, humiliated or hurt, is not an opinion: it is a fact. That it is
better for people to be loved and attended to, rather than hated or neglected, is
again a plain fact, not a matter of opinion”.190 Thus a robust concept of human
nature turns out to be indispensable to sustain our rejection of unlimited human
flexibility. 191
It is fairly easy to see why a concern about the possibility of treating persons as infinitely
flexible, or infinitely malleable, may drive a thinker towards the idea of nature D3 as
substance. The process view of the world may, at first blush, seem to be a very unsettling
one. After all, it is precisely the view that nothing ever is, in fact, settled. The rock hard
certainties of “dry land” turn out to be fluid (easily seen simply with an expanded
temporal perspective- the continents as boiling seas of geologic and biodynamic
processes), there is no end to the sea of process, and no refuge from its waves and storms
of change. However, the very fact that there is such an emphasis upon and common
acceptance of substantialist ideas of nature, and ontology in general, suggest that we
ought not to be so concerned as all that. After all, many of the processes do in fact
manifest very significant stability over time,192 and lack of possession of a fixed nature, or
a fixed character does not amount to characterlessness, chaos, and infinite flexibility and
malleability, any more than the universal boil of process is without logos. A concern that
political powers may come to view human nature as excessively malleable should be
mitigated by a realisation that the other view can be, and has been, just as terrifyingly
misused. An insistence on a particular, substance view of human nature, such as may be
manifest in the “Solomon Grundy” life referred to above, has many times led to the most
serious abuses of humanity. One hardly need go so far as to invoke the monomaniacal
absolute substance idealism of the Nazis, with their insistence upon a particular race who
will be seen to behave in particular regimented form, to see why an idea of a fixed,
                                                 
189 Midgley M. 1978. Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature. Hassocks, Sussex. e.g. at pp. 19-24
(Attfield’s own reference see: Attfield R. 2006 Op. Cit. note 64.)
190 Warnock G. 1967. Contemporary Moral Philosphy. Macmillan, London; St. Martin’s Press, NY. p. 60
(Attfield’s own reference see: Attfield R. 2006 Op. Cit. note 64.)
191 Attfield R. 2006. Op. Cit. note 64.
192 At least relative to other, more rapid and evanescent processes, such as the current human life trajectory.
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substantialist view of human nature is both wrong and dangerous. Certainly fascism has
at its heart just this kind of substance view of idealised human nature as a static goal, an
ultimate end to which we must conform, or be “sub-human”, but quite apart from
twentieth century fascism history is shot through with such concepts, each one inevitably
oppressive. From mediaeval notions of man as the instrument of God’s purpose, who
must conform to the dictates of the Church, or be expunged as heretical or heathen, to any
number of tribal, civic, and imperial concepts of conformity to the ideal standard of
human nature, with the divergent, less fit, or non-conformists banished, tortured,
oppressed and killed, it is not difficult to find examples of the inherently oppressive
nature of a substantialist concept of human nature D3. Indeed, Attfield seems hardly to
notice that the very thing which he argues must be able to rescue humans from such
oppression, a robust and highly particular concept of human nature, is just what it is that
his “local political authorities” will necessarily be appealing to when they attempt to
corral and stuff the wayward into line with such a vision! Indeed there is something
suspect about the construction of this argument, since it appears to equivocate on the idea
that there is such a fixed description at all. It at once states that there is, and ought to be,
and at another time worries that authorities might misuse the idea that there isn’t one, that
character is infinitely flexible, from the very basis of forcing conformity to just such a
fixed idea of pattern! Surely it cannot be that the “starving” and “torturing” is predicated
on the basis that this is the pattern which “authorities” may have in mind, that human
nature is best conceived as being in accordance with subjection to such practices! No
torturer considers that it is in the best interests of the tortured to be so tortured, else this
would defeat the very purpose of torture. Surely such practices are, as he does state,
undertaken precisely to force a particular concept of human nature upon a people, and
necessarily with a fixed concept already in view! No authorities would torture and kill in
explicit reference to a flexible ideal of human nature, as a multiplicity of possible
characters, without some fixed destination in mind, else there would be no point. What he
is arguing against cannot be simple sadism or wanton cruelty, or purely selfish
aggression, since these reference no particular concept of human nature, or if they do,
precisely trade upon it in order deliberately to cause harm. Indeed, if an idea of human
nature and character as infinitely flexible were held, then torture and coercion would be
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pointless, since on that view humans might adapt to anything at all. Even the burning of
Hell would become tolerable, and eventually unnoticeable to such infinitely flexible
beings, since they would simply, given unlimited scope of time, adapt to its conditions. I
would argue, therefore, that torture, cruelty, abuse, deliberate starvation for coercive
purposes etc. are all tools, if used in reference to human nature at all, which are likely
primarily to be used with a fixed or comparatively inflexible concept of human nature in
mind. Against this backdrop, a concept of human nature D3 as a process of character is
surely less likely to result in oppression. Provided it is understood that such natures are
no more infinitely malleable than is the nature D3 of a river, or of the sun, then a process
view of human nature as character will command, rather than oppression, respect for the
individual characters of the many divergent manifestations of the central stream. In this
way, we simply need some stability, in terms of the character of a process, to anchor
nature D3 in the manner that Attfield wants, avoiding the Scylla of infinite flexibility but
equally and at the same time avoiding the Charybdis of overly rigid conceptions of
human nature, which latter are arguably far more oppressive and dangerous in any case.
In the subsequent subsections I will be looking at the question, inter alia, of whether
human nature must indeed, on a process view, be seen as infinitely flexible, and will
conclude that, while necessarily temporally open-ended and very flexible, the flexibility
of the character of persons viewed as processes is far from infinite, and indeed is far more
fixed by exigencies of the totality of Nature, than is usually conceived on a liberal view.
Apart from anything else, it will be argued below that the structure of persons has a
certain necessary form and nature D3 which both allows nearly unlimited valuing
activity, but which itself restricts that activity when it comes to the negation of the value
of persons, even of persons by their own selves. In this way the autonomy of persons over
themselves, and the predicates of their own personhood, will be seen to be far more
restricted than on the radically autocratic view of the scope of personal autonomy,
bolstered by such liberal ethicists as Harris, or such existentialists as Sartre.
The liberal value of choice, of human prerogative underwritten by a subjective and
instrumental picture of life’s value beckons us forward to the task of extending healthy
personal lifespan. But a question remains: this value may endorse such action, but does it
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command us to do so?  This question relates to a central conservative worry, that has
always prevented conservatives from accepting the liberal view: the worry that in any
secular subjectivist schema the value of life remains, in a fundamental way, contingent
upon subjective human ideas and decisions concerning value, and to that extent, no
matter how stable in terms of cultural history, it is fundamentally whimsical, not absolute,
and therefore dangerously undignified for so important a role. In this way, it is precisely
the picture given in the liberal view of our prerogative to pick and choose among values,
almost God-like, even among the most fundamental, and thereby to decide when life is
valuable, and when it is not, that is objected to by conservatives. I believe that this
concern is justified. There is a problem with the liberal view. It may be this very problem
which itself drives conservatives to seek arcane universal underwriters of value. I will
take up this issue in the following and subsequent subsections of Section Two, where I
will propose an analysis of the liberal view of personhood that will provide, I hope, both
a correct description of, and tractionable explanatory force for the fundamental and
intrinsic value of the continuance of life to persons.
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2.7 The subjectivist liberal view of personhood
and the value of life
Liberal concepts of the value of life begin by asking the question: what is value? The
answer, on the liberal view, is roughly that values are not part of the furniture of the
universe in the matter that objects are.193 Values have no objective ontological status,
independent of subjective valuers, who are described as valuing agents. On the liberal
interpretation of utilitarian ethics, for example, what is ‘good’ is defined with respect to
the subjective preferences of valuing agents. It remains, therefore, to identify what are the
basic requirements for a being to qualify for the status of ‘valuing agent’. Essentially,
these requirements are held to be that a valuing agent, at a minimum, must possess the
following features: self-consciousness, or else an agent could not identify itself as the
source of a value, nor could be capable of valuing its self, as distinguished from anything
else; autonomy, or else a being could not be truly said to be an agent which is doing the
valuing; and rationality, or else the agent cannot hold values to be distinguishable from
one another, and reidentifiable as the values which that agent itself holds. Beings that
possess these three features are generally considered, on the liberal view, to be persons.194
This view has emerged broadly from a dialogue originating in the work of John Locke,195
and modified by Kant196 Which synthesis has become the accepted standard in the work
of modern liberal ethicists. While other criteria have variously been suggested,197 these
key features form the core of the concept, common to virtually all such subjectivist
accounts of personhood. Thus while all valuing agents are persons, not all humans are
necessarily persons, and not all persons are necessarily human. Given these
considerations, on the liberal view, the value of life is the value of life to persons, who
construct this value, as with all values, exclusively by their activity as valuing agents.
                                                 
193 Mackie JL. 1990. Op. Cit. note 36.
194 See e.g. Fan R. 2000. Op. Cit. note 165; Ford M. 2005. Op. Cit. note 161.
195 Locke J.  Op. Cit. note 149.
196 Cf. Ford M. 2005. Op. Cit. note 161.
197 Ford M. 2005. Op. Cit. note 161.
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2.8  Persons as processes
The classic liberal picture of value, based in the value of personhood, is incomplete.
While it may be accepted that self-consciousness, autonomy and rationality are necessary
for personhood, and for valuing activity at the level of valuing agency to take place, they
are insufficient. There is a further requirement that has often been neglected: the
requirement for significant extension of a person in time. Of course it may be accounted
to be trivially true198 that a being which possesses all of these three attributes but has no
extension in time does not exist, is in fact not a being, and is therefore not a real person.
But can a being which has these attributes and which exists for merely some time be
accounted to be a person? Imagine a being with these attributes that exists for merely a
nanosecond. It appears intuitively that such a being cannot be accounted to be a person.
This is because what it is to be a person is not merely to be possessed of these attributes
and to exist, but also to use these attributes to engage in valuing activity in the world. A
being which cannot do so by virtue of having insufficient temporal scope cannot be
accounted as fully being a valuing agent and is not, therefore, a person.
Nicholas Rescher characterises process in general in terms of its necessary temporality in
the following terms:
All processes have a developmental, forward-looking aspect. Each such process
envisions some sector of the future and canalizes it into regions of possibility
more restrained in range than would otherwise, in theory, be available. …
Processes develop over time: any particular natural process combines existence in
the present with tentacles that reach into the past and the future. Just as there can
be no instantaneous vibration or drought, so there is no instantaneous process.199
                                                 
198 Though some constructions of atemporal or timeless substance-persons may perhaps be made to argue
against this, these are of course disregarded here as they are oblique to the subjectivist analysis and in any
case discounted by the primary thesis and supporting argumentation of this work.
199 Rescher N. 2000 Op. Cit. note 90, p. 22.
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It is instructive to re-read this statement replacing the word “process(es)” with that of
“person(s)”. The fit is exact. For a being to be accorded the dignity of personhood, they
must possess sufficient scope in time to take part in the process of valuing. Thus
personhood may be seen to be necessarily a process, rather than simply a particularised
being in a categorical state who may or may not engage in processes, but is not and can
never be touched by process at the core, as may be conceived on an account of persons as
substances. This process of personhood is composed of desires, wishes, hopes,
preferences, thoughts, plans, actions, experiences, emotions, memories etc. These and the
temporally extended interchanges between them are both necessary for and indivisible
from the valuing activity of a self-conscious agent, and thus the existence of persons. For
without the constant interchange of future-directed elements of desiring, hoping for,
wishing and planning, without the rational identification and shepherding of the objects
of such desires into present experience, and the recollection of past mind-states, which in
turn feed back into, sustain, and inform the future-directed aspects, then the valuing
activity of self-aware agency would cease. In such a case, our autonomy would be
meaningless, our consciousness empty and without object even of self, our rationality
would be fixed, idle, and impotent, and our very subjectivity impossible.  Rationality
itself fundamentally involves movement200 and the movement of rationality is processual
in nature.201  Autonomy without change is empty and meaningless. Self-consciousness
flows from one object to the next, and the autonomous proto-rational202 directedness of
this flow is what constitutes the process of personhood. The valuing activity this
particular sort of process predicates constitutes the subjective, instrumental valuation of
living to persons.203 So long as this process obtains, there is a person, and so long as a
person obtains, there is this process.204
                                                 
200 E.g. the movement from one concept to the next- the dialectic of thought.
201 The fundamental driver of this rationality cannot be ultimately in the rationality itself, for this admits of
a kind of bootstrapping circularity, as will be further discussed below.
202 The reason for the proto- qualifier here will become clear in subsequent sections, when the absolute
primacy of rationality will be argued against, in favour of the primacy of the flow, and its driver, itself,
which builds rational structures processually, and secondarily.
203 Horrobin S. 2005. “The ethics of Aging Intervention and Life Extension”. In: Aging Interventions and
Therapies. Rattan S. (ed.). World Scientific Publishers, Singapore.; Horrobin S. 2006. Op. Cit. note 119.
204 Such a view may, at first blush, seem vulnerable to the sorts of “sleeping and unconscious persons”
problems which Kreeft and others have posed. I do not accept that the account is vulnerable to these when
fully iterated, and these will be dealt with further below.
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2.9 The role of conation in the process of personhood, and the
value of life extension
Consider the following passage from Bernard Williams, addressing the question of just
what it is which makes the continuation of life valuable to persons:
…[A] man might consider what lay before him, and decide whether he did or did
not want to undergo it. If he does decide to undergo it, then some desire propels
him on into the future, and that desire at least is not one that operates
conditionally on being alive, since it itself resolves the question of whether he is
going to be alive. He has an unconditional or (as I shall say) a categorical desire
…It is not necessarily the prospect of pleasant times that create the motive against
dying, but the existence of a categorical desire and categorical desire can drive
through both the existence and the prospect of unpleasant times. 205
I think that Williams is absolutely right in his characterisation of what he terms a
“categoric desire”, insofar as its capacity to “drive through” facts and circumstances of
particular person’s lives, to give a “motive against death”, which must arise, of course,
from the value of the extension of life created by this desire.
Consider the desiring for, wishing for, hoping for, and planning towards that form the
obvious features in the landscape of valuing activity, and the movement towards whose
subjectively underwritten objects form the obvious instrumental value of continuing to
live. The affects, our attitudes of positivity and negativity manifest in our desires and
wishes, approbations and disapprobations form the quasi-objective furniture of the non-
cognitivist view of value,206 while the rational process by which they are selected and
secondarily discarded, resisted, or endorsed as considered concrete plans constitutes the
construction of the value itself, according to neo-Kantian constructivists such as
Korsgaard.207 It is one or other of these kinds of purely subjectively-predicated and
                                                 
205 Williams B. 1972.  “The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality”. In: Williams B.
1973. Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. pp. 86, 100.
206 Blackburn S. 1985 and 2000 Op. Cit. note 32
207 Korsgaard C.1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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endorsed desires, and most obviously the latter kind of second order endorsed desires,208
which Williams appears to be putting forward as a possible candidate for the ascription of
“categoric” desire,209 in that the value of continuing to live, and thus continuing to be a
person, (as I would have it) having the forward-directed motivation that drives the
process of personhood towards the future, is suggested by this to be itself contingent
upon a contingent object or set of objects of self-conscious, personal will. In this way,
Williams appears to be agreeing with the idea subscribed to by Harris, that a person may
subjectively legislate the value or otherwise of their own life’s continuance. I do not,
however, agree that each and every such desire is contingent upon or initiated by, or
necessarily sustained by the choice of a person, as Williams here may broadly seem to
suggest.
But how do such objects of self-conscious desire arise? Is any such object in itself as a
particular desire necessary to the process of personhood? Are these particularised objects
of affect or rationally-endorsed desires so exalted that a particular present set of them, in
themselves and however ad hoc this set might be, can be said to constitute the sole and
total value of the continuation of the process of persons?  This last question may well
turn out to be the most important one to ask of the kind view expressed by Harris,
Williams, and more generally in the liberal conception of value to persons, and
particularly in view of the assertions described above at HC1-HC3. For it is just such a
set of values, or disavowals of value, that such a view must assert as constituting the sole
arbiter of the value of their own continuance, to persons. This is especially acute in the
presence of statements such as that noted by Ford of the Judge, who in a judgement
asserted that even a wholly unreasoned disavowal of the value of a person’s own life, by
themselves, may be decisive in terms of this value.210
It does seem, prima facie, that such an account is going to be lacking in satisfying depth.
After all, if a person suffers radical amnesia, such that they lose all memories of any such
affects, desires, plans, or even who they are, does there exist an opportunity to kill them
                                                 
208 Analogous to what Frankfurt would call a “second order volition” Frankfurt H. 1971. Op. Cit. note 168.
209 Williams B. 1972. Op. Cit. note 205.
210 Ford M. 2005. Op. Cit. note 161.
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with impunity? What of very young infants? Should a severely depressed person, who
appears to themselves to feel very strongly, for a time, that they have no continuing
interest in living, and at least for some period repudiates specifically all and any
particular goals, life-plans, desires they may have had of any kind whatever, should such
a person be accounted to have no residual value to or in themselves? For such a person,
would all (non-interpersonally relative – so discounting values such as the value of the
person in question to another) value whatever truly have disappeared? Can they
justifiably or coherently legislate this, for themselves as a total person? Even if it could be
considered coherent, could such an apparent legislation be effective?211
In short, can there be a value of life to persons simpliciter, and apart from any such list of
particularised and subjectively endorsed values? In an even more extreme test, could such
a basic value survive second-order subjective repudiation, alongside or as a bundle with
all other specified values? In order to do so, such a value would need to be, in essence, a
nakedly prospective value, since it could not be said to depend upon any extant particular
objects of value such as simple affects or desires, or subjectively endorsed desires, such
as life-plans. It would also need to be a constitutive value, such that the person simply
cannot be a person in the absence of this value. If such a constitutive value is possible,
may or must this depend upon some other, still more profound value of life, or is the
latter rendered redundant?
To begin to answer the above questions, it is necessary first to ask: what is the driver of
the subjectivity itself which then forms these objects of the affective component of our
psychology, and of the cognitive rational process which selects amongst them? Further, is
Williams’ idea of the “categoric desire” which “drives through” the negative aspects of
experience to underwrite the value of continuation in life, as being in itself a subjectively-
selected and so subjectively contingent desire or some set thereof, the best picture we
may have of such a desire? Is it even the ordinary picture that we do have, and which
appears to us throughout our lives?
                                                 
211 As will be noted elsewhere, the capacity to kill oneself is not identical with, does not equate to the
capacity to disvalue oneself, or rid the continuance of one’s life of value.
127
Consider the following from Thomas Nagel, pondering the same question of the good of
continued existence for persons:
The situation is this: there are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make
life better; there are other elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life
worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is
emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth living even when the bad elements
of experience are plentiful, and the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad
ones on their own. The additional positive weight is supplied by existence
itself…212
This seems right. But this, however intuitively right-seeming, is also mysterious. Here,
Nagel is quite explicitly denying that the positivity can be fundamentally dependent upon
particular subjective goods or desires.  But how can “mere existence” be positive in some
sense? I agree with Nagel, that there is such a non-contingent positivity, but disagree with
Williams to the extent that I assert that such a positivity can be considered to represent a
kind of non-contingent categoric desire, such that the mere continuance of the person
represents fulfilment of this desire.213 In what follows, I will attempt to set out the
groundwork for explanation of the naked positivity argued for by Nagel, which may also
be characterised at the same time as a naked prospectivity, since it is intrinsically future-
directed.
It seems to me that Williams might have accepted my disagreement, to some extent. Later
in the same essay quoted above, discussing the gap between his account of the value of
life’s continuance and that of Nagel, he himself appeared to acknowledge that further
analysis would perhaps discover a more stable and less overtly subjective (perhaps even
non-subjective) basis for the origin and persistence of such life-affirming, categoric
desires:
                                                 
212 Nagel T. 1970. “Death”. In: Nagel T. 1979 Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
pp. 9-10.
213 It should be noted that in this sense, the “desire” represented, identified with nisus and conatus, is not of
a subjective sort, but is basic, and profound. It is, then, a kind of person originating desire. I may be
accused, perhaps, of equivocating on the meaning of “desire”, but at the extreme originating leading-edge,
it seems to me that the meaning of this term may in fact turn out to be rather legitimately equivocal, for
perhaps obvious reasons.
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The difference is that the reasons which a man would have for avoiding death are,
on the present account, grounded in desires – categorical desires – which he has…
Nagel, however, … does not see the misfortune that befalls a man who dies as
necessarily grounded in the issue of what desires or sorts of desires he had … In
fact, further and deeper thought about this sort of question seems likely to fill up
the gap between the two sorts of argument; it is hard to believe, for one thing, that
the supposed contingent fact that people have categorical desires can really be as
contingent as all that.214
Now, the solution to the problem of contingency that Williams points to may perhaps not
extend to the rejection or abstracting away from talk of all and any sorts of “desires”, but
may rather extend from a re-evaluation of the origin of desiring itself. So what is missing,
to fill in the picture? What is missing, I propose, is the conception of persons as future-
directed processes, whose process must be driven continually by something, some
motivating principle, or nisus. This principle or nisus I identify as and with the conative
aspect in our psychology. It is this fundamental future-oriented proto-desire, this
fundamental driver of striving, this forward-directed motivating principle, this conation,
that drives the process and processes of personhood, all other considerations and values
aside. It is ontologically prior, and must be so, to all contingent objects of either
affective, or second-order rationally endorsed desire.
Indeed it is from the conative that particular desires arise at all, for without the
fundamental, and constitutive aspect of the process of personhood that this represents,
there would be no motivation for any desire to form, or to come into defined being as an
object in the affect, much less the cognition. The original motivating component of the
formation of desire is conation itself. Further, since without the driving of conation the
process itself would cease, there would be no person to form desires, at all, and in any
case, without such prior motivation, iterated desires would never arise from their most
primitive psychological forebears.
But this fundamental conation is not open for negation by an action of the personal will,
or some overriding desire, nor even by the architecture and machinery of rational
                                                 
214 Williams B. 1972. Op. Cit. note 205. pp 87-88
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concepts. This is because the will is itself conative, and any desire that seeks to direct it,
is driven and underwritten by the conative, and in any case must locate within an
originating person, who would not exist without the conatively-driven process by which
they are constituted. The rational process which might seek to deny it, in the sense of
causing its surcease, cannot hope actually to do so, for it is itself motivated by this
ontologically prior stream, this basic processual driver.215
What “puzzles the will”216 about death is not, to deny Hamlet, that there may be
continuance of the person in “what dreams may come” beyond death, but rather that there
may not be continuance at all. Puzzling of the will is a beautifully precise way of
describing our quandary when attempting to conceive of our own deaths. When thinking
about one’s own extinction, the attempt to imagine it results, involuntarily, in an attempt
to “see beyond”, to think of blackness, say, or of another world in which the process
continues, but falsely or paradoxically, perhaps, merely contemplating its own non-
existence. What the will balks at is the cessation of personhood, and why it does so is that
personhood is an intrinsically future-driven open-ended process. We cannot conceive of
its surcease within ourselves, because for us, while we conceive of anything, both
ourselves and our conception itself flow inexorably and involuntarily towards the future,
our thoughts and musings themselves spun into being in its stream, in turn modifying the
flow into new eddies, swirls and concepts, shaping its flow into the crystals of
apprehended and conceived objects of desire, but the conception itself is never, can never
be the deep originator, never the fountainhead of the primal desire, never the progenitor
and transitive sustainer of the stream itself. The value of living, then, is a subjective
instrumental as well as a non-subjective (in the sense of the subjectivity of persons as
opposed to more primal conceptions of subjectivity, such as that of Jonas, described
further below) categoric value, as this latter is the facilitator, the instrument of the
coming-to-be, the neverending (while a person) becoming of the process of being a
person. In this way the compound value is an inalienable value for persons. That a person
might state, and even believe that they have, and will have, no further instrumental value
                                                 
215 Except, of course, by a gun to the head or similar but this will be seen to be irrelevant to this value, and
so is no true exception, as will be discussed in the subsequent subsection on suicide at 2.9.1 below.
216 Shakespeare W. 1601. Hamlet. Act III, Scene i.
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in continuing to live, and even that they may feel that they can wholly repudiate what
values they do have, is based, I believe, upon a mistaken concept of the origination of
such values at all, as well as the mistaken assumption that the total person is present at
any one self-conscious point in time. The person who claims thus is doing so on the basis
that they, as present self-conscious persons, are the sole and complete predicators and
arbiters of the all of the values that they have. But if true at all, this is only very weakly or
partly true, for the values we do have, based upon our affects, are not built, nor ended, by
our self-conscious decision or fiat. Can we decide to like tennis, or a particular person, or
asparagus, or working? Do we decide what sexual preferences we have, or do we
discover these same? If we decide, may we then, for example, decide chiefly to desire
brunettes with an athletic physique one week, and the next, overweight blondes? Can we
decide to cease to enjoy, to value, or to love, or even that we have so ceased, qua our
“total person”, including the person we will be in a week, a year, a decade? How about
choosing, at the outset of a two-year cycle, one year primarily to enjoy mathematics, and
the next, instead of mathematics (which will be genuinely disliked, from the first day of
that year) monster truck racing? These cases ought to strike the reader as absurd, and
indeed they are so. We may try to change our affects in this way, and we may perhaps
eventually be successful, through prolonged effort of will and exposure to some new
influence or other, or removal from some old, but we are not easily capable of doing so.
If we were, then punishments would likely not be very effective, since we could simply
and easily decide to enjoy them. Or faced with the prospect of unforeseen imminent
death, we could simply switch off or negate all of our categoric desire for continuance,
and it would be as nothing to us (I of course ex hypothesi account this complete negation
actually impossible). This suggests that the affects, and preferences which are the basis,
for the most part, for our personal instrumental values, are not in fact originated, built, or
negated by fiat of the self-conscious supremo of the present self, but rather arise to the
self, from some more basic stream, themselves motivated into being by some more basic
internal motivator- the conatus, and perhaps, if they pass away, do so by the same means,
being washed away by the stream of becoming. But it is not that our preferences and
affects, or the plans that extend therefrom, nor indeed our characters, remain fixed and
changeless through life. Rather these are often quite remarkably changeful, and new
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affects, preferences, and desires seem readily to appear, predominantly without being
called into being in any rational or self-conscious manner whatever. If the foregoing is
true, then it is simply a false conceit at any particular time to suppose that one has no
further instrumental value qua oneself, and further it is equally false to suppose that one
may by some fiat ordain that this state of affairs shall obtain at all, let alone continue
indefinitely. If all (or even some) of our affects, and more iterated instrumental values (in
turn giving rise to the likes of life plans) have their origin in a stream which is more
profound than the level of the self-conscious person, and if that stream is constitutive of
our being persons at all, it would seem that quite apart from and in addition to the value
of this driver, the primal categoric desire itself, supplying the positivity of continuance
simpliciter, there is never a point at which it is true to declare that one’s life will have no
further instrumental value, qua oneself. Now of course, as shall be further dealt with in
subsection 2.9.1 below, it is true that one may be in the process of being burned at the
stake, and in view of this, it may appear safe to contradict the foregoing, but even this is
not as obvious as it may at first appear, and is rather more complex, such that the
contingent circumstances do not impinge upon the categoric value, as we shall see below.
Indeed the suffering of the contingent circumstance of being burned at the stake is to a
large degree (in particular in the apprehension of approaching annihilation, but
secondarily, likely also in the originating functions of the negative sensations themselves)
predicated upon the inalienability of this value, as suggested above. In the subsequent
subsection also, we will further explore the concept of the “total person”, as opposed to
the merely “present self-conscious person”, which will better allow us to examine
questions such as the supposed possibility of the self-negation of instrumental personal
value.
So long as there is a person, then, there is the forward-directed value of the driver of
conation, which represents a constitutive forward-directed categoric desire, supplying the
basic positivity and prospectivity of continued life. This basic desire, this driver itself
gives rise to further more iterated affects and rational desires, and the two together
represent a compound value of life’s continuance to persons.  Neither aspect of this
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compound value may be separated from the other, as they are, qua the person, co-
dependent.
Let us examine the situation a bit more fully with regard to the value of life’s
continuance. The present and backward-directed elements of the process of being a
person, such as experience and memory, have necessary forward-looking counterparts:
hopes, desires plans, etc. Hoping, desiring, and planning are intrinsically future-directed.
Hoping for, desiring, or planning our past is meaningless or futile. Without the constant
interchange between the future, present and past elements of the process of being a
person we should be fixed, and frozen, ourselves objectified and unable to fulfil, or even
possess, an autonomous will, much less formulate rational values, designs and desires, let
alone actualise them. Our rationality could not exist, for it would sit idle, no movement
between concepts possible, for a desire to use it even to analyse the past, is a desire that
extends towards the future, and needs the forward directed process to exist at all. Our
autonomy would be stripped of meaning. The process of formation of affect and second
order valuing and thus being a person would cease, and the continuance of being be
without source or root, for its driver, the categoric value, must be supposed to have failed
to manifest. Indeed the consequences described above would result directly from a failure
of the categoric desire, the psychological driver that is the conatus, to provide the force of
the flow. Should we lose this future-directed element of ourselves, then, we would no
longer be persons, and living would have no personal value. Further, the desire for future
goods is driven by the forward-looking categorical desire, and is not contingent upon
there being particular goods which are presently identified by a person. These particular,
subjectively identified and endorsed goods arise, as has been said, at least semi-
spontaneously, as the flow of the psychology, driven by its conative aspect, pours out
over the world of experience, or rather flows into the very existence of that world. It is a
false view to conceive of such particular subjective goods or values as arising from affect
or deliberation as prior to this flow. They are first and foremost the objects of the flow,
arising within it, and crystallising into the objects of affect, attention, consideration, and
secondary endorsement or denial. The very difficulty, and frequent impossibility of this
rationally predicated second-order denial’s having any effect upon the affective desire
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towards these objects shows the profundity of their relationship with our pre-personal
selves. But even as they rise from the flow, through the affects, eventually to receive the
exaltation of subjective second-order endorsement, they rise by the activity of the flow of
basic desire itself, which drives the very processes of the affects and the exaltation of
cognitive endorsement themselves. In this way, all possible categoric desires of the
higher-order, strictly subjective kind which supply exclusively instrumental value to
life’s continuance arise from the stream of the most basic categorical desire of the
conatus, which in turn drives the very processes of affect, cognition, and rational choice.
The fundamental future-directed element of the process of personhood, the root
categorical desire represented by the inseparable conative aspect, presupposes the
continuation of a person into the future in the ceaseless process of becoming.
In this way, it would appear that there can be no arbitrary upper limit on the good of the
extension of life to a person. There is no point at which being a person does not involve
the future-directed elements and their involvement in the process of interchange with the
present and past elements. An attempt to set or discover such a general limit would
appear to involve a misunderstanding of the nature of the process itself. That we may
know some facts about human biology, which suggest that we indeed have an end in
store, and even how far in the future that end is likely to be, in no way impinges upon the
intrinsic nature of the future-directed elements that are fundamental to the process of
being a person. These point toward the ever-distant horizon of the possible, irrespective
of the actual personal circumstances, such as, say, a terminal disease.
If no general limit can be arbitrarily set or discovered, could one be set by a person upon
themselves? That my desires, hopes and plans may fix upon particular objectives does not
in itself suggest that I can easily, or at all, fix these elements of myself purely upon and
contained within some set of particular objectives, such that the basic categorical desire
itself can be somehow brought to an end upon the completion of this set. No matter what
I specifically plan for, desire, or hope for, it seems that the conative aspect of my
psychology overflows the limits of these particular objects without any particular second-
order act of will on my part, and indeed, in defiance of one. So, willing these aspects of
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ourselves to be contained within a fixed, time-limited framework would seem to be
impossible. I may seek rationally to direct or curtail the objects of my first-order desires
and affects (those that simply “ I desire”) with my second-order desires or volitions
(those by which “I desire that I do or do not desire”),217 but that a second-order desire to
have no desires should be effective would seem impossibly self-defeating. For such a
desire is itself a future-directed desire, and so arises from the inalienable categoric
conation which is the fundamental driver of the process that itself enables the
autonomous will to exist. We cannot effectively will ourselves not to be a person, while
also being one, since that will itself requires us to be a person.
It is instructive to try to imagine a person setting a particular date beyond which she will
be free of all desires. Such a picture strikes one as absurd. Further, if it is acknowledged
that a person, in any particular moment of the extended process of their personhood, is
rarely or never presently conscious of all the particular desires they themselves possess,
much less the general and categoric desire that gives rise to them, as silently pervasive as
gravity, this observation becomes greatly stronger.  So it does not seem reasonable that a
person may even set a limit to the good of their own future extension in time. On this
view, then, there is no point in time at which the continuation of a person’s life may be
said not to be valuable, since these forward-directed elements are necessary to the process
of being a person, as no particular set of contingent concepts, desires, or endorsements
ever can be. And as such, the process of being a person is continuously open-ended. It is
a process of becoming, not one of arriving. The cognition no more owns the total set of
possible ends and values of a person, than it owns the very motivator of process which
brings it into being at all.
Given the above considerations, we should look very sceptically indeed at the kinds of
assertion made in HC1-HC3 that a particular, contingently present set, or absence
thereof, of particularised subjective desires should constitute the whole value of life’s
continuance to the person-process. These seem rather incidental to a true assessment of
that value. They may augment it, to be sure, but can they really negate it?  They are
                                                 
217 Frankfurt, H., 1982 Op. Cit. note 168
135
products of the flow of the person-process, but they do not themselves constitute it, and
in order for themselves to deny the value of this process itself, they must somehow be
said to negate that value as a prospective positivity entirely. In terms of the instrumental
aspect of the compound value, such a negation would essentially represent a choosing, by
fiat, of one particular present set of values, endorsements or negations, as being the
ultimate set of all possible such sets. But upon what basis of appeal would or could such a
fiat be made? As persons process through their lives, as they move forward in time, they
hold differing sets of values, endorsements and negations at differing times, sometimes
more, sometimes fewer or less urgent, sometimes frivolous, sometimes deeply serious,
but always in process. The particular values and desires held at any one time is never,
therefore, ultimately definitive of the total person. To consider it so is to make an
unwarranted and ad hoc ascription of substance to this particular moment in the process
of personhood. Any particular set will themselves process, weaken and pass piecemeal
by, and may become utterly replaced. The only constant is the continuity process of the
person themselves, driven by the conatus. What authority should one particular present
set hold over the totality of the person-process? Any such authority must appeal to some
substantialist view of the person, such that the person may be wholly present at one
particular time. I deny that this view of the person matches reality in any manner at all.
In effect, this negation would amount to a denial of not just the values as presently held,
but of all possible values which may arise from the stream. It amounts, therefore, to a
category error of persons, for how can a singular moment in the process in referring to
the objects briefly and contingently present in and predicated by that process constitute
the basis for legislation upon the totality of the process itself. How can a particular set of
presently held objects or conceptions of desire legislate the value of the nearly infinite
possible set, towards and through which a person is, as purely a prospectively driven
open-ended process, never-endingly moving in their becoming? For the single set to
legislate the whole, the person must already have ceased to be a process, having arrived
at the final set within which they are wholly continent, and beyond which they can no
longer move or become. But since a person is only a process, and since as long as the
person obtains the process of being a person, which is always a becoming, obtains, this
cannot occur.
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Further, since the endorsement of such a denial itself is a product of that stream, it cannot
extend to an effective denial of the value of the driver of the stream. To deny the value of
the conatus is to use the conatus, in its role of psychological master driver of the
rationality, to deny the value of itself, and as such is quite literally wholly self-defeating,
as it is to deny the value of all future contingent, subjective desires, and at the same time
represents the denial of the value even of the rational process which is driven by it in
attempting such legislation. It represents the starkest possible denial of all possible value.
But such a denial itself must stand upon some value, must point towards some value, else
it is utterly nihilistic. Whence, and with what meaning, the desire to deny all desires?
What can be rationally made of the intention to end all intentions? Whence the value of
extinguishing value? Such a move is utterly self-defeating. No appeal can be made to the
idea that “it is only this particular set” of intentions and desires etc. which is being
extinguished, on the basis that it is only one person in question, since ex hypothesi that
person is a potentially infinite series of such attitudes, intentions, and desires. In this way,
the absolute self-legislation of utter self-negation is hardly different, if different at all,
from the legislation between and across other living selves or persons.218 One is
reminded, though for rather other reasons, of Sartre’s words that a decision made for the
self, is a decision made for all mankind.
It might, at this point, be objected that first-order desires of the basic kind here referred
to, however pervasive and commanding, cannot of themselves rise to the level of
normativity. I admit that the precise manner in which such a normativity obtains is likely
to be problematic, or at least require further consideration. Some of the considerations
argued above of the entanglement of “higher order” desires and values, and their
dependence relation on this basic one, should go a long way to establishing the necessary
relation. Equally, it should be acknowledged that any naturalistic account of the
beginnings of normativity within a person will involve some borderline case, or grey
area, and indeed this is what we should surely expect. Indeed, any naturalistic explanation
                                                 
218 This may be seen to be bolstered by Parfit’s conception of a series-person, wherein, even during
ordinary lifespan, we are psychologically continuous, but psychologically disconnected with at least some
of our past selves. See subsection 3.1 below.
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of the origin of value within nature should not assume or “smuggle in” the explanandum
to its premises or initial descriptions. Only a panpsychist or similar system which holds
that moral value inheres in the basic material of the world simpliciter would be devoid of
the requirement to describe the point at which values arise, from components free of
value. That which I propose is not such a system.219 Some proposals for the means by
which this value arises, or at least the likely candidates for the necessary structures and
physical principles which are coincident with its appearance, will be given in subsequent
subsections.  Meanwhile, it should be recognised that the case of the drive for personal
continuation is indeed isomorphic with perhaps the most pervasive and universally
recognised moral imperative throughout history and culture: do not kill. Of course
constructivists will point to the pragmatic social aspects of this universality. But is it the
case that there are no related internal motivations as well? While the connection between
the normative value “pro-life” and against murder or suicide with the fundamental
conative drive of personhood as process which comprises the categorical desire spoken of
here may seem questionable to some, it must surely be acknowledged that it is at least
both plausible, and isomorphic in terms of the former being corollaries of the latter.
Further, if it is right that this drive gives rise and motion to all desires, and itself
motivates rationality, in the process of personhood, then it is the motivational underwriter
of all and any value, including the second-order desires held by some to be exclusively
normative. In this way, it might be called, humorously, the “mother of all values”. And
such a value is to be expected to be singularly powerful, and uniquely motivating. In this
way, I suggest that this underlying, ubiquitous, and therefore often overlooked,
underwriter and co-generator of the value of life’s continuance is far more akin to the
“ordinary picture of life’s value” which we intuitively perceive as being something which
must be both very powerful, pervasive, and very stable, than is some value derived
entirely from a second-order endorsement of some further and subsidiary, rationally-
constructed object of desire. It need hardly be noted that, whatever else their philosophic
or religious convictions, when suddenly confronted with the prospect of imminent death
                                                 
219 Alfred North Whitehead’s thoroughly processualist system is just this, however. In this, and other
related ways, Whitehead’s system is profoundly divergent from what is being argued for in this thesis.
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(however sotto-voce it has previously appeared on account of its very ubiquity) there are
few indeed, if any, who would not feel the drive and force of this value, most keenly.
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2.9.1 Of suicide, euthanasia and sleeping persons: the
comparative unimportance of present conscious persons
and the inalienable nature of the value of life’s continuance
to persons
The reader may well have already made many connections between the foregoing and the
questions of suicide and of euthanasia. After all, HC1-HC3 were made in specific
reference to questions concerning the propriety of euthanasia, and it is not difficult to see
the relevance of the above analysis generally to such questions. Some specific notes
about the implications for these of my analysis of persons will be useful, however. I
consider that the observations of the foregoing subsection provide a powerful ethical
rationale against the morality of suicide. Very simply put, they explain exactly why the
suicide commits murder against themselves. Those who consider that we own ourselves
in any particular moment may consider suicide to be perfectly moral. But we do not, I
argue, ever in any particular moment own our total selves, since the “we” that must
necessarily be referred to in this sentence, must be the set of conceptions, values,
rationales, desires, negations, affects etc. of which we are presently aware and which
therefore compose only our present self-conscious selves.  A view which holds this set to
be the total self, despite Harris’ protestations to the contrary (though he is perhaps
unlikely to have encountered an adequately iterated process concept of persons), takes a
substantialist concept of the self as its model, and reifies the affects, present concepts,
and current objects of desire or denial of that substance-person to be representative of the
total person. Such an understanding, is common enough, and indeed assumed by such
human conventions as, for example, contract law.220 As has been argued, a correct
understanding of persons will view them as processes of ceaseless becoming. On such an
account, it is impossible to conceive of the total self being present in a moment. Just as
                                                 
220 Wherein a mere signature can be taken as token for the reified total person-substance at once, such that
this one decision may legislate for, in some cases, all time. Of course, some of this is heuristic, in that we
must accept persons’ decisions as their own, if anything like a contract, or indeed a promise, is to be taken
seriously, and I accept the heuristic provided it is understood to be one. However, the contract of a self-
fired bullet through the brain has consequences of an altogether more serious nature. In these cases, no
heuristic account of the actual presence of the “total self” should be accepted.
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no process is instantaneous, and persons are not in any manner substances, there is no
point at which the total self obtains, that it may pass legislative judgement of ontological
denial upon the values or existence of all of the person-self-process of which the instance
in question is merely a brief slice, a flickering, changeable manifestation. Consider the
following story:
A child grows up dreaming, frequently and persistently, of becoming a pilot, of
learning to fly. Various difficulties intervene, his parents break up, he has brushes
with the law, and soon he is on his way down, past a couple of bad relationships,
to the gutter. He ends up homeless and addicted to various drugs. Years pass and
for many days, months, and years he forgets he has any desires whatever apart
from the wanton first-order compulsions to further booze and get high, further to
lose himself. He drifts this way through his late twenties, thirties and forties,
during which time he frequently feels despair, and attempts to kill himself on
several occasions. By pure chance (if such there is!), he does not succeed, and the
physical demands his body makes each day drive him into continuing existence.
Eventually, through the help of a charity, he manages to wean himself off the
addictions, and finds himself living in sheltered accommodation in the country
near a private airfield. He gets a menial job at the airfield, and becomes
acquainted with the owner. At this point, in his early fifties, having utterly
forgotten it for decades, and repudiated all desires and even his life, attempting
suicide, he begins to remember that once, many many years before, as a child he
had a desire, an overwhelming dream, to learn to fly. He discovers that this desire
is not in fact extinguished. He talks to the owner of the airfield about this
remembered dream, and the owner, remembering his own boyish motivations,
which led him eventually to his present position in life, offers to give our hero
lessons. The experience of learning to fly, for this man, becomes an
overwhelming transformation, and he experiences it absolutely as the fulfilment
of his own boyish dream. He finds himself competent, and before long he is
working as a flight instructor himself, well content in his life and happier than he
ever thought he might be.
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The above story does not need to be true to be relevant here. It only needs to be plausible
to us as persons ourselves. If plausible, as I consider it eminently so to be, it vividly
illustrates the point I am attempting to make about the lack of presence of the total self, in
the moment, from which we might hope to legislate for that total self. Had this story
ended halfway along, or at any one of the points in his thirties and forties that this
unfortunate had comprehensively resolved to take his own life, then it would have been a
very sad tale indeed. Crucially, we may have been tempted to accept that his denial of
any remaining value in his life, was true. But it need not have been, and in the fuller case
was not.  We may further stipulate that these decisions to self-annihilation were made not
while drunk or intoxicated, but during periods of recovery, when not so befuddled, as is
often the case in reality.221 One may easily recast the story to make such a stipulation
stronger, such that the person in question was not a substance abuser, but merely
chronically depressed, or in the grip of some religious convictions because of which he
was convinced that suicide was the required – and desired – course of action, or any such
similar. We will deal with a case, the “Makropulos” case, further below, which will
address the issue of whether a much further continued story might not or must end rather
badly again, solely in virtue of its great length. But for now the crucial point is that it is
clear to see that, for this man, and for any other suicide or attempted suicide, the
legislation of death, of a defeat of all personal value of their own selves, is at least
founded upon a mistaken conception of what it is to be a person, and as such constitutes
murder upon the self who is killed. To see this is so, we need only enquire of the pilot
instructor, of whether he is glad that his earlier self had not killed his total self. Even if
the story had never had such an ending, the outcome is the same, for it is impossible for
the partial self of any one moment, so dim and fragmentary, and so present-bound as it is,
to have more than the most imperfect knowledge not only of events, but of its own total
complement of desires. For it is easy to believe that, as I shall stipulate, during the
darkest, most despairing times, when our hero wished to enforce legislation for his total
self with a knife or by other means, he was unaware that he still harboured the desire to
fly. If this seems far-fetched, we need only introspect for a few minutes concerning all
                                                 
221 Fadem B. 2003. Behavioural Science in Medicine. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, USA.  pp. 216-218
142
the desires we might have, and not have any present awareness of. Plans, goals, desires,
these overlapping chains of projected being which bind up the compound self of the total
person continually being added to in becoming, are present chiefly in our unconscious
selves. They may be called to mind deliberately, or else present themselves to our
introspection, though it is difficult to see how they could do so in totality. But even
should they present, in whole or part, the manner of that presentation is deeply coloured
by the affects of the present, and these garments projected on these aspects of our own
selves, by the present conscious partial-self, disguise and alter the appearance of the
deep, process-chain we are viewing, without necessarily altering its true manifold
character. How many times have we in anger, despair, sorrow, or similar passion of the
affect, with seemingly perfect reasons ready to hand, sometimes passionately and
confidently, even imperiously expressed, done or said things, enacted repudiations of our
previous desires or plans, or damaged things or processes or relationships we have
ourselves painstakingly constructed, only later, and sometimes much later, coming
profoundly to regret these same actions. The imperious self-destroyer, the hegemon-judge
of the proud, even if rational, present self is not less real, but is only a partial self, and
part of a chain of self-becoming, whose totality is unavailable even to the clearest-minded
partial self, such that no self-legislation enacting the denial the total self can ever be a
moral action.
An interesting adjunct to this is that I consider it extremely unlikely that anyone does in
fact commit suicide with the spirit of complete nihilism. As I hinted at above, it seems
difficult conceive of the holding of a value which disvalues all and any value, the holding
of a strong desire that there should be no desires at all. If there was no drive towards self-
becoming, if there were no person, there would be no action. True suffering requires
passion that is thwarted in some way. A truly empty person, a person who really does
have nothing more to gain, and nothing left to lose, would in many ways have ceased to
be a person. The process of becoming would have ended, and they would have no
motivation to pick up the gun. A truly undesiring person could not commit suicide. But
there is more than this. Even self-loathing is an emotion which has in its view some better
world, some desire towards a better circumstance, or a better mode of being. A person in
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despair is likely always in despair in view of some other idea they have of not being in
despair. In this way, suicide is also a mistake in another way. It is a failure to understand
the nature of one’s own true motivations even as they drive one towards the action of
self-slaughter.
So much, at present, for suicide. But what of euthanasia? I do not, though it may surprise,
consider euthanasia to be forbidden. I think Mary Ford is wrong about this. I have already
denied her conception of personhood as the ultimate value, unargued and quasi-
substantialist as it appears. However I have gone a long way, I feel, to rebuilding the
solidity and dignity of that value in ways thoroughly grounded in the tradition which
itself built the kind of concept she appeals to. But I do not think that this rebuilt
conception of personhood mandates that we shall never kill ourselves under any
circumstances. Here what McMahan calls the “problem of specifying the antecedent”222
is relevant. This problem arises in cases where, to use Joel Feinberg’s language, there is
an “overdetermination of causation”. Suppose John is shot and killed by Robert. If that is
all we are allowed to know, it may be clear what caused John’s death- a bullet, fired from
Robert’s gun. We may perhaps be moved condemn Robert as a murderer. Suppose we are
told now that directly after killing John, Robert uses his gun to kill himself. We might
now be moved, on the above grounds, to consider him also a murderer of himself.
However, despite the apparently clear-cut facts, it may be reasonable to argue that Robert
caused neither death. How?
Suppose we are given some further information, widening the causal picture just a little.
We are told that John and Robert are both on a ship, which is a sailing craft made entirely
of wood. It is the early 19th century, prior to the age of the telegraph, and the ship carries
no special signalling equipment such as rocket flares. The ship is part of an expedition to
the far Antarctic south, and is at least a thousand miles from any other known or likely
shipping. The ship has caught fire, and at the moment of our tale is burning fast and
beyond hope of recovery. The sole small craft aboard is already destroyed by fire. It is
daylight, and clear to the horizon, such that a sailor may know that even in the wildly
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unlikely case of there being another ship just beyond the horizon, it could not arrive in
time to save anyone aboard from the fate of either burning, or freezing to death in the
water. Both men are very experienced sailors in cold water, and know that, although
death in the icy water will be fairly quick, it will be in many ways every bit as
agonisingly painful as the alternative of death by burning. John and Robert are facing
either imminent immolation, or imminent plunge to their deaths in freezing water, or
perhaps both. John has asked Robert to kill him. Robert, he knows, has a pistol. Robert
obliges, shooting John in the head, and immediately afterwards, kills himself. Moments
later both bodies begin to burn.
Do we now feel that Robert was the cause of either death? Certainly, his action of pulling
the trigger was a fairly proximate cause, and the bullet’s passage through the brains of
each man, the ultimate proximate cause of their deaths. But what was the transitive
cause? What was the antecedent cause? One may say it was the decision each had to join
the ship at all. One may say that it was any number of factors that led to the
uncontrollable fire, etc. We have a problem of specifying the true antecedent cause of the
death of these men. Our task here is not, however, to argue for or against determinism, or
any other such thing. It is to examine the judgement that the men made in asking to be
euthanised, and in deciding to commit suicide, a case of self-euthanasia.
The crucial question to ask is: in making the decision to shoot, did either of the men deny,
or seek to deny the value of the continuance of their own or each other’s persons through
time? Plainly, the answer is: no. None of the transitive causes leading to Robert’s actions
in pulling the trigger need have involved at any point any decision to disvalue or to cease
to value the continuance of the lives of John and Robert. The unfortunate men, just as do
many unfortunates in life, and eventually us all, simply found themselves in a situation of
causal overdetermination towards death. Whatever they did or did not do, they would
imminently die. This resolves, and therefore removes and makes irrelevant the question
of the non-continuation of their selves. They did not, and in no way sought to legislate
any denial of their own value. They simply rationally legislated, for the only self which
would exist at any point between, to move the timing of their inevitable death forward
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momentarily to avoid bitter agonies the experience of which would not in any case
prevent, but rather would predicate that death. The legislation is wholly valid and
consistent, for it refers only to the wholly present partial self, which is all the self that
remains available to them as conscious beings. Therefore, euthanasia is a legitimate,
moral, rational choice in an overdetermined situation. The rejection of the value of self-
persistence as a sole end in itself is an evil apart from all else in that it entails the
rejection of all other values, in addition. In this way it is a rejection of value in totam.
This may be seen by the universal legislation principle employed both by Kant and
Sartre, as mentioned above, in the latter case. However, a decision to self-euthanise, or
endorse such action is not necessarily a decision against self-persistence, since the
question of self-persistence in the situation in which the agent finds themselves is already
resolved. They will not self-persist, and that death is imminent. They do not, thereby,
make a choice against continuing to live as a person, or at all, since this choice is not in
any case theirs to make. They make a choice against continuing to undergo experiences
that in themselves both deny them the opportunity for other kinds of value, and which
experiences themselves constitute part of their own dying process. It is fallacious to argue
that they kill themselves. They are already being killed, and are presently engaged in the
process of being killed. Therefore they may at one and the same time rationally choose to
live, but realise that that choice is already denied them, since they will not continue to
live, and so with perfect rational compatibility with the former choice, decide to enact
their deaths earlier in the process of its unfolding, rather than later.
In his earlier discussed reply to Ford, Harris asserts of those who choose euthanasia:
Although the person who is then killed remains a person with a valuable life its
value being recognised as the set of interests that the characteristics of personhood
make possible and which death fulfils. [Footnoted text]… [Main text] Since these
interests can include an interest in ceasing to exist, there is nothing paradoxical or
inconsistent in recognising that it can be in the interests of a person to die and
hence that killing can constitute respecting the personhood of individuals.223
                                                 
223 Harris J. 2005. Op. Cit. note 164. p. 390
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 I of course deny this entirely as a false picture of what is going on in cases of euthanasia.
The victim of incurable cancer or other disease, or inevitable subject of imminent painful
death who chooses euthanasia is patently not choosing death as the true end of their
interests as a person. Here Harris is completely wrong. That person is choosing to live,
but in view of valuing positive goods, ones which they are rewarded by their physiology
for precisely because they accord with the value of the conatus towards self-
preservation,224 and in view of the denial of these goods, and the only remaining
experiences being those of punishment by their physiology in view of the causes of the
pain being ones which tend against the conatus to self-preservation, they choose not to
undergo the latter, since it is in vain and cannot lead to its own purpose but only ends in
death, which suffering and death is all that remains to them in any case. This is crucial
because such a person is not, as Harris asserts they are, even capable of emptying the
value of their total selves (or in the case of the categoric desire of the conatus even their
present self) from their own person-process. In this way, we escape the “personhood
paradox” which Mary Ford was worried might exist in such cases, while at the same time
accounting for personhood in a rich manner which adds explanatory force for her
assertion concerning the robustness of the value of personal life.
How might the above observations and analyses relate to the cases, so often posited
against the liberal view of the value of persons by conservative substantialists, of
sleeping, unconscious, and comatose persons? Such views do indeed have bite against
those liberal theories of personhood which, like that expressed by Harris225 excessively
focus upon and vaunt the present psychology of self-conscious persons as the sine qua
non of their existence. As earlier intimated, this latter kind of view is quasi-substantialist
                                                 
224 This refers of course to the physiological feedback mechanism of pain and pleasure, which mechanisms,
contrary to both hedonism and the idea that pain in itself is always an evil, are evolved tools of the
homeostatic processes of self-preservation. One need only consider leprosy in order to understand clearly
that this is true, even for advanced human persons. However, there are circumstances wherein pain does
become a purely negative response, and those circumstances are precisely those of present causal
overdetermination towards death, since pain in such a circumstance cannot in any case tend to the
preservation of the individual.
225 Originally: Harris J. 1985. Op. Cit. note 115. pp. 7-27. But perhaps more obviously, since the enactment
of the capacity to disvalue life depends upon being presently conscious of such a desire to disvalue, which
would purport resolve all and any such value for all possible states of the individual: Harris J. 2005. Op.
Cit. note 164.
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in nature, for it seeks to hold in its view at once and as a unity the whole person. A quasi-
substance view such as this, but simply and wholly based in conscious psychology, is of
course vulnerable to precisely the objection that, during periods of unconsciousness, such
a person ceases altogether to be. Hume himself made this very objection in denying true
personal identity.226 But such an attempt simply mistakes what a person in fact is. I can go
along with Hume, and indeed Parfit (as I shall discuss in Section Three below), on the
rejection of the identity criterion for personhood, since identity in the deep sense of
requiring that which is identical is not something which can be said to obtain on a process
view. However, a view which holds that the present psychology is not only what is most
important to persons, but what indeed is both necessary and sufficient, is vulnerable to the
objection that this leaves the unconscious as importantly non-persons. A view, however,
which relinquishes the stipulation that present psychology is so sufficient will not be so
vulnerable. A view of persons necessarily as processes, necessarily will relinquish this
stipulation, since a person must be a process spread across many states in time. A brief
introspection should establish that we are not presently conscious, let alone self-conscious
of much which must qualify as aspects of our persons. Further, much of what we might
unreflectively account actually to be our present selves is not, in fact, manifest in our
present psychology. Next time you speak, for example, consider whether you consciously
pre-manifest the language you use. Are you aware of your search through your total
lexicon, of your construction of sentences, of the actuation of your muscles and control of
your breathing which allows your speech? Are you even more than very dimly aware of
just what it is you are about to say? Is speech not frequently, indeed habitually, or nearly
constantly a process which arises from the subconscious, or the unconscious self, and is
merely observed by the present self-consciousness? What of all the present projects,
desires, plans etc. even of the wholly quotidian local kind (that which spans, say, only the
projects, desires and plans of one week, or a collection of hours in a single day)? Are
these present in whole at any point? An attempt to present them to ourselves in this
manner, in totam,227 wherein they appear whole as a set in our presently self-conscious
psychology is a task which may perhaps not be impossible, but which would require a
                                                 
226 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28. Book I, Part IV, Section VI (p. 252).
227 In totam here referring only to the total sum of the present conscious self. It is of course held that it is
completely impossible to present the total sum of the self as a process through time, so the total self.
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special and highly unusual effort of will, akin to that required in juggling. Thus it seems
that even what we would ordinarily, and in a sloppy, hand-waving or gesturing way, refer
to as our present selves, is largely a matter of actually non-conscious processes. Such a
view is not a problem for a truly processualist account of the person. It is, rather,
anticipated by it. So, the process of persons, on this view, becomes largely a matter of
non-conscious, subconscious, or unconscious processes, and the presence or absence of
consciousness becomes neither wholly necessary (at any one time) nor wholly sufficient
for persons to obtain. On this view, all that need obtain at all times is the constant,
ceaseless motivator of persons, the constant, ever-present conatus, which indeed drives
our psychology, our psychophysiological process, but also drives our unconscious
physical, non-conscious simply neurophysiological processes, and all our other bodily
processes. Consciousness is not necessary to the conatus. The conatus may build
consciousness, may drive our neurophysiology into psychophysiological states for
example in the process of waking up, but it is present, and keeping our persons in process
sotto-voce of the conscious self which arises from it. In this way, we find no mystery in
the fact that we wake up at all. And this is much more commonsensical and ordinary in
terms of intuition than one might suppose. After all, I wake up, I do not return to being
after having been woken up by some unconscious impulse. The rise to consciousness,
complete with ongoing psychological processes, is a daily, but often ignored
phenomenon, worthy of attention. How many times have we gone to sleep, worried about
getting up at a particular time, earlier than usual, and found that we rise to consciousness
moments before the alarm-clock goes off? How many times have we gone to sleep
exhausted, worrying over some rational problem, lacking understanding of its intricacies,
only to find, on waking, and often clearest in the earliest stages of waking, the problem
wonderfully clarified, and laid out before us, as if by magic? It is not magic, and must
only seem magical and mysterious if we are chauvinistic in our mistaken narrow view of
the personal self as being wholly present and solely instantiated in self-conscious being,
which somehow self-motivates by the bootstrapping acts of self-conscious, rational will.
Such self-motivation, if present at all, as I do believe it is, is but the thin shadow of the
driver of the total person. The conatus drives the processes, which later may become
manifest in consciousness, and in self-conscious rationality, ready made, and neatly
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presented to the self-important aristocrat of the self-conscious rational, merely present
self, who states, in his (or her) ignorance, “L’etat, c’est moi!”, ignoring the vast
conglomeration of the corporate self of overlapping chains of being towards becoming,
which present the aristocrat of the present self their fine breakfast and news every
morning, and carry on, for the most part, without the least prompting of his or her
dictates. In this, we may be reminded of Hume’s words, considering the nature of
personal identity, when he considers that persons, properly understood, are more akin to
nations (“republic or commonwealth”),228 than to particular unified individuals.229 Indeed
there is much resemblance of Hume’s bundle theory of persons to a processual theory
thereof, and he does use the language of process to describe it:
Thus as the nature of a river consists in the motion and change of parts; tho’ in
less than four and twenty hours these be totally alter’d; this hinders not the river
from continuing the same for several ages. 230
However Hume stops short of actually naming persons as processes, and, despite
discussing the motivation of the passions or affects,231 famously showing that rationality
is not intrinsically motivating, fails to notice that the same critique may be applied to
(especially the origin of) the passions, and so fails to account for, the more general
underlying driver or motivator of the whole process that he describes, making this a
bundle theory, rather than a process theory. Further, the analogy to nations is mistaken, in
that he uses it to bolster his assertion that the individuation of persons is essentially
illusory. As we will discover later in the remainder of Section Two and Three of this
work, the conatus is neither illusory, since it has a deep basis in thermodynamics and
biodynamics, nor is the individuation of persons or personal selfhood illusory, since it is a
necessary corollary of the existence of this physical phenomenon at all. We may use the
analogy to nations, but only if we make certain very particular preconditions, such as that
                                                 
228 It might be considered, at this point, that we do indeed encounter what at least appear to be other minds,
in the dream characters of our REM sleep. Could it be that these are, in some sense, not simply wholly
unconscious illusions, but have indeed some conscious elements in themselves? The question is rather
oblique, but is not empty of interest, or possible merit.
229 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28. Book I, Part IV, Section VI (p.261).
230 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28. Book I, Section VI (p. 258).
231 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28. Book II, Part III, Section III
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the nation in question is indeed composed of a set of beings whose primary function and
drive is the striving not only towards self-preservation of each corpuscular member of
that nation, but also and necessarily that this striving must be necessarily and
permanently aligned with the self-persistence of the nation-state itself.232
Thus far our analysis has been as half of an hourglass, beginning in the widest
considerations of universal ontology, narrowing in to a focus upon the uppermost towers
of the self, the apartments of the often chauvinistic mandarin we habitually misname
ourselves, being the rational, self-conscious present partial manifestation of the total
person. We have delved a little deeper, through the focal point, the core thesis, towards
the wider depths of self below, to find the driver of selfhood, the conatus. But we have
not examined the nature of the conatus itself, in terms of its origin, structure, and place in
the wider ontology of the universe. We will now do so, before moving on, in Section
Three, to open out into questions of the ethics of personal self-continuance in the social
world. In our next analysis, prior to moving on to such higher considerations of
interpersonal morality, we will, I assert, discover the root of all value, and the nature of
the connection between morality, so often falsely considered to be the exclusive province
of the imperial mandarin in her high tower, and the broad natural world. We shall, I
believe, discover the method by which values, morality and ethics may be naturalised.
                                                 
232 Non co-operators or the unaligned, who strive for self-preservation solo, with no thought to the nation,
and no alliance with its self-preservation as a whole, would then be analogous to cancerous cells, which
have failed to exhibit contact inhibition, and have begun to procreate in a manner unaligned with the self-
persistence of the body to which they belong. Cancer is often misunderstood as a disease of the body which
may have a particular cure. It is father a form of bodily indiscipline, and has as many manifestations as
there are methods and motivations of mutiny.
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2.9.2 Conative-affective-cognitive: a suggestion
concerning classic problems in metaethics
Perhaps the central debate in metaethics in the past two centuries has been that
surrounding the issue of whether valuing activity is cognitive, or non-cognitive in nature.
The classic picture, and among some modern conservative thinkers and very many
(primarily religiously-minded) public this picture remains endorsed, is that there are
moral facts which we come to know by dint of our cognitive faculties. Whether these are
natural or “non-natural”, and how they may be known is not our concern at this moment.
These moral facts are in some mysterious way inherently orienting, such that mere
knowing of them commands our affective psychology into certain attitudes, which in turn
stimulates the conative aspect of our psychology to a greater or lesser extent, such that we
may, or may not act upon such affective orientation. Following Hume’s dissection of
belief and motivation233, and his separation of “is” from “ought” statements, a
considerable philosophic scepticism of the cognitivist picture has arisen. The various
streams of metaethics which have arisen subsequent to acceptance of the force of this
scepticism have broadly abandoned, therefore, the idea that values and normative
judgements are based initially in cognition, and have generally accepted some form of
internalism about moral reason, whereby desires and attitudes-towards, are the initiator
of, or even perhaps even synonymous with value and normative judgement. According to
these theories, valuing activity would appear to be located primarily, and in its origin, in
the affective component of our psychology. This is most explicitly clear in the
emotivist234 accounts of valuing, but is arguably the case in other expressivist accounts,
such as the projectivism of Blackburn235 among others. This has left considerable debate,
however, concerning motivation itself, and in particular whether such affective states as
desire or hope can in themselves be said to be in some sense intrinsically motivating. In
                                                 
233 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28. Book II, Part III, Section III (esp. pp. 413-14).
234 Chiefly following the work of Ayer, as originally argued in: Ayer AJ. 1936. Language, Truth, and
Logic. Gollancz, London.
235 This is not necessarily true of Neo-Kantian constructivist accounts such as that of Korsgaard which seek
to locate the originator in the rational process, which then constructs the affective component. I will deal
with this further in subsequent subsections, and especially in Section Three.
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other words, there remains a question from a motivational internalist standpoint, about
the various expressivist pictures, as they have hitherto been iterated. In short, just as
Hume questioned the necessity of the jump from the cognitive to the conative, it may still
be questioned whether there is any necessity of implication of the conative from the
affective.
It is important, of course, to recognise that there is considerable blurring arising from the
intertwining of the conative and affective aspects of consciousness, which complicates
this picture. Indeed, the intertwining of conation with affect, and also with cognition at a
very basic level has perhaps in part led to its being largely ignored as a primary factor.
Conation has a way of being “assumed” within affect, indeed in the very way which
made it a shock when Hume first began to untangle conation from cognition (being a
necessary result of it, though conation is strongly associated with cognition in a driving
role, as argued above). It is the possibly comprehensive nature of this intertwining for
which I argue below as is acknowledged inter alia by the identification of the phrase
“categoric desire”, in my thesis, with conation. However, the question here is one of
primacy.
I suggest that the theoretical move from the primacy of the cognitive to the primacy of
the affective component of our psychology as the candidate for the fundamental origin of
motivational attitude, or normative judgement, does not go far enough. In at least one
case, and perhaps more generally, it appears to me that there may well be a deeper origin
still: that of the conative aspect of our psychology itself. I consider, for example, that
conation is a feature of cognition, but not in a way that falls foul of Hume’s theory236.
Rather conation, I argue, is the driver of cognition, just as it is the driver of affect, in that
both these require, at base, a fundamental motivator for the processes which they
represent.
                                                 
236 In that beliefs and knowledge are formed by rational process, which itself is driven by a conative nisus.
That these beliefs do not have a necessary further conative component is not an issue for the role of
conation in their construction.
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2.10 Conatus: the Master Value. 
Given an acceptance of a fundamental driver of personhood and predicator of the value of
life’s continuance to persons, what can be said about the nature of this objective
motivation, this objective categorical desire?  If it is objective in some way, insofar as its
being irreducible to subjectivity, as the latter arises from its drive, and if we are, as I
absolutely assert, wholly naturally constituted beings, then such a principle should, in
principle, be open to description by natural, even empirical scientific means. Could this
be done? What could possibly provide the arrow of the striving towards self-preservation,
the striving towards the process of existing, if it is not subjectivity alone? Some things
can be said at this point. Firstly, if it is a naturalistic “arrow” we are looking for, then it
should be accessible to physics, or at least describable within a language of physical
terms. Secondly, if it is correct ex hypothesi, that this natural phenomenon, law or
principle should, in context of persons, be both the originator, universal driver, and
fundamental orientator of value in the universe, perhaps as mediated secondarily by
valuing activity in persons, then we come hard against the problem alluded to above:
namely, how to reconcile such an idea with a naturalistic account, and in particular with a
reductionistic account, which is the predominant model. A full treatment of this subject
would amount to a book length treatise, so what follows in the remainder of Section Two
should be regarded as a kind of speculative introduction.
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2.10.1 A brief history of the conatus cluster concept
There exists a cluster of traditional positions in philosophy that centre on a concept
known as the conatus. This constellation of ideas has had various incarnations at various
times, with varying degrees of emphasis and scope, but at its core may be stated to be the
principle by which things strive to keep themselves in being, or motion. If in the former
sense of striving to keep in being, this usually encompasses the thing’s striving not only
to persist in being, but also towards self-enhancement, or self development.  In the most
ancient formulations of this concept237, it was applied solely to the world of living
organisms, but was later extended238 to include the motions of inanimate as well as
animate bodies, so physical dynamics.239 This more comprehensive view was embraced
by the early modern founders of empiricism240, who were also, significantly, the founders
of reductionist mechanistic views of the natural realm. The comprehensive view of
conatus as explaining both the motions of bodies and natural forces such as centripetal
and centrifugal “force”, as well as the striving of living beings towards self-preservation
and development reached its height in the writings of such 17th Century rationalists as
Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes and Spinoza. The views of the latter two are the most
interesting in the context of this thesis.  I will deal briefly with these further below, but it
is important, at this point, both to untangle the central fault line in this cluster-concept,
and at the same time briefly to explore the possible reasons for the general collapse of
interest in the conatus hypothesis, subsequent to the Seventeenth Century. I account that
this collapse was predicated by three main factors:
                                                 
237 Particularly in the work of Aristotle, and later, the Stoics.
238 Originally by John Philiponus, in the course of his criticism of Aristotle’s theory of motion. See article
by Christian Wildberg in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsophy: Wildberg C. 2007. John Philoponus.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philoponus/#2.2
[Accessed February 2008]
239 Sorabji R. 1988. Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel. Duckworth,
London.
240 For example by Bernardino Telesio, an important influence on Spinoza.
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1. The conflation of the idea of the conatus as the driver towards self-
preservation and development of specifically living systems, with that of
the (superficially similar but deeply distinct) idea of the “driver” of the
mechanics of motion in systems generally, whether inanimate or animate.
In each case these (distinct) concepts were held to be a positive force or
principle that urges to motion.
2. The emergence of a strictly reductionistic and mechanistic Scientific
World View in the course of the 16th to the 18th centuries.
3. The publication of Isaac Newton’s Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia
Mathematica (“Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy”).
It is perhaps easy to see why the ancient, and I believe still useful, concept of the conatus,
as it appertains to the striving towards self-preservation and development of living
biological systems became conflated with the quite separate set of attempts to answer the
questions concerning the motions of physical bodies generally in the universe. Living
bodies are seen to move. It is no great leap, particularly given a reductionistic project and
commitment241, to consider that the principles of the motion of living versus nonliving
bodies may be accounted to be the same. The concept of the conatus was merely
borrowed from its old category, and generalised in what appeared a quite logical manner,
to apply to and explain the pressing question of what, say, keeps an arrow in flight, as
well as a duck. That these concepts were only very broadly isomorphic, (the latter for
example lacking the crucial element of self development, let alone reproduction, in living
systems) perhaps did not trouble so much in an age wherein no such concepts were as yet
clearly defined. After all, Natural Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century lacked the
disciplinary specialisations of physics and biology. Further Descartes, Hobbes and
Spinoza, among other major thinkers of this period, in line with a commonly accepted
view of the day, held the motion of bodies in general physical dynamics to depend upon
                                                 
241 Evidenced, for example, in Descartes’ assertion that all non-human animals were mere automatons.
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some active force, which was conceptually isomorphic with the apparent active principle
in animal behaviour.242
The publication of Newton’s Principia on 5 July 1687 caused a revolution in thinking
about physical dynamics, and one which, of course, had great consequences for the
conatus cluster hypothesis, as it then stood243. The idea of an active force which kept
bodies in motion, so arrows in flight, was demonstrated to be a misunderstanding and
instead what caused the continuation of motion in moving bodies was shown to be a
passive tendency, which Newton dubbed “inertia”. According to this, Newton’s First
Law, arrows stayed in flight because all bodies resisted changes in their states of rest or
motion, and would remain in such states until some force was applied to change these
same. In the case of arrows, this was of course friction with the air, and the force of
gravity (though this only impedes motion, of course, secondarily by occasioning contact
with the ground), which meant that in absence of such friction or other impeding force,
an arrow would continue to move smoothly and indefinitely, requiring no special “force”
to propel it along. There was no need for an active principle or force whatever. The same
applied to the centrifugal “force”, dubbed by Descartes as the conatus recedendi, which
subsequent to the Principia was recognised to be a “fictitious force” explained by appeal
to inertial frames of reference, within which the First and Second Laws are seen to be
valid. Simply put, the consequence of the new dynamics of the Principia and the
aftermath of its publication was finally to hole below the waterline the concept of the
conatus as an active principle in general physical dynamics244.  With the collapse of the
                                                 
242 Pietarinen J. 1998. “Hobbes, Conatus and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Paideia Project, Boston University.
Available at: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mode/ModePiet.htm [Accessed February 2008]
243 That there is some controversy over whether Newton understood, at the time, the full consequences of
this himself is neither here nor there, since the Principia precipitated the collapse of the conatus hypothesis
subsequently in fairly short order, whether Newton himself was directly cognisant of this or not. See
Kollerstrom for a critique of the historical implications of Newton’s discoveries in this, qua Newton:
Kollerstrom N. 1999. “How Newton Failed to Discover the Law of Gravity.”  Ann Sci  56, 331-356.
Available at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/nk/newton-gravity.htm [Accessed February 2008]
244 This is of course an oversimplification. However it neatly summarises what did actually happen, whose
actual sequence was, as with the development and decline of all ideas in real history, messy and fiendishly
complex. For example, while it is true that Descartes saw conatus as an active force ultimately derived from
divine power, he considered that this was solely manifest as a primordial impulse from the Divine, the
motion proceeding in a smoothly mechanistic manner thereafter (Geroult 1980 see reference at end of
note). A book-length work would be required to tease out all the threads of this transition, but the broad
lines of the story are, I believe, correct, and the story as told may be regarded (as with perhaps all history)
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conatus concept in physical dynamics, and the ascendancy of a reductionist mechanistic
view of the universe in large part predicated by the same natural philosophers who had
completed the conjunction between the ancient, strictly biological, and the
medieaval/early modern physical dynamical aspects of the conatus, the concept cluster as
a whole appeared ramshackle and unfit for purpose, and thus largely disappeared from
view.
However, the total collapse of the concept’s perceived relevance may well have been
premature. For the work done by the initial, ancient concept of biological conatus has yet
to be adequately fulfilled and replaced by any modern theory. Taxis, or activity on the
part of living organisms (including internal activities, for example maintaining
homeostasis), while described as a general phenomenon in biology, are essentially merely
assumed, and then described, rather than explained by a general theory, and the striving
towards self-preservation which undoubtedly represents an active principle made
manifest by such taxis is as yet not adequately explained in a hard reductionist,
mechanistic manner, such that it is smoothly integrated with the physics of non-biological
systems.
Before returning to this claim, however, it is important at this point to outline why some
of the particular philosophies of the Seventeenth Century relating to the conatus are of
great interest and relevance in context of this thesis, and more generally in modern
metaethical discourse. The two philosophers who are most relevant in this regard are
Hobbes and Spinoza. Each of these described a system of ethics and metaethics whose
principal feature was the central role of the conatus of self-preservation and development
in human psychology, making this principle in effect the “master value”.
                                                                                                                                                  
as a heuristic approximation of the truth. See: Geroult M. 1980. “The Metaphysics and Physics of Force in
Descartes.” In: Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics. Gaukroger S. (ed.). Harvester Press,
Sussex.
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2.10.2 Spinoza’s conatus argument, physics, and modern
metaethics
I will look at Spinoza first, although he was a later contemporary influenced by Hobbes,
since his thinking is considerably closer to the spirit of this thesis. In his magnum opus,
Ethics (published posthumously in the Opera Posthuma, 1677),245 he undertakes an
astonishingly comprehensive project to elucidate a rational and objective naturalistic
explanation for ethics, with the conatus as its lynchpin and guiding principle. From this
simple principle he constructed a comprehensive view of metaphysical and metaethical
reality. Spinoza echoed Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, and Cicero, as well as Hobbes in his
belief that human affects and cognition had a dependency relation to conatus. This is best
expressed in the Scholium to Proposition 9 in Part Three of his magnum opus, Ethics:
[The conatus], when it is related to the mind alone, is called will but when it is
related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is called appetite246, which
is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from the nature of which
necessarily follow those things which promote his preservation, and thus he is
determined to do those things. Hence there is no difference between appetite and
desire, unless in this particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as
they are conscious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as appetite of
which we are conscious. From what has been said it is plain, therefore, that we
neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything because we think it good, but,
on the contrary, we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek,
or desire it.247
In this statement, Spinoza anticipates what has become a central move in modern western
analytic moral philosophy, starting with Hume’s projectivism,248 through Ayer’s
                                                 
245 There do not appear to be any modern editions of the whole.
246 The term appetite or appetitive was often used as a synonym or modifier or the conatus concept, when it
was used in context of unconscious or pre-conscious living matter, or the states thereof. Leibniz, for
example, primarily calls the conative, the appetitive. Although the latter (of the two following) may be said
to be derived from it, the appetitive in the former sense should not be confused with simple appetite, in the
sense of hunger for food, but is rather a more general physical principle, cognate with conatus.
247 Spinoza B. 2001 (f.p. 1677). Ethics. Wordsworth Classics, Hertfordshire. Proposition 9, Scholium. (pp.
106-7)
248 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28.
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emotivism,249 and the quasi-realism of Blackburn250 to Korsgaard’s constructivism.251
These all rely on the move from the conservative/religious classic position of locating
moral psychology in cognition, but in a passive mode, in which one is cognisant of
objective moral facts in the world which are apprehended by the cognitive faculties, and
then in turn influence the affects and result in a conative stimulation or moral motivation,
to locating the originator of moral psychology in the affects, such that the affective
triggers the conative or motivating aspects (say, to primitive moral exclamations of
outrage or approval) and from there (in constructivist theory, at least) to the cognitive in
the active construction of more iterated moral concepts and normative theories. However
Spinoza goes further than these, stating unequivocally that the conative aspect of mind is
the prime moral psychological driver252, in this way providing an objective moral
“arrow” or moral “master value” that is largely free of the embarrassing difficulties of the
classic moral cognitivist picture, which theory, in order to explain the mysterious moral
“objects” which are apprehended in cognition, is forced either to postulate supernatural
properties or “non-natural” properties (hardly distinguishable, in my view, and equally
suspect, requiring a special faculty of “moral intuition”, presumably itself natural, which
surely begs the question), which cannot be accounted for in a naturalistic frame.253 The
non-cognitivist theories, which locate the originator of value in the affects, suffer from
the difficulty of explaining motivational internalism, in other words they simply don’t
explain why the affects give rise to motivations, especially moral or valuing motivations,
if they are themselves the prime originators, they simply state that they do, or assume
them altogether. In this way, they again suffer from some of the central problems they
themselves lay at the door of cognitivism, for if the motivational aspects of moral “facts”
or properties require (and lack) naturalistic explanation, the same is true of the affects,
                                                 
249 Ayer AJ. 1936. Op. Cit. note 234.
250 Blackburn S. 1985 and 2000 Op. Cit. note 32.
251 The picture is slightly more complicated in Korsgaard, but I consider that her neo-Kantian position has
indeed made this move, and is indeed a form of non-cognitivism, in that while values are cognitive
features, they are constructed within the cognition, and are not perceived as external facts by the cognitive
faculty, prior to such a construction. Korsgaard C.1996. Op. Cit. note 207.
252 Conation, less well recognised generally, is typically the poor cousin in modern psychological theory,
but nonetheless represents one of the triumvirate of basic psychological modes conative, affective,
cognitive. Though Spinoza’s hierarchy is not presently widely accepted in this field, Freud expressed
something rather similar to Spinoza’s position, and grudgingly acknowledged this influence in his work.
253 Mackie JL. 1990. Op. Cit. note 36.
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unless these are somehow radically sui-generis, as is to say the least, unlikely in a
naturalistic schema. Following my analysis of persons necessarily as processes, however,
it appears that the affects simply cannot be the fundamental motivators, as they are
themselves driven into being by some more fundamental motivating principle.254
Spinoza’s construction of the conatus, however, postulates a far more elegant schema
than these above described projectivist, emotivist and constructivist ideas, whose project
is at least significantly intended towards locating value in a naturalistic frame. As
outlined further below, I believe that the conatus at the heart of Spinoza’s project of
naturalising this psychological and normative ursprung may be beginning to be described
and located in modern natural scientific terms.
The relevant propositions of Spinoza’s Ethics that define the conatus principle in this
context are propositions 4 to 9 of Part Three:
Proposition 4: A thing cannot be destroyed except by an external cause.
Proposition 5: In so far as one thing is able to destroy another they are of
contrary natures; that is to say, they cannot exist in the
same subject.
Proposition 6:  Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to
persevere in its being.
Proposition 7: The effort by which each thing endeavours to persevere in
its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing
itself.
Proposition 8: The effort by which each thing endeavours to persevere in
its own being does not involve finite but indefinite time.
                                                 
254 Horrobin S. 2006. Op. Cit. note 119.; Horrobin S. 2006. “Immortality, Human Nature, The Value of Life
and the Value of Life Extension”. Bioethics volume 20, number 6, pp. 279-292.
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Proposition 9: The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas,
and in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
persevere in its being for an indefinite time, and is
conscious of this effort.255
It is not the purpose or focus of this thesis fully to elucidate Spinozistic metaphysics, but
some brief discussion will help clarify the situation, as I think it stands. Spinoza died a
decade prior to the publication of Newton’s Principia, and nearly two centuries prior to
Rudolf Clausius’ description of the second law of thermodynamics,256 and entropy.257
The latter’s significance will be discussed further below, but in the context of the above
propositions, it is clear that this latter principle in physics constitutes a problem for
propositions 4 and 5, but equally one of which Spinoza could not possibly have been
aware. With regard to inertia and conatus, Spinoza applied the latter equally to nonliving
and living entities, which he referred to as “modes” of the ultimate singular “substance”,
which term is synonymous with “nature”. He made no strict delineation between them as
regards the conatus, but I believe that this is precisely because he did not have access to
either of the concepts of inertia, or of entropy, which combined provide a reason both to
reject talk of conatus in the context of a general physical dynamics, but on the other
hand, in the case of thermodynamics may give us a reason not to reject talk of the conatus
as a whole, and indeed to seek to amend his propositions accordingly, or build their like
afresh in a new, more comprehensive system. More will be said about the latter below,
and I will return to the implications of the other propositions shortly, but first it is
important briefly to outline the use of the conatus concept by Hobbes, since it has an
equally resonant modern aspect.
                                                 
255 Spinoza B. 2001 (f.p. 1677). Ethics. Wordsworth Classics, Hertfordshire.  pp. 105-107.
256 Clausius R.1850. “Über die bewegende Kraft der Wärme.” Ann Phys 79, 368-397, 500-524
257 Clausius R. 1865. The Mechanical Theory of Heat – with its Applications to the Steam Engine and to
Physical Properties of Bodies. John van Voorst, London.
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2.10.3 Hobbes, the conatus, and evolutionary theories of
morality
Essentially, for Hobbes, the conatus was the master value in that each living being strived
to preserve its own life, and in context of conscious social beings, and especially self-
conscious, rational social beings of the nature of humans, this striving was seen to be best
served by entering into contractual arrangements which allowed for peace, and an end to
the war of all against all. The war itself was predicated by the requirement for resources
to be accumulated by each individual, from food on upwards, in order to preserve
themselves in existence.258 The resource-gathering behaviour was best done, according to
a kind of game theory,259 in localised cooperation, rather than general hostile
competition. These contracts may be seen to be either the primitive, prelinguistic social
bonds of herds or packs or flocks of animals, or the linguistically iterated, complex, and
conceptually abstracted concepts of particular tribes, societies, nations, etc. Crucially, in
Hobbes, these larger groupings would then be seen to act in ways that made them appear
to be a corporate body, or a single, self-interested person, which for Hobbes was quite
literally personified in the body and person of a monarch or dictator.260 The resonances
between this and Hume’s conception of person-processes as being akin to nations are not
to be overlooked.  These corporate bodies, given finite resources, would of course enter
into competition with other such, in some cases predicating war on an international scale,
but also, more fruitfully, providing the rationale for cooperation in the form of political
treaties to foster the benefits of international economics. It doesn’t take a great leap of the
imagination to see how this Hobbesian model lies in conceptual isomorphism, and
                                                 
258 Vitally, this maps very neatly on to the requirement of non-linear open thermodynamic systems, in order
to hold themselves far from equilibrium, to feed on “free energy”, dumping increased entropy or statistical
(Boltzmann) disorder downstream of themselves. Because of the requirement of the second law of
thermodynamics that entropy increases in the total system, it can only be decreased within strictly bounded
systems, or localised groups of systems, even if they are subsystems within a mid-range open
thermodynamic system such as a planet, fed with free-energy by a star. Thus such systems will, in order to
exist at all, necessarily compete for resources, in order to “swim upstream” of the flow of Gibbs free
energy, and thus maintain and develop themselves. This note will become clearer on reading the remainder
of the paper.
259 See e.g. Pietarinen J. 1998. Op. Cit. note 242.
260 Hobbes T. 1998 (f.p. 1651). Leviathan. Oxford World’s Classics, OUP, Oxford
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considerable accord, with modern evolutionary biological theories of ethics, wherein the
“contractarian” impulse, driven by the need for survival, is described as biological
“altruism”, predicated by “group selection”.261  Indeed considering evolutionary theory as
a whole, while it is most certainly correct in its basic premises of evolution by natural
selection, it crucially appears to lack an elucidation of one of its central assumptions:
that living beings do in fact strive to keep themselves in being. This concept is simply
assumed as a precondition, after which, all else follows according to Darwinian
principles, very nicely. However one must be very cautious not to draw any hasty,
morally reductionistic conclusions from this nexus. The situation is more complex than it
might prima facie appear.
                                                 
261 For a discussion of the manner in which ethics may arise from biology, see: Ridley M. 1997. The Origin
of Virtue. Penguin, London
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2.10.4 The conatus and modern thermodynamics of self-
organised systems
So what, then could we say, in modern, scientific terms about this missing principle,
about this ancient but possibly magnificently useful concept of the conatus, whose
conceptual cognate appears to be assumed by the most stable and useful theory in the
whole of biology, and possibly the whole of the sciences? Where can we turn for
inspiration?
I believe, as an initial port of call, we may turn to an essay by physics Nobelist Erwin
Schrodinger, originally delivered as a lecture in Dublin in 1943, entitled “What is
Life?”.262 This essay is especially fascinating because it represents a rare and immensely
powerful nexus between the now fragmented disciplines of physics, biology, and
philosophy, once whole within Natural Philosophy. The significance to biology of this
essay cannot be overstated, since Schrodinger’s description within it of the replicating
material of living organisms as an aperiodic crystal of a certain size, with the property of
replication facilitated by genetic information encoded in a system of covalent chemical
bonds accurately gave Watson and Crick their target zone.263 Apart from successfully
outlining and predicting the “master code” of living, self replicating systems, another,
indeed overriding, aspect of this paper deals with the historically more metaphysical,
though in this context the intention is to make it precisely physical, question of what
living matter is, as opposed to non-living matter:
The large and important and very much discussed question is: How can the
events in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of a living
organism be accounted for by physics and chemistry? The preliminary answer
which this little book will endeavor to expound and establish can be summarized as
follows: The obvious inability of present-day physics and chemistry to account for
such events is no reason at all for doubting that they can be accounted for by those
                                                 
262 Schrodinger. 1967 (f.p. 1944) What Is Life? Mind and Matter. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Available at: http://home.att.net/~p.caimi/schrodinger.html [Accessed February 2008]
263 Watson J. 1968. The Double Helix- A personal account of the discovery of the structure of DNA.
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London.
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sciences. (Schrodinger 1944; Chap 1, 1st para)
Schrodinger’s conclusion is essentially merely to draw a more specific target area, and
may very roughly be stated as being that living organisms constitute bounded material
systems which by their activities prevent themselves falling towards equilibrium, or
succumbing to the effects of entropy (as defined by a statistical, so Boltzmann
interpretation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics), by feeding on “negative entropy”,
which is also known as Gibbs free energy available in their environment, and dissipating
it through their processes. In more modern language, following the work of the likes of
Nobel Laureate physicist Ilya Prigogine,264 we might describe these same as nonlinear
dynamic dissipative open systems that are subsets of an open thermodynamic system in
the form of the biosphere of the earth, with the sun providing a constant supply of raw,
“free energy”. All other “nonliving” systems fall toward equilibrium in a fairly smooth
statistically predictable manner, and exhibit no taxis, behaviours, or activities which
“swim upstream” of the fall towards equilibrium, and most particularly no “self
developing” activities, which exhibit innovation or variation of both strategy and physical
form with the common object of maintaining an internally low entropy, or state far from
equilibrium, both within the system of each instantiated living being, within groups of
living beings, and along the genetic line of descendants, as do living systems.
What is on offer here is not, at least not yet, an answer. It is more of an outline, a
pregnant absence, like remarkable tracks in the snow, giving some idea that not only is
there some unknown or new kind of beast, but what general shape and size it might be,
and which direction it appears to run, leading on, perhaps, to where it might be found,
studied, and finally fully described.  Speaking of this outline, Schrodinger draws what he
calls a “remarkable general conclusion from the model”:
…there is just one general conclusion to be obtained from it and that, I confess,
was my only motive for writing this book. From Delbruck’s general picture of the
hereditary substance it emerges that living matter, while not eluding the ‘laws of
physics’ up to date, is likely to involve ‘other laws of physics’ hitherto unknown,
                                                 
264 Prigogine I. 1997. The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature. The Free Press,
New York, NY.
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which, however, once they have been revealed, will form just as integral a part of
this science as the former.265
This is very much the conclusion that the complex systems researcher and theoretical
biologist Stuart Kauffman also draws, and towards the elucidation of which his
remarkable book Investigations266 reads like a training manual for future trackers of this
perhaps new thermodynamic principle or law. Whatever final shape this will take, some
things are reasonably clear. Most particularly what might be said is that this principle has
a directionality about it. If the classical thermodynamic principle of entropy (as
statistically described by Boltzmann) provides not only a ratchet giving us the arrow of
irreversibility in physics, but perhaps even the arrow of temporal directionality itself, as
has been suggested,267 then it is not so surprising, perhaps, that a still elusive member of
this genus should possess an arrow of its own, perhaps even bestowed by the
directionality of the former, classic Second Law: the quasi-opposing arrow of striving
towards self-preservation, and self-development in specifically living, biological systems.
Yes, I am suggesting that these concepts are not merely isomorphic, but that the paw of
the ancient conjectural beast of the conatus of living beings appears to fit precisely into
the pawprints of this possible new law. It is no coincidence that Schrodinger chose to
preface his essay with a quotation from Spinoza’s ethics, specifically Part IV, Proposition
67: “Homo liber nulla de re minus quam de morte cogitat; et ejus sapientia non mortis sed
vitae meditatio est.” (A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is
not a meditation upon death but upon life.) The demonstration to the Scholium continues:
A free man, that is to say, a man who lives according to the dictates of reason
alone, is not led by the fear of death, but directly desires the good; that is to say,
desires to act, to live, and to preserve his being…268
Returning to Spinoza’s propositions relating to the conatus, we may now suggest that,
provided one allows for the developments of inertia, separating the conflated cluster-
concept into its component parts, and doing away with the general, but not the living-
                                                 
265 Schrodinger. 1967 (f.p. 1944). Op. Cit. note 262.
266 Kauffman S. 2003, Investigations. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
267 Zeh HD. 2001. The Physical Basis of The Direction of Time. Springer-Verlag, Berlin and Heidelberg.
Available at:  http://www.time-direction.de/ [Accessed February 2008]
268 Spinoza B. 2001 (f.p. 1677). Op. Cit. note 255. (p, 212.)
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systems case, and provided likewise one allows for a modern understanding of entropy,
then while propositions 4 and 5 need at least amendment, propositions 6-9 look
remarkably accurate, and appear to be perfectly in line with a putative thermodynamic
arrow specific to self-organising systems far (and increasingly far) from equilibrium.
Further, they provide a clear route by which, through a process understanding of
personhood and subjective value generation, ethics can be joined to modern conceptions
in systems biology, and theoretical physics, and thereby provide a coherent route by
which norms may be naturalised, and at least one value, the Master Value, may be seen to
have a very real, and indeed objectively real ontology!
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2.10.5 Jonas, autopoiesis, biodynamic value and the
irreducibility of subjectivity
Probably no single thinker has made a bolder and more iterated attempt at naturalising
value within a specifically biological organismic system, and as a necessary consequence
of the ontology of such a system, than has Hans Jonas. In a series of essays beginning in
the middle 1960s and extending through the early 1990s, Jonas outlined his vision of the
simultaneous and co-dependent ontology of organisms, value and subjectivity. Aware of
the common reference to biological organisms as “machines” with all that such a term
implies about thoroughgoing eliminative reducibility to material efficient causes both of
any apparent value and subjectivity itself, which in this conception are held to be sorts of
illusions, he sought to distinguish between mere machines and organisms by first
defining what exactly is the difference between living and non-living systems, using the
paradigm process of metabolism as his initial model:
As a physical body the organism will exhibit the same general features as do other
aggregates: a void mostly, crisscrossed by the geometry of forces that emanate
from the insular foci of localised elementary being. But special goings-on will be
discernible, both inside and outside its so-called boundary, which will render its
phenomenal unity still more problematical than that of ordinary bodies, and will
efface almost entirely its material identity through time. I refer to its metabolism,
its exchange of matter with the surroundings. In this remarkable mode of being,
the material parts of which the organism consists at a given instant are to the
penetrating observer only temporary, passing contents whose joint material
identity does not coincide with the identity of the whole which they enter and
leave, and which sustains its own identity by the very act of foreign matter
passing through its spatial system, the living form. It is never the same materially
and yet persists as its same self, by not remaining the same matter. Once it really
becomes the same with the sameness of its material contents – if any two “time
slices” of it become, as to their individual contents, identical with each other and
with the slices between them – it ceases to live; it dies [Main text]… [Footnote
text] We have to realize the all-pervasiveness of metabolism within the living
system. The exchange of matter with the environment is not a peripheral activity
engaged in by a persistent core: it is the total mode of continuity (self-
continuation) of the subject of life itself. …[A] machine persists as a self-identical
inert system over and against the changing identity of matter with which it is
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“fed”; and, we may add, it exists as just the same when there is no feeding at all: it
is then the same machine at a standstill. On the other hand, when we call a living
body a “metabolizing system,” we must include in the term that the system itself
is wholly and continuously a result of its metabolizing activity, and further that
none of the “result” ceases to be an object of metabolism while it is also an agent
of it. For this reason alone, it is inappropriate to liken the organism to a machine.
… metabolism is more than a method for power generation: in addition to, and
more basic than, providing kinetic energy for the running of the machine,… its
role is to build up originally and replace continually the very parts of the machine.
Metabolism is thus the constant becoming of the machine itself – and this
becoming itself is a performance of the machine: but for such performance there
is no analogue in the world of machines. 269
Having established this basic definition of living systems, so organisms (metabolic quasi-
or para-machines), he establishes what he regards as the necessity of isolation of such
systems from the background environment they inhabit. Such isolation is required for the
identification of just what it is which is the subject of concern of the process of
continuous self-establishment of form. This necessary isolation in itself requires and
defines the inwardness of organismic structures, which is identical with their “selfhood”,
with necessary boundaries, or boundedness defining the beginnings of “self” and “other”:
In purely physical description, no more than continuous presence in the
containing continuum is assumed (but no less can be assumed) for the “sameness”
of an entity; and thus, on physical terms alone, there is only this external identity
conferred on discrete units (particles and fields) by the principia individuationis
(space and time), or, equivalently, by the totality of the physical universe defining
their place: in either case a matter of external reference. Of an internal principle
of identity in physical particles we do not know, even if there be one. Organic
identity, however, must be of a different nature altogether. In the precarious
metabolic continuity of the organic form, with its perpetual turnover of
constituents, no inert substratum, no single “path” and no “bundle” of parallel
paths of contemporaneous members, is available as referent for external identity.
Internal identity of the whole, transcending the collective one of the present and
vanishing substratum, must span the shifting succession. … The introduction of
the term “self,” unavoidable in any description of the most elementary instance of
life, indicates the emergence, with life as such, of internal identity – and so, as
one with that emergence, its self-isolation too from all the rest of reality. Profound
singleness and heterogeneousness within a universe of homogenously interrelated
existence mark the selfhood of the organism. An identity which from moment to
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moment reasserts itself, achieves itself, and defies the equalizing forces of
physical sameness all around, is truly pitted against the rest of things. In the
hazardous polarization thus ventured upon by emerging life, that which is not
itself and borders on the realm of internal identity from without assumes at once
the character of absolute otherness. The challenge of selfhood qualifies all this
beyond the boundaries of the organism as foreign and somehow opposite: as
“world” in which, by which, and against which it is committed to maintain itself.
Without this universal counterpart of otherness, there would be no “self”.270
Although he does not characterise such a metabolising system as such, what he is in
effect describing here is indeed very much a dynamic, dissipative system as is described
above. The boundedness of a thermodynamic system which actively stabilises and,
especially, develops itself towards states of increasing improbability and decreasing
entropy must do so in isolation from the background, in virtue of the very dictates of the
Second Law of thermodynamics.271 In this way Jonas’ vision is, I believe, wholly in
accord with the thermodynamic concept of living systems. However Jonas is not very
explicitly aware of this relation, and not especially concerned to locate such structures
within their thermodynamic description, concerned as he is with general physics
primarily in a phenomenological mode to distinguish them from pure mechanisms of the
strictly reducible kind. In this way he never really iterates a clearer concept of the nature
of the arrow of what we have called the conatus, other than to describe it in classic
Heideggerian terms as the analogue of “care” or “self-concern” (though he critiques
Heidegger in the very terms of this concept).272 He is primarily concerned in this work to
make the physical distinction by appeal to the phenomenological reality of subjectivity,
                                                 
270 Jonas H. 2001. Ibid. pp. 81-83
271 The requirement in particular is given by the fact that the second law mandates that all (non-living)
systems, in totam, move towards states of greater probability, and increased entropy, so declined “free
energy” available for “work”, such as the “work” of activity towards self-persistence. But this in itself
means that for any system not merely to stabilise the increase in entropy, but actively to reduce entropy,
such reduction can only take place within a specifically bounded space, for any such reduction in one area
of a total or wider system, will increase entropy in another part of the total or wider system. In this case,
the increase will be downstream of the system itself, such that while entropy is decreased in the bounded
area of self-concern of the metabolic system in particular, the very activity which causes this reduction
increases, and must increase entropy in the immediate environment of that living subsystem. Such
subsystems are called dissipative precisely because they reduce free energy by dissipating it, from the point
of the total system, and rather than decreasing, actually increase total entropy. Because the second law
mandates an increase in the total system, including living and nonliving matter in a single mereology,
decrease in entropy is, and can only be local, and must needs therefore be bounded.
272 e.g. see: Jonas H. 2001 (f.p. 1966). “Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism.” In: The Phenomenon of
Life. Northwestern University Press, pp. 231-232
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which he considers to be irreducible to the pure mechanism of universal efficient causes,
as conceived through the device of a “mathematical God” or “pure Mathematician”,
rather akin to the “demon” of Laplace described further below in the final subsection of
this section. Further, Jonas states that knowledge of such selfhood, such internalism of
“identity”, is required for any such ascription itself to take place at all:
But what kind of inference is this? And by whom? How can the unprepared
observer infer what no mere analysis of the physical record will ever yield? The
unprepared observer indeed cannot: indeed the observer must be prepared, as the
hypothetical “pure Mathematician” is not. The observer of life must be prepared
by life. In other words, organic existence with its own experience is required of
himself for his being able to make that inference, which he does make all the
time, and this is the advantage – perennially disowned or slandered in the history
of epistemology – of our “having,” that is, being, bodies. Thus we are prepared by
what we are. It is by this interpolation of an internal identity alone that the mere
morphological (and as such meaningless) fact of metabolic continuity is
comprehended as an incessant act; that is, continuity is comprehended as self-
continuation.273
It is by the selfness of living systems, by their necessary non-identity with their particular
physical constituents, and by their awareness in some sense, which is a proto-awareness,
non-conscious, initially, but manifested by the necessary mediacy of their quest towards
self-persistence, of their own self-inherence and the coincident directedness of their
activity towards the persistence of this self-inherence, and its necessary distancing of self
from surrounding matter (in order to find food, and escape danger, for example) that both
transcendence of brute nonliving matter is brought into definite being, along with a
necessary teleology. By transcendence is meant, at first, simply this very self-inherence
by which living organisms separate themselves from, and transcend identity with the
purely objective mechanistic world of matter, and by teleology is meant, at least at first,
the final cause of the purposiveness of activity towards self-persistence of form as such a
self-inherent process. This latter will later be seen to be somewhat misleadingly named a
“final” cause, as it is not a closed-ended arrow, but an intrinsically open ended one. Jonas
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accepts that the exact nature of the relationship between the brute linear274 mathematical
physics of the mechanistically determinate world of inanimate matter, and the self-
inherent, apparently irreducibly subjective realm is mysterious, but asserts the necessity
of the above conclusions in despite of the apparent lack of smoothly conjoining rationale:
But there is always the purposiveness of organism as such and its concern in
living: effective already in all vegetative tendency, awakening to primordial
awareness in the dim reflexes, the responding irritability of lowly organisms;
more so in urge and effort and anguish of animal life endowed with motility and
sense-organs; reaching self-transparency in consciousness, will and thoughts of
man: all these being inward aspects of the teleological side in the nature of
“matter.” How this finalism tallies, in the same world, with mechanical causality
whose reality cannot be denied either is a problem not to be “solved” by
sacrificing evidence (purposiveness) to a theorem (exclusiveness of causa
efficiens) which was derived by generalization from another evidence; but, if
solvable at all, only by treating it as the profoundly challenging and as yet
completely unsettled problem it is. At all events, the teleological structure and
behaviour of organism is not just an alternative choice of description: it is, on the
evidence of each one’s own organic awareness, the external manifestation of the
inwardness of substance. To add the implications: there is no organism without
teleology; there is no telelolgy without inwardness; and: life can be known only
by life.  This is the advantage we poor mortals have over Jeans’s mathematical
God: happening to be living material things ourselves, we have in our self-
experience, as it were, peepholes into the inwardness of substance, thereby having
an idea (or the possibility of having an idea) not only of how reality is spread and
interacts in extensity, but of how it is to be real and to act and to be acted upon.275
The irreducibility itself is not the specific focus of Jonas’ enquiry. He essentially simply
notes it, asserts that there is no priority of evidence logically necessitated between
subjective phenomenal and ordinary “objective” mechanical scientific observation, which
means that in empirical inquiry we have to take both seriously, and moves on. In the final
subsection of this section I will discuss the implications of this discontinuity, and whether
or not we should consider that there are hidden principles of an ultimately entirely
reducible kind, whose nature is as yet unexplained, or whether the phenomenon of
                                                 
274 Dissipative systems are expressly nonlinear structures, but in any case this nonlinearity is insufficient in
itself to capture what Jonas means by irreducibility of selfhood. Such a deep irreducibility may be a
strongly emergent fact of the universe, involving the establishment of wholly new laws at the level of
organisms. This is the interpretation I take of the irreducibility that Jonas highlights. For further discussion
of irreducibility and emergence, see the final subsection of this section.
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selfhood and subjectivity, together with what I consider to be its formative counterpart,
the thermodynamic arrow of the conatus, is as a local principle belonging to the
emergent layer of the universe which begins at the level of living systems, formally
discontinuous with, and so strongly emergent from the “lower” physics from which it
arises. The chief distinction here is between a reductionist-constructivist view, and a
reductionist view as distinct from a constructivist one, in which case emergence may be
real, rather than illusory.  Returning to Jonas, the key insight, then, is that metabolising
systems have an irreducible inwardness which necessarily separates them from the rest of
the mechanical-causal continuum, and this separation itself predicates phenomenal
distance, described as mediacy, for example the mediacy which is required for simple
organisms first to apprehend the presence necessarily as external to themselves, and then
to distinguish food from toxin, shelter from predator or adverse environmental
circumstance, free energy from destructive energy, and initiate actions to and from these
detected facts in the world of “other”. A key observation of this mediacy is that as it
increases, as subjects gain greater sensory distance between themselves and the “other”,
their environment, this self-inherence itself increases, such that both the depth and scope
of the subjectivity, and the value of selfhood to self increases. He characterises this
increase as an increase in risk:
In terms of mere biological safety, the advantages of animal over plant life are
highly questionable, and in any case they are bought at a heavy price. … Motile
existence is fitful and anxious: plant life is nothing of the kind. But doubtful as are
the gains of motility and a balance of mere survival values, the survival standard
itself is inadequate for the evaluation of life. If mere assurance of permanence
were the point that mattered, life should not have started out in the first place. It is
essentially precarious and corruptible being, an adventure in mortality, and in no
possible form as assured of enduring as an inorganic body can be. Not duration as
such but “duration of what?” is the question. … The feeling animal strives to
preserve itself as a feeling, not just a metabolizing entity, i.e., it strives to continue
the very activity of feeling: the perceiving animal strives to preserve itself as a
perceiving entity – and so on. Without these faculties there would be much less to
preserve, and this less of what is to be preserved is the same as the less wherewith
it is preserved. … The selfhood here adumbrated has from the beginning its
counterpart in the otherness of the world. The further accentuation of this dualism
with all its inherent burden is nothing but the accentuation of life itself. Its
dialectic cannot but make each more developed state of it more double-edged.
From this point of view we see wherein the real advance of developed animality
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lies. … This increased mediacy buys greater scope, internal and external, at the
price of greater hazard, internal and external. A more pronounced self is set over a
more pronounced world. The progressive nervous centralization of the animal
organism emphasizes the former, while correspondingly the environment
becomes open space in which the free-moving sentient has to fend for itself. In its
greater exposure and the pitch of awareness that goes with it, its own possible
annihilations becomes an object of dread just as its possible satisfactions become
objects of desire. Its enjoyment has suffering as its shadow side … Its price from
the beginning was mortality, and each further stage of separation pays in its own
coin … The kind of coin determines the value of the enterprise. The rift between
subject and object, which long-range perception and motility opened and which
the keenness of appetite and fear, of satisfaction and disappointment, of pleasure
and pain, reflect, was never to be closed again.276
As the organism increases, through evolution, its distance from, the mediacy between
itself and the world as “other” from which it must secure its survival, its self-inherence
also deepens, since the increase in mediacy is predicated by its abilities to detect and
interact with ever more distant states of and (other) agents in the external world, as
opposed to mere structural coupling with the instantaneously present immediate world in
which it physically exists. This increase in sensory capability requires that the evolving
organisms inhabit a self-inherent space which is increasingly temporally extended and
recursive, with recollection and anticipation allowing for movement towards “positive”
stimuli, and away from “negative”, ever more distantly located in space, and therefore
also in time. The activity of movement towards or away from some stimulus judged to be
positive or negative involves the maintenance of that activity in anticipation of a future
event, and with recollection of a past stimulus (especially as greatly increased mediacy
allows mapping of recollected stimuli which are not continuously present). This activity
must constantly be monitored by the organism in a recursive fashion to allow it to update
its activity to accommodate for any changes such as changes in position of the stimulus,
but most particularly in case of error of judgement. The stimulus, distant in space and
time, might, as the organism moves towards it, turn out rather than positive, to be
negative, requiring evasive action to be taken. Crucially, any self-propelling active
organism failing to possess at least some basic system of sense-mediated recursive
adaptivity to changing circumstances, will rapidly become extinct, for reasons which
                                                 
276 Jonas H. 2001 (f.p.1966). “To Move and to Feel: On the Animal Soul.” In: The Phenomenon of Life.
Northwestern University Press. pp. 106-107
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appear obvious. The necessity for self-persistence of the organism supplies the ultimate
norm upon which these value judgements are made. That they are judgements of the
organism itself is made true specifically in virtue of the mediacy of the organism with its
environment, and the increase in that mediacy increases the internal, or self-inherent
recursive activity modulating processes of the organism itself.277 In this way the organism
adapts to its environment through behaviours and activities that are not determined by the
immediate structural coupling of its physical self with the immediate physical world
around it, but are projections upon that world of the increasingly self-inherent,
increasingly temporally extended, and increasingly capacious internal processes of
sensory evaluative mediation. This mediacy is itself made possible by, and so coevolves
with sensory capacities, and increases as these become more sophisticated, and as new
such emerge. So, above the level of simple self-sustaining direct chemical interaction by
direct structural coupling between itself and the immediately surrounding matter, there
are increasingly mediate stages made available by sensing capacities from mechanical
senses such as temperature (which is vital to homeostasis and is likely among the very
earliest) and vibration sense (important for primitive organisms in a liquid medium,
which may or may not have relation to the advanced sense of hearing) through
chemosense (eventually very sophisticated with many manifestations, some, as in the
case of the Emperor Silk Moth, enabling startling mediacies of 40 km or more, with
concomitant distances in time- some theorists consider that chemosense, and in particular
the necessity for storage and interpretation of the very complex information conveyed by
it, is the originator of the vast increase in self-inherence represented by the centralisation
of the nervous system) upwards through the various stages of this ultimately to sight. For
Jonas, sight is the sense which predicates, eventually, self-perception, and self awareness,
for it allows the very first eidetic control of the self, the imagination of outside events,
and the mapping of their possible future progression in eidetic terms, and so ultimately
leads to project (and life plan) making based upon full self-representation, or self-
                                                 
277 Consciousness is not, on this model, necessary to judgement in this basic sense. Thus an amoeba which
swims hard towards and engulfs a nearby cell with its parapodia, makes a judgement to do so, as it had
wide range of other possibilities for behaviour, including flight from the cell. The cell in turn may be a
flagellate, which makes a judgement to evade or not, and in which direction to self-motivate or else may
turn out to be a eukaryote predator itself, which instead of evading, engulfs the would be engulfer. In the
latter case, it is perfectly reasonable to say the first amoeba made an error of judgement in a complex
system, based upon a false assumption.
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consciousness. It is this self-awareness, founded in eidetic self-representation, which
allows human persons to exist fully as persons, in the sense outlined by the criteria of
autonomy, rationality, and self-consciousness.
Now we must be careful to distinguish what is going on here from a premeditated,
ordained or designed mode of teleology. The foregoing can rather be characterised in
fairly mechanistic, or blind terms. In the passages quoted above, it is easy to see a parallel
in the concept of a ratchet, such that at each stage what is valued is the persistence of
selfhood as it is at that stage. In the struggle to preserve what has been gained, the agent
searches the space of possibilities, and this, combined with the biological instabilities of
natural selection, genetic drift, and the genetic drives of random mutation, chiasmata,
lateral gene transfer, and viral (especially retroviral) transfection determine the
development of the organism through processes of ever-greater mediacy. This ever
greater mediacy, experienced as it is as gain bought through increase of risk, and increase
of perception of risk, itself predicates increase of self-generated value through the
extension of the self-inherent space of the organism’s self-and-world mapping of risk and
reward, of fear and goal, of retreat and project, eventually, of despair and self-inherently
valued at a (nearly) wholly second-order level life-plan. To return to the basic relation:
the more deeply and acutely the organism perceives risk, the more deeply and acutely
must it perceive and value itself and the continuation of that self’s processes, in which it
inheres, and by which it is instantiated.
He does not discuss it as such, and indeed rather ignores it, having foregone talk of
physics largely at the boundary of “self” and “other”, living and non-living matter and
process, but this living process is itself not above physics, but wholly within it. It is,
therefore, in turn, fundamentally driven, as I contend, by the arrow of the conatus, which
is the emergent thermodynamic arrow peculiar to living organismal systems.278 I would
suggest that the increase in value as described by Jonas matches, and extends from so is
the mirror or shadow or representation of, the increase in the “length” of the arrow of
                                                 
278 There is increasing advocacy in the philosophy of science of the concept of local, rather than universal
interpretations of physical laws. See e.g. Cartwright N. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the
Boundaries of Science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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thermodynamic conatus as a principle or law of matter and emergent attribute of nature
manifest solely at the level of living organisms. The increase in “risk”, “value of self”
and mediacy corresponds very nicely to the increase in complexity, Boltzmann
improbability and self-organisation..
Returning to Jonas, at this point in his story, the tale takes a remarkable turn, one wherein
the peculiarly moral self-recognition of human persons, and the attendant possibility for
eidetic re-objectification, brings with it the suggestion of the possibility of a return to
unity of the self with the objective whole, from which it has become so profoundly
disunited as an irreducibly self-inherent subject. The natural history of the arising and
evolution of value, coincident with and necessarily a foundational part of biological
arising into existence, and subsequent evolution, becomes, in human persons, the advent
of the first possibility of true morality, manifest, Jonas would suggest by an approach,
through self-conscious rational eidetic representation, toward the objective, allowing at
least partial release from the absolute dominance of self-inherence and (to put it in
Frankfurt’s language) first-order motivations and judgements, toward second-order,
quasi-objective valuation of self, and of other valuing agents, and indeed the valuing of
value itself. It is arguable that it is the valuing of value, or the evaluation of value, which
opens the way to what we might describe as true morality. For Jonas this rapprochement
of Being as self-inherence towards Being as Universal Object represents a kind of
ultimate final destination, such that humanity is, in some way, the “appointed” end of the
story of self-inherence. For him the story of the latent possibility of objective being’s
venture into subjective being, arising to the possibility of near-complete self-awareness in
human persons represents the Universe’s coming to true self-awareness, and self-
valuation. Here also another peculiarity of Jonas’ work manifests in what one might term
a radical departure in tone and theme, into one very much of a theologically committed
nature. In this pecularity, one is reminded of the sudden “turn” in the work of his old
master, Heidegger, though not in terms of its quality. Apart from noting that I consider
this turn to be a major failing in Jonas’ work, I will leave this story to a later subsection,
and continue this one with some notes about resonances in the work of some
contemporary biologists.
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Jonas’ work may largely be considered a work of speculative metaphysics and ontology,
using primarily phenomenological reasoning as its modus operandi. It is a philosophy of
biology, and not a theory of scientific biology. However, a few years after his first major
work was completed in this area, and entirely independently, a pair of biological
scientists Humberto Maturana and Fransisco Varela proposed a scientific model of living
systems which fits hand in glove with Jonas' beginning model of metabolism as a
paradigm process. This concept was dubbed “autopoiesis”:
Maturana and Varela formulated the notion of minimal autonomy as a circular
process of self-production where the cellular metabolism and the surface
membrane it produces are the key terms. Thus an autopoietic system – the
minimal living organization – is one that continuously produces the components
that specify it, while at the same time realizing it (the system) as a concrete unity
in space and time, which makes the network of production of components
possible. More precisely defined: An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a
unity) as a network of processes of production (synthesis and destruction) of
components such that these components:
1. continuously regenerate the network that is producing them, and
2. constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which they
exist.279
The above was taken from a 2002 paper, published shortly after Francisco Varela’s death,
wherein he and Andreas Weber explicitly link their work and that of Humberto Maturana
(co-author with Varela of the original theory of autopoiesis) with the biological
philosophy of Jonas. They go on to assert that, chiefly through this link, it is possible to
claim that the description of living organisms as autopoietic systems has furnished the
foundational biological theory which Jonas lacked, and allows them therefore, chiefly
through the work of Jonas (with some reference to the later works of Kant), to declare
that the connection between valuation and biophysics has at last been made, and
normativity is now firmly grounded in scientific theory:
                                                 
279 Weber A. Varela F.J. 2002. “Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of
biological individuality.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences I: 97-125, p. 115.
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As we have said, autopoiesis has been explicitly formulated for the minimal living
system, the cell. … Now, it is clearly possible on this basis to extend this well-
grounded notion of biological individuality beyond cellular life to a fully
constituted multi-cellular organism. A multicellular organism … is not in itself an
autopoietic unit of the second order, since its organization does not follow the
same self-constructing principles. However, a multicellular organism inherits its
autonomous nature and sense-making qualities through the configuration of its
neural identity. This is a matter for a long discussion that cannot detain us here; it
has been discussed in extenso elsewhere280 Thus when we speak here of the
autopoietic tradition we not only refer to the origin of the life of the cell, but also,
and by extension, to the life of the (multicellular) organisms in toto.281
Interestingly, and in my opinion demonstrating an unfortunate example of the too
commonly observed disciplinary distaste of biologists for physics, Weber and Varela
disdain the idea that the descriptions of the physics self-organising dissipative systems
are sufficient to capture their intended and claimed connection between biological natural
science and phenomenological selfhood and teleology:
In its original formulation as well as in subsequent literature it has been
customary to see the central concept of autopoiesis as just one more self-
organizing mechanism (which it undoubtedly is), and even to conflate it with
dissipative structure or autocatalytic cycles, or mere open systems. These ideas
basically stay within the perimeter of a physicalist view of nature and understand
these new developments as necessary extension of classical physics. However
there is an essential difference between these views and autopoiesis: autopoiesis
proposes an understanding of the radical transition to the existence of an
individual, a relation of an organism with it-self, and the origin of “concern”
based on its ongoing self-produced identity. One could envisage the circularity of
metabolism-membrane entirely from the outside (this is what most biochemists
do). But this is not to deny that there is, at the same time, the instauration of a
point of view provided by the self construction. 282
However I find their disdain to be more than slightly parochial, echoing the too common
distrust, disdain and tribalism between biologists and physicists, and to some extent self-
serving, since in the paper quoted they hope to lay claim to the title, in conjunction with
                                                 
280 Maturana H., Varela F. 1987. The Tree of Knowledge: A New Look at the Biological Roots of Human
Understanding. Shambhala/New Science Library, Boston.; Varela FJ. 1979. Principles of Biological
Autonomy. Elsevier/North-Holland, New York, NY.  Varela FJ. 1991. “Organism: a meshwork of selfless
selves.” In: Organism and the Origins of Self. Tauber AI.(ed.) Kluwer, Dordrecht.
281 Weber A. Varela F.J. 2002. Op. Cit. note 279. pp. 115-116.
282 Weber A. Varela F.J. 2002. Op. Cit. note 279. p. 116.
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Jonas, of “Newton of the Grassblade”, thus proving Kant wrong in his conjecture that
there could not be such an achievement by humans.283 While I have some sympathy with
this view, in that I do consider norms and values naturalisable in very much the way that
they are proposing, it appears unsporting and simply ungrateful to fail to acknowledge,
and even to disdain the work of physicists in this selfsame area. For the definition of life,
the foundation of biology, is most certainly to be found in physics every bit as much as it
might be found in strictly biological description. The requirement of a “membrane”
which separates the autopoietic metabolic system from its surrounding material is indeed
an elaboration of autocatalysis or “simple” open dissipative systems, but it is not a
particularly grand one. In order for systems to be able to exhibit not merely entropy
reduction, in the sense of static resistance of a move towards equilibrium, but also to act
for themselves, to have a point of activity which is the norm of their own continuing
increase in disequilibrium, decrease in entropy, increase in Boltzmann improbability, in
active response to changes in the environment, one could easily see a characterisation of
the necessity for such inwardness and physical boundedness in strictly physics terms: in
order to constitute a locus for the active reduction of entropy, the system would need to
be physically separated from its environment, in order that these same activities may be
themselves the target of the entropy reducing activity. The lack of such a boundary would
mean that the system would be a fully open thermodynamic system, reminiscent of a
complex vortex, which would forever be on the point of collapse into the background fall
toward equilibrium, from which it is never sufficiently shielded to allow further complex
emergent processes to arise which will themselves result in the “instauration of a point of
view”.284  This latter can be restated as the construction of a system, defined and
separated from its surroundings by a physical barrier allowing for valve-like control of
the flow of entropy (one is reminded of Maxwell’s demon)285 which separation itself
already predicates, in the necessity for opening and closing of the valves in the right ways
in order to maintain metabolism, or definite structure, the instauration of a point of view,
                                                 
283 Weber A. Varela F.J. 2002. Op. Cit. note 279. pp. 120-121
284 e.g. The Red Eye of Jupiter, for example, however long it lasts, will never develop the internal
complexity to inaugurate a system dynamic of self-inherence or a “point of view”, precisely because it is
too open, too governed by the immediately surrounding system with which it is directly and in an
unmediated manner, structurally coupled.
285 As, following Norbert Wiener, it has become known. The concept is indeed rather isomorphic.
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if only in the most basic of senses. This most basic of senses is simply that such activity
must succeed in the structural persistence of the walled-off  (as I will call it) area of
concern. Thus biodynamic and thermodynamic modes of description can be overlaid
upon one another with seamless symmetry. The claimed divergence is, I fear, a conceit
on the part of the biologists.286 However, I agree with Ezequiel Di Paolo that this in itself,
this simple self-maintentance above, or simple placeholding in the stream of, the fall of
entropy, is not yet sufficient to succeed in grounding teleology fully in the way that Jonas
wished, which requires sense-making of the interactions between the organismal “area of
concern” and its environment, including the past and future of its own states in
interaction with the present and future states of the world of the “other”. Weber and
Varela do seem to make such a claim:
Thus autopoiesis is a singularity among self-organizing concepts in that it is on
the one hand close to strictly empirical grounds, yet provides the decisive entry
point into the origin of individuality and identity, connecting it, through multiple
mediation with human lived body and experience, into the phenomenological
realm. These are the mediations that Jonas addresses with so much force, and
makes these two lineages of thought not only contemporaneous287 but fully
complementary. …Autopoietic biology … provides an open link with empirical
biology and thus a link to a re-understanding of teleology as intrinsic or
endogenous. Bluntly stated self production is already and inevitably a self
affirmation that shows the organism as involved in the fundamental purpose of
maintaining its identity. … The key here is to realize that because there is an
individuality that finds itself produced by itself it is ipso facto a locus of sensation
and agency, a living impulse already in relation with its world. … In other words
by putting at the center the autonomy of even the minimal cellular organism we
inescapably find an intrinsic teleology in two complementary modes. First, a
                                                 
286 One perhaps bolstered by their refusal (at least in the earlier publications) to accept irreducible
emergence (at least the emergence of novel physical principles, which are, by definition of their
localisation, irreducible, though wholly continuous with physical nature) a in physics as a real possibility.
This attitude itself can be traced, ironically enough, to the scrupulous attempt to describe autopoiesis in
strictly operational (descriptions of the operations of physiological systems) as opposed to functional
(description of biological events in terms of their meaning to organisms) terms, which itself can be seen as
an attempt to align the early theory with the prevailing mechanistic reductionism in the 1970s and 1980s, as
well as a wholly valid intention (best seen in hindsight) to ground functional language in operational
language, in order to demonstrate the discontinuity between objective and subjective which they correctly
believed themselves to be describing. But it should be noted that all of these efforts already trade upon the
terminology, assumptions, and methodology of physics.
287 Actually, Jonas preceded them here by half a decade, and they were preceded in the speculative arena in
which they claim a singularity by others, as noted by Di Paolo: Di Paolo E. 2005. “Autopoiesis, Adaptivity,
Teleology, Agency.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Vol. 4, Number 4. pp. 429-452(24)
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basic purpose in the maintenance of its own identity, an affirmation of life.
Second, directly emerging from the aspect of concern to affirm life, a sense-
creation purpose whence meaning comes to its surrounding, introducing a
difference between environment (the physical impact it receives) and world (how
that environment is evaluated from the point of view established by maintaining
an identity). 288
Di Paolo has very carefully critiqued this claim,289 showing, definitively in my view, that
the claim made in the above quotation that a minimal autopoietic system would establish
both the modes of teleology which are meant here, is mistaken. It guarantees only the
former, the simple all-or-nothing value of being alive (maintaining autopoiesis) or not
(failing so to maintain it) but lacks the ability to explain the latter, being the initiation of a
hierarchy of systems of sense-making of the world, for which Jonas stated mediacy as the
basic requirement. The mediacy in question, argues Di Paolo, can only effectively arise if
one adds to the picture adaptivity as a further feature of the basic autopoietic system,
which is not predicated by the original definition. In this way, the autopoietic system
implies maintenance in the face of entropy, but it does not imply striving of an agent.
Striving arises when adaptivity arises in a self-assessing system, which is synonymous
with the autonomy of agency, or freedom, or self-direction in a value-space of positive,
negative, and (crucially for systemic development) a plurality of neutral valences.290 The
autonomy in the most basic form which Weber and Varela speak of above is not agent-
autonomy, it is simply self-definition. It is the existence of a plurality of neutral valences
which makes the actions of such para-autopoietic systems open to self-development. But
the capacity for active (so agent-mediated) adaptivity is the key, since if it were absent
and there were mere “structural coupling” taking place between organism and
environment, with simply the autopoietic arrow towards self-persistence without “free”
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290 At the hyper-advanced further emergent level of the person, such neutral valences widen out and
become very much the ground for the creation of truly personal values which are quasi-independent from
the basic valency structure. This quasi-independence is, however, not total, for ex hypothesi, even the
construction of these values depends absolutely upon the continuing driver of the conatus. The argument
that the very neutrality of such valences must be the ground for their independence should in turn ground
such a claim, for as soon as a valence becomes antagonistic, for example, to the continuation of the person-
process themselves, it quite self-evidently exits the space of neutral valence, and becomes antagonistic to
the master value which allows any and all such values to obtain at all. Herein lies the existentialist illusion
of radical freedom: the radically widened space of neutral valences available at the level of the (especially
civilised and sheltered) person.
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activity, then the systems would be wholly objectively determinate by direct structural
coupling with their environment, and could hardly be said to have the sense-making
aspect which separates them from the strictures of their environmental encounters in a
definite manner which may be said to involve true sense-making:
Notice that the nature of the physical coupling is always fully dictated by the laws
of physics, a cell cannot change the laws of reaction and diffusion. But what is
given to the organism is  the parametrical control of those laws by the influence
on the constraints of the coupling dynamics. … Activity, like perspective, is an
asymmetrical concept. There is the actor and that which is acted upon. But just
because autopoiesis establishes a self-distinct physical unity doesn’t mean that the
necessary asymmetry has been achieved in the domains of exchanges between the
unity and its medium. Structural coupling refers to the mutual perturbation
between organism and environment and this exchange may or may not subserve a
tendency towards mediate conservation of autopoiesis. Only when a process is
established that is able to regulate this exchange so that in general the result is an
improved condition of viability, only then is it possible to speak of a true
asymmetry. … Behaviour defined not as structural coupling, but as its regulation,
is always asymmetrical, has an intentional structure, and can be said to either
succeed or fail. It is only at this stage, when the organism behaves, that we may
speak of an agent … i.e., a self-constructed unity that engages the world by
actively regulating its exchanges with it for adaptive purposes that are meant to
serve its continued viability† [Main Text] [Footnoted Text] †As adaptivity is
generally not implied by autopoiesis … so agency is not implied by autopoiesis
and adaptivity combined. There can be adaptive autopoietic systems where
regulation is circumscribed to internal responses to external encounters without
any active regulation of the conditions that affect these encounters … There can
also be different degrees of agency measured by the organism’s capability ot
control and alter its body and environment. The transition to animality [from
vegetative life-forms] discussed by Jonas is in this view a jump in the degree of
organismic agency.  [Main Text]… A consequence of this definition … is that the
intentional structure is inevitably related to both what the organism is and what it
is likely to become [latter emphasis added]… Adaptive regulation can properly be
called an act in the general sense given by Langer.291 It is a structured event, with
clearly defined phases of onset (the sensing of a negative tendency), acceleration
(the activation of the adaptive mechanism), consummation (the overturning of the
negative tendency) and cadence (the de-activation of the adaptive response). …
The form of adaptivity is such that a given stage always pre-shapes the next one
without fully specifying it. Adaptive events thus have a temporal direction that
autopoiesis (surprisingly) lacks. Being a conserved quantity, autopoiesis is also
conserved if we invert the flow of time (the network of inverted reactions still
maintains itself, waste products and nutrients change roles), but adaptivity (unlike
robustness) becomes dysfunctional by converting safe conditions into dangerous
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ones which are, in this thought-experiment, fortuitously nullified by
environmental encounters. … History follows from the granularity and the time-
asymmetry introduced by adaptivity: the possibility of neutral valence means that
certain regulative responses may compensate negative tendencies and leave the
organism viable but changed, i.e. marked by the encounter in ways that constrain
further dynamics. Those changes may then be reflected in the working of further
regulation. The effects are propagated, eliminated, transformed or generally time-
managed by sequential or hierarchical regulative events. A historical dimension is
thus inaugurated which is not merely the contingent reflection of environmental
encounters, nor is it governed entirely by an internally generated plan. … The
operation of single adaptive mechanisms is in normal circumstances self-
extinguishing but their interaction, the ongoing coupling with the environment,
and the precariousness of metabolism, make their collective action also self-
renewing, thus naturally resulting in valenced rhythms of tension and
satisfaction.292
In these passages, Di Paolo (explicitly in the main text) gives what is, in his opinion, the
adjunct to the basic autopoietic system which is necessary, at a minimum, to supply the
ground of sense-making. It is the regulation of adaptivity which makes an agent what it
is, and values which have meaning to an organism require this basic form of agency, at a
minimum, to qualify as valuers in the second sense of teleology that Weber and Varela
had hoped would be supplied simply by the concept of autopoiesis. Very interestingly, Di
Paolo argues that autopoiesis in and of itself can only generate an all-or-nothing norm,
which is then a bivalent value. Less autopoiesis, as opposed to more, in terms of the size
of the autopoietic system, say, is simply irrelevant to this value. All that matters is that it
is autopoietic, or not, alive, or not (if you accept the autopoiesis theory of living matter).
In the above quoted passages we see that Di Paolo notes that such a value is significantly
disconnected from temporality, in that it is temporally neutral in terms of direction. This
has some resonances (though I wouldn’t necessarily wish to go to far with this without
further reflection) with my observations in earlier subsections concerning the
atemporality of a strictly bivalent intrinsic value of life. The meaning of continuance to
the organism in this mode is nullified, since regression and continuance of self-
development of mediation are equal in value, since irrelevant, to basic autopoiesis.
Simple persistence cannot supply the sense-value, or the meaning of life to an organism,
which, by the above, I consider correct, reasoning, can only obtain in the case of an
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agent, which is a time- as well as a world asymmetric structure. Recalling our
observations in the section above concerning the thermodynamic arrow of time, and
considering that what is occurring in an agent which is being successful in following its
necessary directionality of value is not mere persistence, but is movement through value-
states by a kind of recursive ratchet as is seemingly implied by the descriptions of Di
Paolo, we have in this description an apparent fit for the paw-print of the new
thermodynamic principle or law of matter, at this level of emergent, self-organised
complexity. As the organism evolves through ever greater levels of regulated agency, or
to put it in Jonas’ terms as the organism develops increased mediacy and self-inherence,
it also develops greater complexity, but in a manner which appears to be describable as a
decrease in entropy within the given bounded area described as the total autopoietic
agent-system, and exhibits a concomitant (synonymous) increase in Boltzmann
improbability. It is this increase in Boltzmann improbability that I propose gives the
physics value to the extent of risk which Jonas speaks of in subjective phenomenological
terms. Indeed, it is true that the fall toward equilibrium on death is all the more heady and
dramatic, the more Boltzmann-improbable is the organism in question. In the latter
manner, it seems to me that Weber and Varela are premature in their rejection of
thermodynamic descriptions of the biodynamic systems in question. The directionality of
agent-valuing matches, I suggest, the directionality of what has hitherto been described as
the arrow of the conatus, which remains argued as an emergent and novel principle or law
in nature which emerges as a defining condition of the emergence of agency at this
structural level of the physical universe. This is the reason for Jonas’ correct observation
of the discontinuity between self-inherent beings (as opposed to simply self-persistent
ones, which are simply autopoietic), and the rest of the world, or, to put it in the terms he
uses, the discontinuity between subjective, and simply objective beings. The self-
perspective of the subjective viewpoint that emerges from the background material
processes is precisely coincident with the emergence of the thermodynamic arrow of the
conatus. It cannot be “reduced” to the objective background without annihilating the
emergent property upon which it depends, and with which it is co-instantiated.
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The idea of a combination of biodynamics and thermodynamics in a necessarily (at least
quasi-) irreducible (or better, emergent) manner is not new, of course, and there has been
much work done, spearheaded by Eugene Yates,293 on what appears to be just such a
model. While such work is not particularly concerned with the naturalisation of value in
the sense which would provide a teleological arrow for values of the morally relevant
kind, it has, especially recently, moved towards a different sort of valence description,
which is extremely relevant to the topic of this thesis. This is the conjecture that the
degenerative mechanisms and events in aging can be cashed out in thermodynamic terms,
such that aging represents a decline in the organised complexity of an organism, in ways
which appear to map quite directly onto my arguments concerning the conatus,
thermodynamics, biodynamic systems, and the good of aging intervention. There is not
space here adequately to survey this cutting-edge area in modern biology, but it is
important at least to mention it in passing, to give some sense of the convergence of a
fairly diverse spectrum of research on this area, which is supportive of the general thesis.
While asserting that what has been said in the past few subsections is very significant for
and relevant to the main thesis of this (my own, current) work, it is important for the
reader not to be mislead into thinking that the thermodynamic and biodynamic aspects
here described are themselves the core thesis. The core thesis is outlined in subsections
2.8 through the end of 2.9 above. It is that persons are temporally-extended processes
with necessary forward-looking aspects driven by a conative aspect over which they have
no ultimate control, since the latter’s instantiation is constitutive of that process and
therefore their personhood. This, combined with the consideration of the lack of presence
of the total person at any moment of existence, and the necessarily co-dependent nature
of all and any subjective instrumental value and the intrinsic value necessarily present at
all times in the form of the conatus, means that persons can in no wise devalue their own
continued existence. The consequence is that, for persons, their own continuation is an
inalienable value.
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The empirical and phenomenological analyses performed at this stage are independent of
the assertion that the driver itself, the conatus, is indeed identical with the thermodynamic
arrow of a new biodynamic law, which may map onto what Yates has described as a
“homeodynamic” principle of physical systems. These adjuncts to the core thesis in my
opinion powerfully ground it in a naturalistic schema, and add weight and additional
explanatory force to the assertions made in the core thesis. These appear to form, then, a
significantly supporting and especially grounding adjunct to the core thesis, and to that
extent can be considered a part of it, but it must be recognised that the core thesis can
stand alone, for very much the reasons which Jonas gave, that the empiricism of Hume,
that of subjective empiricism, must count as evidence just as, and in some measure
independently of, the evidence from “objective” impersonal experimentation.
In the words of Di Paolo:
We can only be speculative at this stage about the processes underlying non-
metabolic teleology and the general malleability of value-generation that takes
place during evolution or indeed in the “engineering of the self” that is manifested
in socially mediated human projects. The important point is that the potentially
workable form of these proposals follows directly from the shape of Jonas’
biophilosophy proving once again its far-reaching implications.294
The core thesis of the work currently in hand inhabits the space gestured at in the first
line of this, the closing paragraph in Di Paolo’s paper, at least insofar as it relates to non-
metabolic processes at the level of the person. That it connects it to the various historical
and modern trends in physics, philosophy, and biology dealt with in section 2.10
generally constitutes the grounding and extension of the thesis, rather than its   core.
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2.10.6 Nature, essence, and perfection: final causal versus
open processual teleologies
In the foregoing subsection we discussed Jonas’ proposals for the description of a bio-
dynamic teleology. In this case, the final cause is firstly the persistence (for example in a
simple living, or autopoietic state), and secondly the self-development of the organism as
a locus of selfhood and subjectivity, whose sense-making processes create the possibility
for an ever-changing becoming of the self and the values and evaluative processes which
define it. Insofar as this remains the picture, I am happy to go along with it. But natural
teleology in the final-causal mode has a long history in which such an open-ended, even
if emergent or even perhaps transcendental picture of telos represents something of a
departure from the usual form. So far is this departure that I consider the use of the phrase
“final cause” rather ill-at-ease with this more recent concept. The predominant tradition
in natural teleology, as originating in Aristotle, and reaffirmed by the likes of Thomas
Aquinas, is that the the telos of nature as a whole has final causal structure, such that all
in nature is part of that telos, and tends toward some very particular end. In the case of
the Abrahamic, and in particular the Thomian interpretation of telos, this ultimate
destination is the reconciliation of humanity with the Divine, particularly in the
supernatural eternal hereafter. In this model, then, the arrow of the telos leads through the
door of death out of nature altogether, to rest at last in the bosom of Abraham, at one with
the Lord. Perhaps needless to say I find this view unlikely, unwarranted, incoherent, and I
generally reject it. The Aristotelian teleology upon which it was, in its most academic
iterations, built holds that the whole of nature is teleological, literally everything is
purposive: the sun shines in order to shed light and warmth upon the earth; the rain falls
in order to make the plants grow, which in turn grow in order to feed the animals, which
live ultimately in order to serve the needs of man. Everything, in his system, tends
towards the one goal, which is the construction of Humanity, and the serving of its
purpose. But what is its purpose? What is the purpose of man? The purpose of man is the
life of pure philosophical contemplation, and by this also the achievement of absolute
harmony in a virtue-ethical sense, being the achievement of the state of Eudaimonia, or
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personal perfection. The former allows man to contemplate the eternal truths and move
closer to the nature of the divine, but this is subordinate, in Aristotle’s system with its
turn away from Platonic idealism, to the latter, which is the ultimate final cause, the
cornerstone of the Categories of Substance: the perfect man. Such is the archetype of
final causal, ultimately “closed” teleologies. And such is the nature of Jonas’ teleological
system, also. Jonas’ system is neither wholly Aristotelian, nor is it wholly
Thomian/Abrahamic. It begins as a wholeheartedly non-finalistic, open descriptive
system, and ends as rather a mixture of both these latter finalisms. It is not my purpose
[smile] in the writing of this thesis to critique Jonas’ extensive development of what I
would call his neo-theistic anthropoterminalism,295 but I must note it here, in order to
define a radical distinction between Jonas’ view and my own. Jonas, a processualist,
nonetheless concerns himself with the realisation that the externalised supra-intentional
processes of technological scientific endeavour may, in serving humanity, also sweep the
very humanity away. He worries that the core of purpose of the very process itself may
be being missed in the ever rushing onward of technological process itself:
There are those who would cheer the surge that sweeps them along and disdain to
question “whither?”; who hail change for its own sake, the endless forward thrust
of life into the ever new, unknown, the dynamism as such. Yet, surely, for change
to be valuable it is relevant what entity changes (if not toward what), and this
underlying whatness must in some way be definable as that nature of “man as
man” which qualifies the endless consummation of its possibilities in change as a
worthwhile enterprise. Some image then is implied in the affirmation of change
itself. But, if an image, then a norm, and if a norm, then also the freedom of
negation, not only the surrender of affirmation; and this freedom itself transcends
the flux and points to another sort of theory. … But if ever we entrust or resign
ourselves wholly to the self-corrective mechanics of the interplay of science and
technology, we shall have lost the battle for man. … Whatever the insights of that
“other” theory called philosophy, and whatever its counsels, there is no stopping
the use of scientific theory which propels us into the flux, for stopping its use
means stopping theory itself; and the course of knowledge must not be stopped –
if not for its gains, then in spite of the costs. … Theory itself has become a
process, and one, as we have seen, which continually involves its own use; and it
cannot be “possessed” otherwise. … Yet its very possibility implies, and its
actuality testifies to, a “transcendence” in man himself as the condition for it. …
This relation – a capacity, a commitment, a quest, in short, that which makes
science humanly possible – is itself an extrascientific fact. … To philosophy as
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transscientific theory the human fact of science can provide a clue for a theory of
man, so that we may know again about the essence of man – and through it,
perhaps, even something of the essence of Being.296
Now some of this is perfectly fine, and in line with what we might expect of a
processualist, seeking some knowledge or understanding of the structure of the processes
of greatest concern, and in particular human nature D3. But there is already a clear sense
that what is at stake is not merely, for example, the concept of persons, but rather the
concept of “man as man”, or biological humanity. This has more than a whiff of
substantialist thinking about it, and the use of the word “essence” in this context recalls
Aristotelian substance metaphysics. The plot thickens considerably in later essays in the
text, wherein it becomes clear that what is being hoped for as “Being” is not simply a
Spinozist “God or Nature”, or the totality of Nature D3, but rather a Deity in the more
familiar cast of an Abrahamic God. Further it becomes clear that the “image of man” and
the “image of Being” slide into line with the Abrahamic dogmas of “man as made in the
image of God”:
I wish to choose two of those we encountered: the “Book of Life,” and the
transcendent “Image”. … What can the symbol of the Book of Life tell us? In
Jewish tradition it means a kind of heavenly ledger wherein our “names” shall be
inscribed according to our desserts. … Might it not be … that what we thus add to
the record is of surpassing import – not indeed for a future destiny of ours, but for
the concern of that spiritual account itself kept by the unified memory of things?
And that, although we mortal agents have no further stake in the immortality
which our acts go to join, these acts of ours, and what through them we make of
our lives, may just be the stake which an underdetermined and vulnerable eternity
has in us? And with our freedom, what a precarious stake! – Are we, then,
perhaps an experiment of eternity? Our very mortality – a venture of the immortal
ground with itself? Our freedom – the summit of the venture’s chance and risk?297
He has not yet made fully explicit the nature of the “eternity” he speaks of, but this is
important because it indicates, as he does elsewhere, his idea and commitment that we,
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even we, now, as we are now, ourselves as humans are the universe’s ultimate
experiment of self-realisation! We are the END of the experiment. He continues:
We turn for further advice to another simile, that of the transcendent “Image”
filled in, feature by feature, by our temporal deeds. … Not the agents, which must
ever pass, but their acts enter into the becoming godhead and indelibly form his
never decided image. God’s own destiny, his doing or undoing, is at stake in this
universe to whose unknowing dealings he committed his substance, and man has
become the eminent repository of this supreme and very betrayable trust. In a
sense, he holds the fate of deity in his hands.298
With this in mind, Jonas ventures upon a kind of neo-creation myth, which has, at its
surface, what might be considered to be rather Spinozistic overtones:
In the beginning, for unknowable reasons, the ground of being, or the Divine,
chose to give itself over to the chance and risk and endless variety of becoming.
And wholly so: entering into the adventure of space and time, the deity held back
nothing of itself: no uncommitted or unimpaired part remained to direct, correct,
and ultimately guarantee the devious working-out of its destiny in creation. On
this unconditional immanence the modern temper insists.  It is its courage or
despair, in any case its bitter honesty, to take our being-in-the-world seriously: to
view the world as left to itself, its laws as brooking no interference, and the rigor
of our belonging to it as not softened by extramundane providence. The same our
myth postulates for God’s being in the world. Not, however, in the sense of
pantheistic immanence: if world and God are simply the same, the world at each
moment and in each state represents his fullness, and God can neither lose nor
gain. Rather, in order that the world might be, and be for itself, God renounced his
own being, divested himself of his deity – to receive it back from the Odyssey of
time weighted with the chance harvest of unforeseeable temporal experience:
transfigured or possibly even disfigured by it.299
So far so Spinoza, more or less, the Immanent Nature exploring the space of the
possibilities through its own modes as mediated through its attributes. Whether the Being
is permanently Immanent in fullness at every moment in time or not is debatable, though
Spinoza has often been considered a pantheist, however this needn’t detain us, since what
is coming next is more important than precise symmetries between Jonas and Spinoza,
for which I am in any case not arguing. But then, while still in a mode of thinking which
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broadly but unambiguously (and nearly wholly unacknowledged) owes its basic structure
to Spinoza, we take a radical turn away from the naturalistic, Spinozistic world, to an
account of the emergence of transcendence which is heavily overlaid with images and
ideology from Abrahamic myth:
Note also this that with life’s innocence before the advent of knowledge God’s
cause cannot go wrong. … Every new dimension of world-response opened up in
its course means another modality for God’s trying out his hidden essence and
discovering himself through the surprises of the world-adventure. … The ever
more sharpened keenness of appetite and fear, pleasure and pain, triumph and
anguish, love and even cruelty – their very edge is the deity’s gain. … Thus, this
side of good and evil, God cannot lose in the great evolutionary game. Nor yet
can he fully win in the shelter of its innocence, and a new expectancy grows in
him in answer to the direction which the unconscious drift of immanence
gradually takes.300
And the answer? Yes, you guessed it: Humanity! But of course not just humanity, no,
humanity who becomes a moral species, and introduces “good” and “evil” into the world,
which is accounted to be through “knowledge” and “freedom” which have entered into
the world with humanity also for the first time:
And then he trembles as the thrust of evolution, carried by its own momentum,
passes the threshold where innocence ceases and an entirely new criterion of
success and failure takes hold of the divine stake. The advent of man means the
advent of knowledge and freedom, and with this supremely double-edged gift the
innocence of the mere subject of self-fulfilling life has given way to the charge of
responsibility under the disjunction of good and evil. To the promise and risk of
this agency the divine cause, revealed at last, henceforth finds itself committed;
and its issue trembles in the balance. The image of God, haltingly begun by the
universe, for so long worked upon – and left undecided – in the wide and
narrowing spirals of pre-human life, passes with this last twist, and with a
dramatic quickening of the movement, into man’s precarious trust, to be
completed, saved, or spoiled by what he will do to himself and the world. And in
this awesome impact of his deeds on God’s destiny, on the very complexion of
eternal being, lies the immortality of man. With the appearance of man,
transcendence awakened to itself and henceforth accompanies his doings … for
can it not be that by the reflection of its own state as it wavers with the record of
man, the transcendent casts light and shadow over the human landscape?301
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Now anyone who does not see the heavy hand of Abrahamic mythology in the above
passage has got to be partially blind, or ignorant of its core credos. We see obvious
echoes of the myth of the Garden of Eden and the fall of man, of the purpose of Man as
the reflection of God’s moral purpose in the universe, of man as the “image” of God in
precisely the terms of capacity for knowledge of “good” and “evil”, of the awesome fate
and responsibility Man holds in the success or failure of God’s enterprise in his creation
of the world, and his gamble in allowing the free will of Man. The one main difference is
that God in Jonas’ theology (for it is that) is not separated from and above the universe,
so capable of direction or interference. Rather, in Jonas’ world, God is actually helpless.
He is rather contingently, increasingly immanent, he is the very possibility of becoming
in the universe at all, which becoming is modal, and which modes are movements of the
ultimate Substance towards its own self-inherence. Now I cannot but see that the core of
this idea leaps straightway from the pages of Spinoza’s Ethics, and yet Jonas both fails to
acknowledge this, but quite straightfacedly, and in what appears to me to be the most
brutally ad-hoc manner welds it together with chosen, treasured bits and pieces of core
Jewish mythology, which Spinoza had of course entirely rejected as incompatible with
such a conceptual structure.302 I am simply not going to critique the theology here, other
than to note that this is what it is, and not philosophy. But I must draw attention to the
fact that, absent the parochial theological basis of prioritising the anthropic form,
humanity, as the pinnacle and summit, the crown of creation, in whose sole hands rests
the fate of the success or failure of the universal experiment, there is no warrant at all to
consider such an idea to be anything other than exceedingly vain anthropic bias and,
bluntly, chauvinism. It is the moving on from the naturalistic teleology of emergent value
coincident with the necessary subjectivity of biological systems (with which I fully agree)
to the ad hoc and warrantless grafting-on of universally final causal doctrine dressed with
heavy borrowed robes of religious doctrine, in which the very purpose of universal
history culminates in the existence of humans as the recipients and arbiters of its
appointed end which I consider to be unwarranted neo-Aristotelian, or more properly
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Theo-Aristotelian Anthropoterminalism. Why on earth (or more to the point, in the
heavens!) should we consider that we are the sum and pinnacle of the Modes of the
Absolute Substance, teetering on the edge of bringing It to full self-inherence once
again!? The very language Jonas uses betrays him, for only in the presence of settled
concepts of, for example “good” and “evil” could his story have any meaning at all in the
first place. But there are no such settled concepts, and his own carefully constructed bio-
teleology tells strongly against the bases of the theological formulations of these very
same ideas. Further, as we have seen in the work of Maturana, Weber, Varela, Di Paolo,
and others, there are strong reasons to take seriously Jonas’ own claim that by bridging
the gap between humanity and the rest of living organisms, not only were we de-
sanctified, but they were enhumaned. In other words, the connection allowed us warrant
to anthropomorphise, or at least to see shadows of our own prized faculties in other
species. The “Santiago Theory of Cognition”303 (similar to the system of Gregory
Bateson, but lacking his, and the usual, criterion for mental representation), pioneered by
Maturana and Varela, indeed goes a long way to puncturing the chauvinism of the
assumption that cognition, knowledge, agency, and even morality, are the exclusive
province of humanity. Human persons happen to be the most developed, in some ways,
and for now, but there is nothing whatever that warrants the belief that we’ve reached the
top of the mountain of emergent possibility. Nothing at all. For Jonas, we are on the
summit, and more, we are, contrary to the spirit and function of his earlier assertions,
radically discontinuous from what has come before. In this way, as in others which will
be discussed later, Jonas betrays his own system by his inability to rid himself of the
theological commitments of his youth and particular culture.
Beyond this, the philosophic conceptual basis of Jonas’ purportedly processualist
discussion can be questioned, for it is clearly one which is compatible with a substance
idealist view of the world, in which perfection is possible, and indeed is that towards
which all is moving. Now, such a vision might not be incompatible, perhaps, with a
process interpretation of a Spinozistic view in which, while all was modes in process, the
                                                 
303 See: Capra F. 1996. The Web of Life: a New Synthesis of Mind and Matter. HarperCollins, London. pp.
257-267.
195
Total Process, Nature, is considered a Substance, and is the sole possible Substance, since
it alone contains all possibilities within it, and so in some deep sense never changes.304
This is rather mysterious, but I do find myself tempted towards it, and in this manner
tempted towards a version of what Jonas has in mind, in the above passages. But this
version most certainly does not have the ad-hoc Aristotelian and Abrahamic aspects
Jonas bolts on. As for the Aristotelian, for a single mode in itself, to be perfectible, one
would have to accept that it has a substantial essence, and not a processual essence.
Processes are intrinsically imperfect. There is no suggestion of deep perfection in
process, since perfection is a static unity- it is an attribute of Substance, not Process. If
humanity is an end-in-itself not merely of the bioteleological or personal sort, but rather
of the grand telos of universal history, such that all is purposive towards humanity’s
existence, as the prelude to the culmination of the great gamble of coming-to-be of the
self-disintegrated deity, then at least one must first accept a version of Aristotelian
substantial forms, wherein humans are just such substance-particulars. If it is not that
humans are necessary, but just happen to be the conduit towards universal self-
realisation, I can only say that this means that Jonas must abandon his Anthropic
chauvinism,305 such that it doesn’t matter whether our form in particular did or did not
come to be, but any analogous form would do (just as through the ages many separate
species from many divergent groups have played the ecological role of lion, or hyena),
but also he must abandon the idea that we hold in our hands the immediate fate of self-
realisation of the universe. The latter just seems patently absurd, the image of an ape (not
meaning Jonas himself of course, but his “image” of “man”) dressed in ermine, crowning
himself the Lord Steward, Regent of the Universe, the spokesman of this image pointing
to an old ape-myth, and without even an understanding of the deep meaning of the terms
he claims as justification (since no human has, else we are already at the end of
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knowledge), if they have any. For even if there are emergent transcendences in the
universe, which are truly formally irreducible, and involve wholly novel states of what
might be describable as increased self-inherence (which need not involve formal
irreducibility),306 or perhaps some wholly new, undreamt-of realm, there is nothing
particularly in this that suggests we are at the brink of the last such, or even that there
may be an end to such emergent levels at all.
In short, the bioteleology described in his early work, the ontology of value in the
naturalistic world, is excellent, important, and likely correct. But it does not, of itself,
warrant belief in an absolute transitive final-causal teleology, such that there is a
purposive striving of all things towards any particular end of self realisation, such that
particular forms are predicated for all time, or a specific hierarchy inevitable. It is not
“final causal” in any real sense, for there is no “purposiveness” about living beings, other
than the ones they manufacture for themselves, in furtherance of their own being, as
adaptive autopoietic negentropic living systems. But this teleology, if such it can be
called at all, is a local and open ended, not a universal and finalist one, in its foundational
principles. Nor does it predicate a necessary urge towards universal self-realisation- the
return of Deity to Itself (HIMself, saliently, in Jonas’ words). However, it does not rule
the latter out, at least in its secular mode of a ratchet-like movement towards a kind of
self-reflection of the character of “Total Nature D3” (Spinozistic Substance), and does fit
to some degree into the picture of what might be expected of such a reality of
transcendent emergence and increasing self-realisation through the layered universe,
increasing self-inherence of the universal Substance, should such be the nature of reality.
In this manner, the scientific process itself would be a fairly clear example or
manifestation of such a movement. However, if such is the nature of reality, it does not
sit well in the borrowed robes of Abrahamic myth and doctrine, and it most certainly does
not warrant a Theo-Aristotelian Anthropoterminalism. We may point the way (be an
arrow along-the-way) towards further, more transcendent self-awareness, and self-
inherence of being, but we are most certainly not teetering on the edge of the summit. If
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anything, we have barely entered the foothills of this, fundamentally Spinozistic
landscape.
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2.10.7 Spinoza revisited: conatus, the emergence of
freedom and the nature of inherence in a
multilevelled, categorically emergent universe
Spinoza’s “Ethics”, as Deleuze once quipped, is not his “Ontologies”. It is the Ethics
because it is intended, at least in part, to be a guide to action, and ethical reasoning which
predisposes towards that. To be sure, the normative aspects are often apparently obscured
by the overwhelming metaethical framework, which is indeed largely a matter of
ontology, but they are present, and Spinoza certainly intended his work to be a guide to
living a good life, a guide to a kind of true happiness. His system bears that relation at
least to the Aristotelian Ethics, in that it is not intended as an enquiry into the nature of
morality in terms of duty or absolute norms of behaviour, so much as it is a guide to
living life well. There is not space here, nor is it in any sense the focus of this thesis to
defend Spinozist metaphysics in general. Such a defense, if possible at all, would require
a thorough reworking of Spinoza’s system in light of advances in scientific knowledge
and understanding, as well as in light of developments in philosophical metaphysics
itself. Some conceivable starting points for such amendments have already been noted in
subsection 2.10.2 above. A further one will now be added to this set, which will be
further elucidated in section 2.10.8 below. This is that Spinoza’s system was fully
deterministic. His conception of “freedom”, whose augmentation was central to his
ethics, was restricted to a compatibilist notion, wherein a true or correct understanding of
our motivations, values, and the sources of our grief and happiness would lead us to a
kind of transcendental awareness of our own determined condition, which state of
secondary awareness would allow us to consider our actions, while thoroughly
determined, to be ours in the sense of our being the adequate cause of them. Thus our
happiness will consist in bringing our rationality into line with our emotions, and vice-
versa. Once this has occurred, we cease, he contends, to be ruled by our passions, and
become “free” of them to the extent that we are ruled by our rationality. Our passions
attain the aspect of being “active”, whereby we live in rational harmony with them, rather
than “passive” whereby we live in continual rational disharmony with them. He accounts
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the latter to be the true source of unhappiness. Further, our rational awareness of the
fundamentality to and within us of the conatus of striving towards self-persistence, and
more than this, towards self-inherence (about which latter more below), would not only
lead us to greater felicity as our affect and rationality come into alignment, but also
would allow us to participate more closely with what he termed the “adequate ideas”
which are the true forms of conception, best considered as true reflections of the nature of
the eternal Substance. In this manner, Spinoza is very much in the tradition of the Stoics,
however, he did not exalt reason to the extent that they did, contending that reason cannot
wholly overcome the affects, but rather can only dissolve the negative effects of their
influence in the attainment of “adequate” ideas of their origin and nature.
Given his doctrine of the fundamentality of the conatus, for Spinoza the highest good is
the preservation of being in accordance with reason or adequate ideas, which itself
promotes the furtherance of such adequate ideas in a process toward ever-greater
knowledge of Substance. This latter knowledge he referred to as “knowledge in the third
degree”, and the nature of this knowledge is precisely the knowledge of Nature, the
knowledge of the full range of causes of a mode or modes, extending towards knowledge
of the infinite such range. In fully adequate knowledge of the modes of Nature, the mind
attains to knowledge of eternal forms, or essence. It would probably be fair to say that the
kind of knowledge he is referring to may be described as knowledge of the nature D3 of
Nature itself. It is in the possession of this kind of knowledge that the mind participates in
eternity, and to that extent, is eternal, or immortal.
Spinoza’s commitment to determinism, however, was ironically founded upon an
inadequate idea of Nature, and to that extent he lacked knowledge of Nature D3. This in
itself should not have shocked even him, let alone Spinozists, since he himself declared
that the possession of a full set of adequate ideas or moreover knowledge of the third kind
of Nature (D3), was impossible for merely finite beings, which we irrevocably are. In any
case, just as Spinoza can have had no knowledge of entropy, and the true nature of the
laws of motion of non-living bodies, being inertia, not conatus, he can have had no
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knowledge nor the slightest inkling of the startling and paradigm-shifting revelations
awaiting the venturers beneath the Democritan substrate of the atom: the quantum world.
Despite Einstein’s staunch defense of thoroughgoing reductionist determinism, 307 and
indeed partly because of it,308 the macroscopic, deterministic realm of Einsteinian-
Newtonian physics was found to stand upon, or rather emerge from, a subatomic realm of
at least partly indeterministic nature. This knocks out one of the core assumptions of
Spinozistic ontology. But what if this radical emergent discontinuity in the laws of the
physical universe were not the only one? What if further emergences were possible above
this level? Indeed, what warrant at all would we have to conclude that there weren’t any
such? As will be discussed in subsection 2.10.8 below, the picture of the universe as in
accord with radical reductionism is, if not in tatters, in a fair degree of quandary. What
appears to be emerging as a new scientific and ontological paradigm, is that the universe
may be intrinsically layered, with irreducible discontinuities emerging as it progresses
through stages of magnitude, both in terms of energetic and spatial scale, and also
systemic complexity. If there exists, as now has become all but dogmatic, such a radical
discontinuity involving precisely the nature of causation, between the quantum and the
macro-scale worlds, then, given especially the possible emergence of a new
thermodynamic principle at the level of complex dissipative systems, insofar as they
become autopoietic, and thence actively alive, then why should we suppose it impossible
that, along with this may come an emergent further discontinuity may come at the level
of causation, such that subjective beings, and especially those who have second-order,
self-referential processual subjectivism with a range of neutral valencies nearly always
available, may perhaps one day be accounted, in line with commonsense, to be truly
possessed of a freedom of the will. In this, I consider that the approach of theorists such
                                                 
307 It is noteworthy that Einstein considered Spinoza to be among his guiding philosophical inspirations.
308 Since Einstein’s own experimental structure which he asserted would disprove the Bohrian “no hidden
variables” Copenhagen interpretation of data from quantum-scale measurements, the EPR (Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen) apparatus, later known as Bell’s theorem (since it was the Irishman John Bell who first
successfully tested this construct), when finally constructed and tested instead of proving Einstein right
about quantum-level determinism, did precisely the opposite, confirming instead the Copenhagen
interpretation. See: Bell JS. 2004 (f.p. 1987). Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics.
Cambridge University Press.
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as Roger Penrose,309 with his appeal to the concept of brain-mediated access to quantum
indeterminacy, hits upon the fact of the radical discontinuity between the subatomic and
macroscale, but likely makes the wrong inference, which is that in order to achieve
freedom or its analogue, we must descend the emergent layeredness, rather than simply
noticing that this pointed-to discontinuity may mean that in having ascended this
layeredness, we may have simply attained, in the very instantiation of our being as living,
subjective, person-processes, the borderline of a wholly new causal structure, one of
freedom. Of course I deny entirely Penrose’s or any idea that the indeterminism of the
quantum world is in any case what we want when we speak of freedom, which it isn’t,
and can’t be. Further I should note that freedom in itself is in no way crucial or necessary
to the core thesis expressed in this dissertation. Rather, a close reading of the same will
reveal that it rather militates against the claim to radical autonomy or freedom of the will
that is championed in some liberal concepts of the person.  In this way, it tends towards a
classically Spinozist account. But the fact simply remains that the assumptions upon
which radical reductionist determinism were founded have turned out not to be as
profoundly stable as was once thought. The point is that we should at least bear this in
mind when attempting to answer such questions as: What is life? What is consciousness?
What is a person?   
Such conjectures, while remaining wholly conjectural, at least have the merit of
plausibility. Without the warrant supplied by the existing radical causal discontinuity,
which is now widely accepted, one may not easily accept, and indeed may feel compelled
to reject the commonsense view outright. This is the case for Spinoza. I can only account
it a great shame that Spinoza himself did not attain, because of historical strictures, to the
level of adequacy of ideas, but more correctly, to the level of knowledge of the third kind
of Nature D3, which we presently have. It would have been interesting to see how he
might have adapted his system accordingly. One major consequence might have been that
he would find himself with no further use for the concept of Neutral Monism of Attribute
Dualism, whereby the attributes of “thought” and “extension”, corresponding to “mind”
and “body” are parallel but separate attributes of existing modes. However it is not our
                                                 
309 Penrose. R. 1999 (f.p. 1989). The Emperor’s New Mind. Oxford University Press.
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purpose here to examine this difficult question, and re-jigging such a delicately balanced
system as his geometric Ethics is, would require perhaps decades of dedicated work.
But it is reasonable to state that it is perhaps unlikely that such a prospect- an emergent,
layered universal reality, would have troubled rather than delighted him. If Don Garrett is
correct,310 for example, and very relevantly to the topic of this thesis, that the troublesome
and mysterious subclause “insofar as it is in itself” in Ethics III, P6: “Each thing, in so far
as it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its being”, refers to the self-inherence of the
mode, whose self-inherence tends towards that of the ultimate self-inherence of the total
Substance, then such an emergent picture may well appear very compatible indeed. One
need only consider the sorts of arguments put forward by the likes of Jonas, Maturana,
Varela, Weber, and Di Paolo, concerning the progressive “inwardness” and “self-
inherence” of living systems, as guaranteed by their increased mediacy, first away from
and then returning towards true objectivity, to see the resonances between such concepts
and the Garrett interpretation of a Spinozistic system. It is noteworthy that a significant
target of the criticism of Garrett’s inherence interpretation of Spinoza’s conatus argument
is grounded in counter-examples drawn from non-living systems, such as stars, candles,
and bombs, which obviously contradict the stipulation given in the Ethics, part three,
proposition four. Garrett spends a great deal of effort in seeking to reach an interpretation
which gets around this difficulty, without abandoning its universality. If Garrett and other
Spinozists were to recognise the function of Spinoza’s ignorance of modern
developments in matters of entropy, inertia, emergence, and causal determinism; if they
were to accept my arguments about the Conatus’ necessary return to its ancient and true
frame of reference, the living world, emergent as it is, and discontinuous with the non-
living precisely in that the conatus obtains, then a truly workable Spinozistic theory may
possibly emerge from a reconsideration of his old template, in accordance with this
increase in the adequacy of knowledge. This is especially so in view of the fact that my
interpretation of the conatus is absolutely not a kind of supernatural vis viva or élan vital,
but rather is a function of the entropic arrow itself, and just as life cannot proceed in
absence of the second law, since metabolism and other functions would be impossible,
                                                 
310 As set forth in his recent and influential paper: Garrett D. 2002. Op. Cit. note 66.
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the conatus depends upon the existence of that law, so it constitutes no counter-example
to the application of proposition 4 to living systems. I do not, however, seek to defend
proposition 4 wholeheartedly, and I remain sceptical of it. Further, it is not in fact a
fundamental or even necessary aspect of the conception of value and personhood which I
am putting forward in this thesis.
In closing this subsection, it is not entirely premature to suggest that such a reworking
may well result in a view of a renewed imperative of Spinozistic conatus towards
increasing self-inherence, adequacy of ideas, and knowledge D3 of Nature. Such an
imperative itself may reveal an unfolding of further layers of emergent reality, making
what is possible within the universe far more open-ended than has hitherto ever been
conceived possible in a Naturalistic monism.  Such a vision is far more extensive, open,
and inductively probable than is the anthropoterminalistic view that we are, ourselves and
in our present state and state of knowledge, the final cause of all universal purpose, or at
one single remove therefrom.
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2.10.8 Objectivity, reductionism, and emergence: a note on
the nature of the Universe, and of the sciences which
endeavour to describe it
Reductionism is true. But very likely it is not the whole truth. It is clearly correct that
regarding phenomena at each level of the universe, from the cosmic to the macroscopic to
the molecular to the atomic to the subatomic, to the Planck scale and at every level within
this non-exhaustive list, there is a dependency relation of the “higher” more energetic
interactions and phenomena, to the “lower”, less complex, less energetic (in totam,
though not necessarily on their own scalar terms, which sometimes increases dramatically
as size scales descend), and smaller level below, and so on down. In this way, I hold it
true that if there were suddenly a universal shift in the value of some atomic or quantum-
scale characteristic, it would have a universal effect, and would radically change many or
all aspects of the worlds “above”. This reductionistic holism, and the broad dependency
relation it represents, is reasonable, and compelling.  At times, however, it has led
physical scientists to go a little too far in their claims. Much work in Twentieth Century
in physics was directed at the end of finding a unified “Theory of Everything”, uniting
Quantum Mechanics with Einsteinian Relativity, and all physical forces in one grand
equation. String theory was a hoped for candidate, but hope for this appears to be waning,
as the number of possible string theories increases towards levels of absurdity and it is
realised that much of the theoretical aspect will never be testable, and therefore will never
rise to the level of actual empirical science311. Some, such as the Nobel Prize-winning
condensed matter physicist R.B. Laughlin, have gone so far as to suggest that this project
may be formally impossible,312 arguing for a strong emergentist view of physical reality.
Others, such as the Nobel Laureate physicist P.W. Anderson have argued for a weaker
version of emergence,313 but one which is, in practice, no less critical of the strong claim
to attainability of the reductionist holy grail- the constructionist hypothesis- that given
                                                 
311 Kauffman S. 2006. “Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred.” The Third Culture. Available at:
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/kauffman06/kauffman06_index.html [Accessed February 2008]
312 Laughlin RB., Pines D.  2000. “The Theory of Everything.” PNAS Vol. 97, no.1, pp. 28-31
313 Anderson PW. 1972. “More is Different.” Science, New Series, Vol. 177, No. 4047, pp. 393-396
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reduction, it will in fact be possible to describe all phenomena at each level of the
universe by appeal to such a fundamental theory.
Strong emergence essentially is ontological emergence. It states that, as one progresses
upwards through levels of complexity, scale, and energetic interaction, one encounters
wholly “new” properties or laws that are formally irreducible, meaning formally
incalculable from below (so, from a full understanding of properties and laws at a lower,
or fundamental level) in a way which would deny the famous conjecture by Simon de
Laplace in the introduction of his Essai, commonly known as “Laplace’s Demon”.314
Such properties require, in turn, the elucidation by means of new laws, which are equally
formally incalculable from below. This form of emergence denies the hard reductionist,
“theory of everything” model outright, as being a simply incorrect picture of universal
ontology.
Weak emergence essentially is epistemological emergence. It states that, as one
progresses upwards through such levels, one encounters properties that are in principle
calculable, if one were a la Laplace to posit an infinite calculating capacity, but are in fact
pragmatically incalculable from within any one universal history, rendering them in
practice wholly conjectural. In the latter case, hard reductionism and the theory of
everything, with the potential for a constructivist account of all possible and actual states
from these basic laws and properties, may respectively be formally true and possible in
principle, but the latter construction from one level to the next, especially in a predictive
capacity, is formally unknowable in reality.
While a discussion concerning the relative merits of either position might be interesting,
it seems clear that for practical purposes, the difference between them is irrelevant.
There are some systems biologists who hold out hope for a truly accurate calculability of
biological processes, starting with a truly representative in silico model of a cell, which
                                                 
314 Laplace PS. 1814. Essai Philosophique sur les Probabilités. Courcier, Paris; Available at:
http://www.tektonics.org/classics/laplaceprob.pdf [Accessed February 2008]
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may then dispel talk of emergence altogether, at least at this level, revealing it to be
merely a contingent present heuristic.315 But this kind of approach seems to ignore the
more general lesson that the apparent phenomenon of emergence in the apparently
ontologically layered universe, with its apparently striking examples of symmetry-
breaking and emergent properties, offers us. This lesson, surely, is that whatever we may
think we know presently, it is unlikely to be anywhere near the whole story, and the
whole story as it unfolds will always retain the capacity for, qua our epistemic capacities,
radical novelty, whether strongly emergent, or no. If, and here are some big “ifs” the
universe is indeed layered as it prima facie appears to be, with the quantum giving way to
the macroscopic, and the macroscopic, perhaps, giving rise to the psychological realm (so
perhaps indeterminism -> determinism -> freedom of “will” -or at the very least,
consciousness, self-regulating agency, and the reality of conscious valuing agents, or
persons), then what gives us warrant to suppose that the story, the layeredness of the
universe with its unfolding spectacular novelty will end at this level?
Whatever else is true about the nature of the universe, and of our scientific heuristics in
attempting to understand it, it is not unreasonable to think that startling novelty of either
the ontological or epistemological variety remains an inductively probable feature of the
universe, such that layers above the one to which we have attained, with startling new
properties and perhaps attendant new laws await our discovery. Teleology may take the
forms of a final causal model, following Aristotle, with a fixed, closed destination, but
also may take an open-ended form, with the telos an arrow pointing through to worlds
and realms beyond, to new layers of possibility, meaning and purpose within this, our
universe. The conatus is neither a Summum Bonum, nor does it appear that it is a
teleology of ends, or final causal teleology, in which there is a fixed end. In the works of
Aristotle, this end was that of man, and the highest virtue of man, the Eudaimonic man,
the highest good of all. Towards this end, according to Aristotle, did all of nature bend.
Rather, agreeing with (a perhaps reformed) Spinoza, at least until the self-inherent being
                                                 
315 Westerhoff HV., Kell DB. 2007. “The methodologies of systems biology.” In: Systems Biology:
Philosophical Foundations. Boogerd FC, Bruggeman FJ, Hofmeyr J-H S, Westerhoff HV. (eds.)  Elsevier,
Amsterdam; Snoep JL., Westerhoff HV. 2005. “Silicon Cells.” In: Systems biology. Eds. Alberghina L,
Westerhoff HV, Springer, Berlin
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has attained to the level of parity with absolute Substance, the telos of the conatus is
intrinsically open-ended, and, given an acceptance of a non-hard-reductionistic, layered
natural realm, with emergence a reality,316 tends towards the perhaps open-ended upward
layering of the possible in the natural universe. We may agree also with Jonas, insofar as
his quasi-Spinozistic story of the self-reconstruction of Substance is represented by the
increasing self-inherence of modal living beings is concerned. However, we may, and I
argue must disagree with Jonas in his acceptance of a neo-Aristotelian
anthropoterminalism, or anthropic-finalism. In the above ways, hard reductionism, with
its hubristic assumptions of a nearly complete final discovery of all, may well be a wholly
incorrect method of viewing the world, and we may yet find that the bio-teleological
arrow of the conatus points us toward an ever distant horizon of the possible, and towards
a truly naturalistic transcendence.317
Very much more could be said than there is space for here, of course, but I will close
Section Two with a caution and an exhortation. The caution is that we must be careful not
to view a naturalistic system of ethical origin with wholly reductionistic eyes, when
considering normative principles. That there may be some emergent law which predicates
and governs self-organised dissipative living systems, and that that this law has operated
in accordance with strictly Darwinian principles hitherto prior to the emergence of self-
conscious rational agents, tells us in itself but little of the particular further structures
such complex emergent beings have and will continue to project upon the world in terms
of value, however driven ultimately by this master value. Our eyes must rather look both
to the level we find ourselves at now, that of seemingly free valuing agents capable of
culture transcending brute Darwinian principle, whose values are phenomenally real
features of the world, to be examined and considered at their own level, and not solely
through the lens of the levels which gave them rise, and indeed towards other, more
transcendant levels still. In this way, Hobbes’ insight, and that of modern evolutionary
theories of ethics, while instructive and, I believe, likely correct insofar as they go,
cannot give us a fully normative sense, or better, should not be thought of as governing
                                                 
316 Whether ontological or epistemological, but to us, de facto.
317 For a description of the category of persons as being a transcendent category itself, see Ruiping Fan’s
paper on the subject: Fan R. 2000. Op. Cit. note 165.
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and therefore limiting the development of our moral present or indeed future. They may
perhaps rather be best seen through the lens of non-linear self-organising systems, whose
outcomes are either formally or informally unpredictable. In this way, we arrive at
something akin to an emergent moral particularism, but crucially not one without a guide.
The guide is the arrow towards self-persistence, and the increase of self-inherence,
provided by the emergent (whether and in whatever manner reducible or no) principle of
the conatus. This leads, in turn, to the exhortation, which is that we should not consider
our own present situation to be in itself the end of the story. The arrow which brought us
to this place, which drove us to the emergent reality where we now dwell, while not
binding us to the early principles, values and exigencies of our developmental history,
indeed does point and urge us towards that unknown horizon, whose possibilities beckon
with the subtle promise of transcendence of whatever nature, whether formally or
informally discontinuous, nonetheless new. In the words of Rossetti:
Think thou and act; to-morrow thou shalt die
Outstretch'd in the sun's warmth upon the shore,
Thou say'st: "Man's measur'd path is all gone o'er:
Up all his years, steeply, with strain and sigh,
Man clomb until he touch'd the truth; and I,
Even I, am he whom it was destin'd for."
How should this be? Art thou then so much more
Than they who sow'd, that thou shouldst reap thereby?
Nay, come up hither. From this wave-wash'd mound
Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown'd.
Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond,--
Still, leagues beyond those leagues, there is more sea.318
                                                 
318 Dante Gabriel Rossetti, The House of Life: 73, The Choice, III
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To which we may perhaps ask in response, and in his own spirit: tomorrow, shalt thou
die?319
                                                 
319 By this question, I mean to question the inevitability of death in the classic frame of aging, to which
Rossetti was undoubtedly referring, as well as to point to unknown possibilities, and not to some confused
concept of attaining to supernatural immortality, which can only exist, as I have argued, in the supernatural
realm (Horrobin 2006. Op. Cit. note 254). Of course, while not retreating from this assertion, in the open
spirit of the exhortation, I may say- who knows?
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Section Three: The Procrustean Lifespan: 
Person-Processes and the 
Personal Condition
3.1 The personal identity of person - processes
A great deal has already been said, in Section Two, on the subject of personal identity.
Much of the focus of this has been upon the question of substantial identity, which was
comprehensively rejected with relation to persons. The rejection of substantial identity
has significant advantages with regard to concerns about personal identity. At one level,
that of intrinsic sameness, in the sense of identicalness, the problem simply evaporates,
since there are no persons who are identical in this mode to themselves from any T1 to
any T2. If they were, they should not be processes. To that extent, person-processes are
without identity, for identity in this mode is itself a substance concept. With this
realisation, many of the apparently pressing questions about what constitutes personal
identity through time, insofar as they refer to intrinsic identity, simply disappear- there
are no such beasts! But the question at hand, of course, is not whether persons have
intrinsic identity through time, but whether self-identity is the sole basis for self-concern
about the continuation of the process, or the existence the future person-process that the
present one might eventually become. And further, if it is not, then what can be the basis
of such concern, which must underlie any project to extend lifespan, by however small or
large an amount? I consider that the arguments given in Section 2.8 through 2.10 above,
resolve much of this issue, for it is demonstrated that concern for the future self is part of
what is constitutive of persons at all, and becoming is itself the constant and defining
feature of that process. The very idea that persons are processes whose very existence is
dependent upon a basic value-structure, whose core feature is valuation of persistence of
the regulated adaptive autopoietic process itself, and through the development of the
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regulative faculties, which core value of striving towards self-persistence and adaptive
self-development extends fully through the psychology and indeed the whole ontology of
person-processes, itself addresses this question full-on. If there is no substance to
persons, if persons therefore lack temporally-extended self-identity (sameness) by
definition, then a question about why we should be concerned about intrinsic self-
continuance on the basis of sameness is both empty, irrelevant, and in any case would
apply, if at all, to the person-process at all moments of its existence. If such a question
had any force, then, in view of the person-process conception of personhood, it would
deny that there was any basis for such concern at all, even from one hour to the next in
any ordinary lifespan. Of course, this would be to ignore the fact that the person-process
view itself explains the value of continuance as being indivisible from the existence of
persons at all, and further predicts and holds as its core principle, the idea that persons do
not possess the kind of identity that is worried about. Still, some questions might remain,
particularly about whether the extended person-process is something about which our
limited person-processes should be concerned. We can perhaps appeal to the ongoing
debate in this area for some framework on which to hang this question.
Derek Parfit is a theorist who has dealt very extensively with the issue of personal
identity and personal survival through time. His theory is best described as a
reductionistic Lockean concept, whereby all that is necessary for persons to obtain are
particular kinds of psychological states, such as thoughts, memories, desires, intentions,
etc., and that the body and brain are supportive of these, but do not in themselves
constitute a necessary relation to them. If the relevant thoughts, memories, desires, etc.
survive without the body or brain (perhaps in a computer), or with replacement by other
body/brain arrangements, then the person survives. Parfit performs an analysis whereby
two candidates for survival are tested, the psychological continuity, and the psychological
connectedness criteria. This analysis begins with the stipulation that what is important to
survival shall be considered to be some relation, which he terms relation “R”. Provided
that relation “R” obtains, survival obtains. The first candidate, that of the criterion of
psychological continuity, states that what is important to survival must be identity, and,
having already rejected substantialist conceptions of identity, but wishing to retain a
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“sameness” concept nonetheless, that identity must consist of continuity of certain
psychological features, including intentions, desires, and the like, but chiefly memory,
since it is held to be of prior importance (else these others will not be said to obtain).
Provided that these psychological features are held to be continuous, then, according to
Parfit, identity (at least to the extent that is ordinarily meant) obtains. Continuity is thus
transitive, and is an all-or-nothing, one-to-one relation. It is said to obtain when any set of
psychological connections, which are strongly causally connected psychological events
held by both the person P1 at T1, and the person P2 at T2, are held to obtain, at least in
some part. Thus psychological continuity involves overlapping chains of strong
connectedness. But, using a thought experiment originating with David Lewis, and
involving deep time, and a collection of immortal “Methuselahs”,320 it is conjectured that,
while a young Methuselah at 50 may share a significant connectedness with a still
younger Methuselah at 12, the later Methuselah at 300 may share but little psychological
connectedness with the 50 year old Methuselah, and nothing at all with the 12 year old
one. Eventually, it is held, in such cases all connectedness is erased, and the simple fact
of continuity can no longer support the idea that identity is what matters in survival, since
no identity of the important kind remains. He uses imagined cases of branching,
fissioning, and fusing further to bolster this idea, conjecturing that while it is possible to
conceive of each half-hemisphere of a forebrain to be successfully transplanted into
separate individuals, such that some connectedness obtains from each resultant individual
to the former, then it is possible to say that something significant survives about which
the former, whole-brained individual might be justifiably concerned, but it is impossible
to ascribe identity to both, since this results in absurdity. Using such thought experiments
(whose practical improbability, not to say glibness is a signal hallmark of Parfit’s
work),321 Parfit goes on to argue that it is clear that, counter-intuitively to commonsense,
                                                 
320 Lewis D. 1976. “Survival and Identity.” In: Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press, New York,
NY. pp. 55-77. Parfit D. 1987 (f.p. 1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
321 For example, in glossing over and simply failing to refer to any role that the brain stem and cerebellum,
but most particularly the part of the brain stem known as the “pons” which literally means “bridge”, and
whose function is precisely to connect the various parts of the brain, including the hemispheres, might play.
Part of this failure to mention the connection of each hemisphere of the forebrain to these structures may
involve his eagerness to assert that the hemispheres are really “unconnected” in such cases, when all that
has been severed is the corpus callosum, which, while apparently very important, is certainly not the only
important connection between the hemispheres. To this extent, the “split brain” cases he considers are not,
in fact, “split brain” at all. Also, his example of what he calls the “combined spectrum” which involves a
213
identity is not what matters in survival, but rather continuity of strong connectedness,
with the right kind of causation.322
Before continuing with a discussion of this topic, one thing should be noted about this
general schema. Following David Lewis and Parfit’s323 examples of this supposed
problem, it has become almost an assumed dogma, referenced in many publications on
the subject of survival, the nature of identity and also the issue of its role in radical life
extension, that such a picture is indeed based in some analogue of reality. Consider this
example from Reichlin and Barazzetti:
While it is certain that, at the age of 270, my R-related successive self will retain
no memory of my interests and life concerns at 50, he/she will have memories of
a previous self aged 220, who in turn had memories of a previous self aged 170.
In this way, it may be that sufficient overlap between successive selves obtains, in
order to justify continuing egoistic concern.324
However, as has been noted, this is pure, even wild, conjecture, as there are no examples
whatever to base such assertions upon. On the other hand, there is good evidence to
suggest that this pattern of memory-formation, recollection and forgetfulness may not be
what would occur in reality. The Parfitian-Lewisian schema involves something like a
                                                                                                                                                  
thought experiment whereby neurons are progressively and singly inter-transposed between brains,
resulting, so he asserts, in a gradual shift between persons, is simply a false picture of the functioning of
neural networks. He treats such networks as if they were modular, with interchangeable parts that could be
rearranged like Lego blocks. But the thought experiment simply fails because the smooth interchange
would simply not occur nor be possible in reality. This assertion does not depend upon practical issues,
such as the ease of such surgery, but upon principled issues, such as the nature of brain connectivity, and its
development, which is absolutely not modular, between persons. Only the gross structures are (and then
only vaguely) modular. The particular arrangements which make one person a particular person, and not
another person, simply cannot be smoothly reconnected, alive, into a wholly different self-organised
structure, and at the same time maintain their original characteristics, undistorted. His thought experiment
seriously distorts the nature and character of brain neurophysiology to achieve its aim, and while he might
say that it is “only” a thought-experiment, this experiment trades upon a biological plausibility. If it did not
do so, one ought not to bother speaking of “brains” at all, nor ought one to reference real-world cases in
support of the defended hypothesis. See: Parfit Ibid. pp. 236-243.
322 The idea that causation is in fact necessary to the connectedness he has in mind has been interestingly
challenged. See: Cambell S. 2005. “Is causation necessary for what matters in survival?”. Philosophical
Studies Volume 126, Number 3, pp. 375-396
323 Lewis D. 1976.; Parfit D. 1987. Op. Cit. note 320.
324 Reichlin M. Barazzetti G. 2007.  “Life Span and Personal Identity.” Enhance Project. Second
International Workshop on the Extension of Life Span, Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele
University (Publication forthcoming 2008)
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container, or surface upon which objects are placed, the container or surface, say shelf,
representing memory, and the objects being what is remembered, or else and as well as
attitudes, intentions etc. that are had by the person at any given period of psychological
continuity. The shelf being of a certain fixed extent, as it moves through time and new
memories, thoughts, intentions etc. are “placed” upon it, old ones “drop off” the end, or
are replaced in some way by the new. But this seems to be a rather “hand waving” picture
of psychological and neurophysiological reality. To be sure, the brain is a physical object
of a certain extent in space. It is the most complex object known, but it is not infinite. So
one might be tempted to agree with such conjectures out of brute commonsense. Of
course, one can note that it may very well be that suitably modified brains (ones simply
that do not age in the normal trajectory, let alone ones which have been modified to
increase memory penetrance and duration, as has apparently been achieved in mice325),
will not exhibit such a pattern, or will have greatly extended “shelves”, such that the
problem will not manifest for very long periods indeed. But equally it may very well be
that quite ordinary human brains can retain R-relatedness for very much longer periods
than has been supposed.326 But “ah,” say the thought-experimenters, exploiting infinity
once again, “one may always specify a greater and greater period until eventually it
becomes impossible that the brain could gain information [as we shall for convenience
characterise memory, intention, desire, and the like; - although not all desires, ex
hypothesi, are informational in nature327] without losing any, and therefore, without
losing the connectedness of its R-relation altogether over time”. But what warrant do we
have to suppose that the brain, our present psychology, indeed works like this? It has long
been known that at least in the aging brain, new memories become more and more
difficult to form. This would of course be dealt with by any aging intervention which
allowed for the continuance of a fully healthy brain for great periods, as is assumed by all
such thought experiments, but what is often missed is that another peculiarity of memory
loss in the aged is that they frequently exhibit a closer connectedness with the experience
                                                 
325 Tsien JZ.  et al. 1999. ”Genetic enhancement of learning and memory in mice.” Nature; 401; 6748: 63-9
326 As is suggested by the remarkable memory cases such as that of “AJ” (so referred to in the
psychological literature to protect her identity) who seems to be able to remember nearly everything that
has ever occurred to her. See e.g.: Foer J. 2007. “Remember This.” National Geographic, November Issue.
Available at: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/2007-11/memory/foer-text.html [Accessed February
2008]
327 e.g. The categoric desire of the conatus.
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of vivid memories, feelings, and affects from the most distant region of their
psychological past, that of early to mid-childhood, often to the exclusion of those from
the middle periods of life, and despite the fact that during those middle periods, much of
the resurgent memories could not easily be accessed.328 This fact, glossed over and
ignored by the moving-shelf theorists (as I shall call them), appears to suggest a far more
complex picture of connectedness than does the neat shelf-concept employed by Parfit,
Lewis, and others in examination of these questions. For it appears as though, for actual
very long lived persons, far from becoming progressively less connected with their past
selves, they indeed experience a disconnect of this form mostly in the middle years, but
as they age become rather more connected with their earliest past selves. A possible
correlate of such an observation appears to underlie, at least in part, what Williams and
Karel Capek had in mind in The Makropulos Case.329 We shall deal with this kind of
objection later, but it is worthy of mention here, because it seems to reference a worry
which is diametrically opposed to the one in question, which worry is that characters, or
persons, far from infinitely capable of novelty, such that the worry will be loss of R-
relatedness, will be radically incapable of this. In such a case, the character of a person is
held to be more or less constant, such that whatever the turnover of thoughts and
intentions etc, in deep time the person will exhaust all possibilities within themselves,
being tethered to this stake of fixed character. In such a case, it would seem that the
worry that we may change fundamentally appears rather luxurious, and might appear
more as a solution to the real problem confronted in cases of radical life extension, rather
than being the source of the problem itself. In this way, we have an apparent dilemma. I
shall deal with the Charybdis of the supposed problems of fixity and sameness of
character further below, and return in this subsection to the Scylla of the possible failure
of such.
Returning to Parfit’s view, it should be recognised that such a view apparently provides a
reason why we should not worry particularly about the loss of identity over time, since
                                                 
328 Timiras PS. 2002.  Physiological Basis of Aging and Geriatrics. CRC Press Inc; 3Rev Ed edition. See
esp. table on p.127.
329 See below at subsection 3.4.
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according to Parfit, this is not what matters in survival, in any case.330 On this view, then,
it would be perfectly rational to be concerned about the survival of persons who are not
ourselves in terms of identity, provided they were sufficiently R-related with ourselves.
Parfit makes this clear in examples of replication by “teletransportation”, wherein the
original copy is R-related to the resultant copy, but cannot be identical to them since they
are wholly separate. It is stipulated that the copying process has damaged the original’s
heart such that they will die shortly, while the undamaged R-related copy will survive,
providing the necessary criterion of some overlap between.331 In this case, argues Parfit, it
will be rational for the original to have concern for, and find some comfort in, the
survival of the copy.
Glannon and others have raised the objection that while such examples may work for our
near-term, strongly connected concern, in the case of radical prolongation of life332 such
an eventual lack of connectedness, however, will result in such a complete break with
ourselves now, that we have no reason to harbour prudential concern for survival in this
fashion.333 Harris has replied334 that it is quite rational that we should have concern for
such apparently disconnected persons, since our very concern may be transitive, such that
person A has concern for the survival of person B, since they are sufficiently connected
to warrant strong R-relation, and likewise person B to person C, and this relation of
concern is itself sufficient to warrant the assertion that person A should have egoistic
concern for person C. The same idea is referenced in the Reichlin/Barazetti quote above,
                                                 
330 It should be noted at this point, as well, that the concept of persons as conatively driven processes
appear compatible with such a view, as Parfit’s is a kind of process view in its own right, although it does
not seek to explain just what it is that makes continuation of existence to persons good at all. This, as well
as questions about what might be driving the process itself, are simply assumed: there is a process, and it is
good to be a person with certain future-directed concerns.
331 Parfit D. 1987. Op. Cit. note 320.
332 In Glannon’s case, the prolongation is remarkable mainly for its shortness, for he speaks of “virtual
immortality” at the age of 200. This seems really too short a period to confer such a profound difficulty.
There are Bowhead whales which have been known to survive for well above 200 years, and the longest
lived human, Mme. Jeanne Calment, lived to within 78 years of this figure. See subsequent note.
333 Glannon W. 2002. Identity, Prudential Concern, and Extended Lives. Bioethics Vol. 16, Number 3, pp.
266-283
334 e.g. Harris 2004. Op. Cit. note 101.
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and similar arguments have been put forward by others in support.335 I have to add at this
point that the worry itself seems to trade upon some notion of sameness which
equivocates between process and substance, such that, while in such a picture persons
appear to be very much like processes, this is not really taken seriously, and instead of
being “analogue” as a person-process will be, sliding through time as an ever-changing,
intrinsically forward-driven and continuous becoming, the image which is relied on is
very much “digital”, with talk of “person P1 at T1” and “person P2 at T2”, as if at these
points, the whole person were instantiated in a unitary, rather substance-like manner. I
suggest that if we are to take the concept of persons as processes seriously (and explicit
process-thinking has been surprisingly lacking in the Parfitian camp, and within the
discourse relating such ideas to life extension), then we must consider that such digital,
unit-based logic is simply inappropriate. We do not, then, have a nicely complete P1 at
T1, and another nicely complete P2 at T2, or any series of iterations in between, we have,
rather, an extended process, such that there are never any strict delineations which would
warrant talk of series, as though each unit in the series had a distinct centre, which was
fixed at a particular time, and from which we moved away, until eventually we can talk
about a wholly different point in the series, which then forms a centre for talk of a
further, separate person. The person, in this way, is simply not a series, but a continuous
process. The person is never, at any particular time, complete, but is rather intrinsically
incomplete and open-ended. In this way I think that such talk of iterated series persons
may simply be a misleading category error, trading on an illegitimate conflation or
confusion between persons as processes and persons as substances, arising from a failure
fully to realise or take seriously the implications of a person-process view. If what has
been said above in Section Two is correct, about the constitutive nature of the compound
forward-directed value to persons, then this continuous person will never lose the value of
their own continuance.
Laying this analysis to one side for the moment, it will be useful to return to and more
fully to engage with the debate surrounding Parfitian ideas of personal survival, since
                                                 
335 Schloendorn J. Making the Case for Human Life Extension: Personal Arguments. Bioethics 2006; 20:
191-202.
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there is in any case a further aspect to the concept of persons which appears to deal just as
effectively with this worry. To begin with, it should be noted in passing that Parfit’s
model, which only references the survival of Relation-R and nothing whatever about the
particular agent or self in question, is compatible with cyborg or more pointedly “mind-
uploading” concepts of life extension, wherein what matters, Relation-R, is simply the
information, or data of the memories, plans, intentions, desires, etc., and not the
particular information processor, or agent. In this way, survival could conceivably be
constituted in the representation of this data in a sufficiently functional computer
substrate, which, given the near infinitely modular capacity for memory addition and
storage, would appear to obviate further concerns about the loss of connectedness at all,
by making the “shelf” of memory indefinitely extendable.336 I should note that I am not a
subscriber to this view of life extension, partly because it remains conceptually very
nearly wholly unproven (and, given Chalmer’s  p-zombie problem337 applied to the issue
of other minds, especially egregious in the case of minds in silico, where the physical
basis of purported consciousness is radically different from that of the biological context,
may perhaps remain so forever), but partly on other grounds, which I shall begin338 to
address in what follows.
While it may be noted that Parfit’s view of what matters in survival, along with his view
of persons, is broadly compatible with a view of persons as processes, and probably even
of persons as conatively-driven processes, I consider that there are grounds, if not for
rejecting it wholesale, then at least for modifying its conclusions to account for a feature
which he essentially entirely discounts, and which may turn out to be more important for
what matters in survival than anything else which may be said about R-relatedness of
mere information. This relates to the concept of information insofar as information, on
one view at least, is meaningful (indeed definitively so) only in the presence of one who
                                                 
336 According rather well with Parfit’s apparently modular concept of the mind, as demonstrated in his
“combined spectrum” thought experiment.
337 Chalmers D. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
338 It is not the purpose or focus of this thesis to address “mind uploading” and the question of whether hard
AI will in fact turn out to be correct, in terms of not just the modelling of minds and persons, but their
actual instantiation in computer programs. A discussion of this would understandably require a great deal
of discussion in the philosophy of mind, much of which is oblique, though not irrelevant to, this thesis. In
any case, it would require a book-length treatise in its own right.
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is informed, and who processes that information, modifies it, and is to some extent also
modified by it. In short, the account Parfit gives, essentially discounts the existence of
agents, and true selfhood, by insisting that his view of persons may be understood and
considered in an entirely impersonal manner. He characterises the situation with regard
to persons in an absolutist manner as a strict dichotomy with only two possible
resolutions, the personal substantialist, and the impersonal Reductionist modes:
I claim that a person is not like a Cartesian Ego,339 a being whose existence is all-
or-nothing. A person is like a nation … On the Reductionist View, personal
identity just involves physical and psychological continuity. As I argued, both of
these can be described in an impersonal way. These two kinds of continuity can
be described without claiming that experiences are had by a person. A
Reductionist also claims that personal identity is not what matters. Personal
identity just involves certain kinds of connectedness and continuity, when these
hold in a one-one form. These relations are what matter. On the Non-Reductionist
view, personal identity is what matters. And it does not just involve physical and
psychological continuity. It is a separate further fact, which must, in every case,
either hold completely, or not at all. Psychological unity is explained by
ownership. The unity of consciousness at any time is explained by the fact that
several experiences are being had by a person. And the unity of a person’s life is
explained in the same way. These several claims must, I have argued, stand or fall
together.340
Further, he makes it absolutely clear that he intends not that there may be other views, but
that there are likely no other views possible:
… I believe that I have now considered those views that, in this debate, need to be
considered. I may be unaware of some other published view. And I have not
considered views held in different ages, or civilisations. This fact suggests a
disturbing possibility. I believe that my claims apply to all people, at all times. It
would be disturbing to discover that they are merely a part of one line of thought,
in the culture of Modern Europe and America. Fortunately, this is not true. I claim
that, when we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the
fundamental question is a choice between two views. On one view, we are
separately existing entities whose existence must be all-or-nothing. The other
view is the Reductionist View. And I claim that, of these, the second view is true.
As Appendix J shows, Buddha would have agreed. The Reductionist view is not
                                                 
339 This is Parfit’s paradigm case of substantialist identity.
340 Parfit D. 1987. Op. Cit. note 320. p.275
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merely part of one cultural tradition. It may be, as I have claimed, the true view
about all people at all times.341
To help to make clear what he is getting at, here, it is useful to quote Appendix J in full:
At the beginning of their conversation the king politely asks the monk his name,
and receives the following reply: ‘Sir, I am known as “Nagasena”; my fellows in
the religious life address me as “Nagasena”. Although my parents gave (me) the
name “Nagasena” … it is just an appellation, a form of speech, a description, a
conventional usage. “Nagasena” is only a name, for no person is found here.
A sentient being does exist, you think, O Mara?
You are misled by a false conception.
This bundle of elements is void of Self.
In it there is no sentient being.
Just as a set of wooden parts,
Receives the name of carriage.
So do we give to elements,
The name of fancied being.
Buddha has spoken thus: ‘O Brethren, actions do exist, and also their
consequences, but the person that acts does not. There is no one to cast away this
set of elements and no one to assume a new set of them. There exists no
Individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements.’
Vasubandhu: … When Buddha says, ‘I myself was this teacher Sunetra’, he
means that his past and his present belong to one and the same lineage of
momentary existences; he does not mean that the former elements did not
disappear. Just as when we say ‘this same fire which has been seen consuming
that thing has reached this object’, the fire is not the same, but overlooking this
difference we indirectly call fire the continuity of its moments.
Vatsiputriya. If there is no Soul, who is it that remembers? Vasubandhu: What is
the meaning of the word ‘to remember’? Vatsiputriya. It means to grasp an object
by memory. Vasubandhu. Is this ‘grasping by memory’ something different from
memory? Vatsiputriya. It is an agent who acts through memory. Vasubandhu. The
agency by which memory is produced we have just explained. The cause
producive of a recollection is a suitable state of mind, nothing more. Vatsiputriya.
But when we use the expression ‘Caitra remembers’, what does it mean?
Vasubandhu. In the current of phenomena which is designated by the name
Caitra, a recollection appears.
                                                 
341 Parfit D. 1987. Op. Cit. note 320. p. 273.
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The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the
difference between the Buddhist view and other theories, is Santana, i.e. a
‘stream’
Vatsiputriya. What is an actual, and what a nominal existence? Vasubandhu. If
something exists by itself (as a separate element) it has an actual existence. But if
something represents a combination (of such elements) it is a nominal existence.
The mental and the material are really here.
But here there is no human being to be found.
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll.
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks.342
In all this it becomes clear that what is being discussed is a bundle theory of persons, very
much akin to that spoken of by Hume, who also used (and probably initiated) the analogy
of a nation (more properly, in his terms “a republic or commonwealth”), and further
denied that there was anything more to be said about persons than that they were a bundle
of such phenomena as sensations, impressions, intents, affects, etc. and that there is no
further fact about them that can be pointed to.343 But is this strict dichotomy a fair
representation? Is it as absolute as he asserts?  There is a significant body of work which
references another position, which can be called the selfhood conception of persons, in
which it makes sense, and can only make sense, to talk of persons in terms of the agency
of persons, wherein there is not merely a process simpliciter of such things as the
information experienced in the consciousness, but also a higher-order description which
is indispensable, and maps onto the higher order activity, which must be located in a
process of agency, and the self, being the experiencer344 of that which is experienced, and
the author of actions. This may, and I think does, supply another conception of the nature
of the unity of persons which does not fall into either of the camps described by Parfit’s
strict dichotomy.
                                                 
342 Parfit D. 1987. Op. Cit. note 320. pp. 502-503.
343 Hume D. 1990 (f.p.1740) Op. Cit. note 28. Book I, Part IV, Section VI. pp. 251-263.
344 I will discuss the analysis in terms of agency, but the flipside of agency is experience. For an agent to be
the author of their action, they must also be the one who experiences both the precursors of that action,
which give a range of valencies from which a course of action may be considered, further projected and
enumerated in planning, and subsequent to deliberation, chosen. In this way, the agent must experience,
whether consciously or not (allowing for minimalist understanding of agency) themselves in the world, as a
subjective selfhood, whose subjectivity is guaranteed first by the self-inherence of the living system, but
secondly by the mediacy between self and world, as described by Jonas and discussed in section two above.
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This view does not, according to proponents such as Korsgaard,345 involve some further
fact, which necessitates the existence of a homunculean or other substance concept, but
rather may be described in wholly practical terms. In order that we may speak of what is
going on in the course of a person’s life, we must be able to deal with the authorial
aspect of a person’s actions, higher order desires, affects, decisions, etc. Far from merely
flowing through unimpeded and unaltered, as through a simple conduit, the phenomena in
passage through time and consciousness within a person, are affected by some regulative
process, which bends, changes, and chooses between valencies in order to determine a
course of action. Korsgaard identifies various levels of this activity. Firstly, there is the
fact that a multiplicity of motivational streams may exist at one time, corresponding to a
multiplicity of valences in and between possibilities in the world, and states within
ourselves. These may simply be different urges or opinions, or desires, or, as in Parfit’s
example, which she references, cases where the very hemispheres of the (fore) brain are
separated.346 In all these cases, it is a matter of practical exigency in a unified body, that
one such shall prevail, else the body/brain should cease to be able to function to continue
itself, which it nonetheless manifestly does in such cases. As a result of this unity of
agency, the purported disunity in such cases is only apparent with specific diagnostic
tests, and would not be apparent to any ordinary observer, who would see a unified
course of action taking place. Secondly, there is the pragmatic existence of what she calls
the “deliberative standpoint”:
The idea that you choose among your conflicting desires, rather than just waiting
to see which one wins, suggests that you have reasons for or against acting on
them. And it is these reasons, rather than the desires themselves, which are
expressive of your will. The strength of a desire may be counted by you as a
reason for acting on it, but this is different from its simply winning. This means
that there is some principle or way of choosing that you regard as expressive of
yourself, and that provides reasons that regulate your choices among your desires.
                                                 
345 Korsgaard CM. 1996. “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to Parfit. In:
Creating the Kingdom of Ends.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. pp.363-397.
346 But not, as has been noted, the whole brain. And as a result these are not truly separate in the sense of
being neurophysiologically disconnected- a fact which Parfit chooses to ignore. I will go along with this
false conception in any case, since even in its presence the case for agency can be effectively made. If so,
then how much more strongly so when we remember that the hemispheres actually remain connected in a
unified brain in the cases Parfit references.
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To identify with such a principle or way of choosing is to be “a law to yourself”
and to be unified as such. This does not require that your agency be located in a
separately existing entity or involve a deep metaphysical fact. Instead, it is a
practical necessity imposed upon you by the nature of the deliberative standpoint.
… It is practical reason that requires me to construct an identity for myself;
whether metaphysics is to guide me in this or not is an open question.347
Now at this point I am going to draw a fairly bold parallel between what Korsgaard is
talking about, and something that has been extensively discussed in the latter stages of
Section Two above. This is the concept of the self-inherent agency of material systems of
a self-regulating autopoietic, free-energy dissipative, negentropic, conative kind.
Korsgaard’s language, I believe, maps rather beautifully onto the language of Di Paolo in
his interpretation of the self-regulating adaptivity of autopoietic systems, as being
agency, and of course Weber and Varela begin the title of the seminal paper referred to
above: “Life After Kant”. I of course recognise that, being a somewhat more traditional
Kantian, Korsgaard is perhaps likely to disagree that fairly simple systems at the level of,
say, an amoeba, or an earthworm, can indeed possess such deliberative agency as she
here intends.348 However this may be, and it does require acceptance of a kind of “all the
way down” interpretation of cognition as proposed in the “Santiago Theory of
Cognition”,349 it can be recognised that, even where it can be denied that such systems
have self-conscious eidetic control of neurophysiologically-mediated cognitive processes,
cannot make life-plans or radically novel forms of second-order cognitive endorsement of
desire, and so may not be accounted to be persons, they are indeed deliberating between
options available, and making unified decisions for action,350 therefore they are agents in
very much the manner (in terms of the unity of agency) that Korsgaard here speaks of.
                                                 
347 Korsgaard CM. 1996. Op. Cit. note 345. p. 370.
348 Although being a constructivist, she may not.
349 See Capra F. 1996. Op. Cit. note 303.
350 One may consider the deliberative stance necessarily taken by an amoeba when making the choice with
regard to action between this and that item in its environment, in terms of which to move towards, and
which away from, which to pursue as food and which to avoid as threat, and given various such options
which is the best one. Even an amoeba must co-ordinate its fairly extensive hierarchy of processes in a
remarkably complex manner in order to accomplish such tasks. What one observes when watching the
motility of amoebae is not just a concatenation of wholly random vectors, resulting ad hoc in a direction of
movement, whereby the strongest, or the resultant vector wins; rather one observes a coordinated stream of
movement across the whole organism.  A startling and striking example of the centeredness of such agency,
which in my opinion strongly supports an agent-centred conception of the evolution of cooperative
normative systems in groups of organisms, is found in the dictyostelid slime moulds. These are organisms
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Now, this kind of unity, or identity of self, is a pragmatic point identity of agency. It is
identity, but not in a substantialist mode, since it does not require that there is anything
which does not change through time, and indeed, requires that everything does, even the
agent as subject themselves, for, as Di Paolo has noticed, the pragmatic decision-making
of the unified agent will constrain its future possibilities, and will even feed back to the
structure of the agent itself, such that its very character (and so, nature D3) will evolve,
through time. This leads us back to the question of continuing identity over time. It is at
this point that Korsgaard takes a big stride towards full realisation of the concept of a
person as a conatively driven process, without actually alighting on the concept itself:
Perhaps it is natural to think of the present self as necessarily concerned with
present satisfaction. But it is mistaken. In order to make deliberative choices, your
present self must identify with something from which you will derive your
reasons, but not necessarily with something present. The sort of thing you identify
yourself with may carry you automatically into the future; and I have been
suggesting that this will very likely be the case. Indeed, the choice of any action,
no matter how trivial, takes you some way into the future. And to the extent that
you regulate your choices by identifying yourself as the one who is implementing
something like a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in
order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no
clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.351
This strikingly echoes aspects of the analysis of persons as processes given above in
Section Two. Korsgaard goes on to accept that this means that agency may not solely be
predicated of single persons, but may also be so of groups, or any group which, for
pragmatic reasons, requires itself to act as a unit. She refines Parfit’s bundle theory
description of persons as “nations” with the concept of persons more as “states”- not
                                                                                                                                                  
capable of switching between incorporate beings, being fully embodied in a single corporate whole, and
individual forms, capable of independent motion. The incorporation into a self-acting single whole, as well
as the threat-response of the group as separate entities, appears to be mediated through a single agent locus,
that of the originator or founder of the colony. In this manner, one is also reminded of such eusocial living
systems as termites, or most saliently marauding ants exhibit, which form colony structures or bivouacs out
of their very bodies. Such systems importantly transcend the simple boundaries of the walls of the physical
body, and open the way to interpretations of organismic entropy-reducing systems which operate between
bodies and in groups, giving room for realistic talk of normative systems governing the behaviour of groups
of individuals developing from the simple fact of the entropy reducing self-inherent regulated adaptive
dissipative structure that is definitive of a living organism.
351 Korsgaard CM. 1996. Op. Cit. note 345. p. 372,
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merely an ad-hoc, accidental bundle, but rather a deliberately constituted grouping whose
identity “for practical reasons, must be regarded and treated as more determinate than the
identity of nations.” Continuing, she states that:
…the pragmatic character of the reasons for agent unification does not show that
the resulting agencies are not really necessary. Pragmatic necessity can be
overwhelming. When a group of human beings occupy the same territory, for
instance, they have an imperative need to form a unified state. And when a group
of psychological functions occupy the same human body, they have an even more
imperative need to become a unified person. This is why the human body must be
conceived as a unified agent. As things stand, it is the basic kind of agent.352
One can see, in this passage, the beginnings of a rather Hobbesian notion of the
emergence of nation-states, which is not, as has been noted, at all incompatible with, and
may be predicted by the core thesis, in conjunction with thermodynamic considerations. I
of course am going to disagree that the human body is the basic kind of agent, while I can
still agree that it is, at least very nearly, and with the possible competing candidates of the
likes of dolphins, and the great apes,353 the basic kind of person-agent. More basic agents
are predicted, and described, by autopoietic theory, and the pragmatic exigency which
urges them into existence, and greater self-inherence and unity, is the same which
ultimately forces the composition of nation states: the fact of the second law of
thermodynamics. Increased order, increased states of improbability, is what
microorganisms, nation-states, families, and manufacturers of aircraft are all about,
though with differing boundaries of concern, and the achievement of this is made
difficult (and also possible at all!) by the second law, which forces the requirement of
those very boundaries, at all. I am going boldly to suggest that the very construction of
moral norms and rules themselves, results not merely from the whimsical projection of
affect-valuation upon the world, as is suggested by non-cognitivism, nor solely from the
self-conscious cognitive rational deliberation of persons with their wonderful eidetic self-
control, but rather is constituted much more basically by the self-organising principles
governing pragmatic behaviour within particular groups in given situations, when
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353 See e.g.: Wise SM. 2000. Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals. Perseus Books,
Massachusetts.
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increased order and increased states of statistical improbability are required within given
bounded spheres of concern.
Returning from a general metaethical consideration to the particular topic of this
subsection, however, we may see that there are grounds to consider it a matter of
pragmatic truth that there is a continuing unity of agency in a person, particularly when
persons are considered to be processes with certain core features, which in turn are
determined by the exigencies of physics: the bounded, conative process of regulated,
adaptive, self-construction.354
When we consider that this agency has a characteristic signature at any one time, a
particular character, which has at least a moderate persistence, such that while it
certainly changes, it usually changes rather slowly, we can begin to see how a concept
like Paul Ricoeur’s one of the narrative identity of selfhood,355 is useful in understanding
the continuity of agents through time. In the narrative mode, persons are agents who both
inaugurate and formulate life plans, or prolonged, structured and cohesively organised
courses of action, in which they play necessary leading roles, and who in turn are subject
to these plans, and in the course of them, are shaped by eventualities along their narrative
history. The shaping and self-transformation can often be deliberate, and may indeed be
the very point of the story or plan. This is true, for example, of the plan picked out by an
intention to go to university, say to become a doctor, or more generally simply to
experience a character- and life-changing immersion in unfamiliar ideas, or to join the
Air Force and become a pilot. Each of these picks out an intentionally chosen narrative
structure, or plan, with the transformation of the self, at least in part, and in the middle
case in whole, as its intended outcome. This matches rather well with similar
observations made by Christine Overall,356 in context specifically of issues of fixity of
                                                 
354 It is not, perhaps, so surprising after all that there may be significant parallels between Korsgaard the
constructivist, and a theory of adaptive self-construction.
355 Ricoeur P. 1990. Oneself as Another. Blamey K. (trans.) University of Chicago Press, London.
356 Overall C. 2007. “Life Span Extension: Identity, Gender, and Moral Character.” Enhance Project.
Second International Workshop on the Extension of Life Span, Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San
Raffaele University (Publication forthcoming 2008); Overall C. 2003. Aging, Death, and Human
Longevity: A Philosophical Inquiry. University of California Press.
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character, and the boredom which is supposed, by some, to result therefrom, as will be
further discussed below.
I consider that the unity which Ricoer and most particularly Korsgaard want is a unity of
self-inherent processes. In this way the identity is in no way a substance concept of some
unchanging metaphysical entity, such as that exemplified by Parfit’s reference to a
“Cartesian Pure Ego”. But nor is this identity the mere identity of Relation-R. It is an
identity of selfhood, and agency, which arises from what is in one sense a purely
reducible schema, but in another the reduction of which would miss the important and
interesting features of such processes. Living systems are not mere processes, reducible
to the point of indistinguishability to the background of processes of the universe in
general. Rather, they are precisely self-distinguishing, self-inherent processes, whose
activity of self-distinction is constitutive of their unified nature, as separate from the
background objectivity. I will note in passing the further and independently supporting
argumentation for this which can be found in a perhaps unexpected quarter: that of the
substance ontologist Peter Van Inwagen, who contends that living organisms are indeed
the sole unities of complex matter in the known universe, with all other complex objects
simply being accidental bundles, whose existence is indeed simply conventional, and
nominal in nature.357 That he describes them as substances is no matter, and is more to do
with his prior commitments, than any deep fact about the beings he describes, which are
properly described as unified, self-inherent processes. We even may go so far as to say,
given arguments and observations above in Section Two, that this latter is likely a matter
of physical fact, not in that personhood or agency involves some further fact beyond the
physical processes of organisms themselves, but at least in the sense that it picks out
systems which are factually different from other types of systems. There is no further fact
hidden inside living systems, rather living systems represent the further fact themselves
in totam, in being living at all. In this way, to attempt to state, as do the Buddhists in
Parfit’s Appendix J, that a person, or a living being, is nothing other than a bundle of
simpler things, is to miss out a crucial and defining aspect of the nature of these physical
processes: that they necessarily self-inhere in order to maintain their form, and act in the
                                                 
357 Van Inwagen P. 1995. Op. Cit. note 148.
228
course of their becoming more Boltzmann-improbable, by the self-establishing and self-
regulated activity of their own internal processes, as driven by and co-constituting the
conatus whose pragmatic urgency is derived from the necessity of separation from the
fall toward equilibrium as given in the Second Law. To state that something may be
reducible in the sense that it may be understood in terms of subsidiary constitutive
factors,358 is not to say that we may ignore what is then and thereby constituted. In this
way I flatly deny the sense of both Parfit’s and (apparently) the Buddhists’ oversimplistic
understanding of reductionism, since it obstinately ignores what is manifestly the case:
that, whether formally reducible or no, there is a phenomenon of a certain character or
type, whose character categorically emerges from, supervenes upon but is not identical
to, the subsidiary characters its mere constituent parts. To state that an atom is only a
bundle of subatomic particles, is to ignore the special physics that extends from the level
of the atom on upwards, and differs in character and category from the physics of the
subatomic world. To state that a painting is only some pigments suspended in a substrate
of long-chain carbon molecules, is likewise to miss what a painting is, over and above its
constituent parts. I argue that the same (though more likely closer to the scale of
difference picked out in the former example, since the latter depends upon the existence
of person-agents in any case) may be said of living, versus non-living processes, of agent-
processes versus simply autopoietic systems, and of persons versus simple agents. In this
way, this insistence on the reducibility of an organism or worse, a person, to just a
process, like any other in every respect, which is therefore strictly analogous to a non-
living process like a bundle of sticks or whatever else, constitutes a categorical error.
                                                 
358 Though to be sure we are very far from doing this, in anything but the vaguest of ways.
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3.2 Mortality, person-processes, and the existential
personal condition
In his famous 1946 lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism”, Sartre declared
Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle
of existentialism. And this is what people call its “subjectivity,” using the word as
a reproach against us. But what do we mean to say by this, but that man is of a
greater dignity than a stone or a table? For we mean to say that man primarily
exists – that man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a
future and is aware that it is doing so359. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses
a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus or a cauliflower.
Before that projection of the self nothing exists; not even in the heaven of
intelligence: man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be.
Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by
wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken – much more often than not –
after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a
book or to marry – but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a
manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision360.361
Here Sartre is very close indeed to a discussion of the subject matter of this dissertation.
In many ways, I accept the thrust of this passage, and its description of what has been
termed the “human…”, though for the purposes of this thesis, the “personal condition”.
But there is one aspect in which I believe Sartre to be mistaken, or at least confused, and
indeed the matter is significantly blurred or glossed over in this passage. This is whether
persons, as Sartre appears to have it, “propel” (or “hurl” in Frechtman’s translation)
themselves toward the future in some fundamentally subjective sense, for which they as
persons are then wholly responsible, as he appears later to suggest, or else whether they at
                                                 
359 For useful comparison, Frechtman’s translation differs slightly, but carries an enlightening slant in this
context: “For we mean that man first exists, that is, that man first of all is the being who hurls himself
toward a future and who is conscious of imagining himself as being in the future.” From: Sartre JP. 1957.
Existentialism and Human Emotions. Frechtman B. (trans.) Philosophical Library, New York, NY.
360 For useful comparison, Frechtman’s translation again: “Because by the word "will" we generally mean a
conscious decision, which is subsequent to what we have already made of ourselves. I may want to belong
to a political party, write a book, get married; but all that is only a manifestation of an earlier, more
spontaneous choice that is called "will."”
361 Sartre JP. 1989 (f.p. 1946). “Existentialism is a Humanism.” Mairet, P. (trans.) In: Existentialism from
Dostoyevsky to Sartre. Kaufman W. (ed.), Meridian, London.
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least in part and at base are propelled, by the very thing which he is describing (in
Frechtman’s translation) as a “will”. I believe that Sartre was skating across the,
admittedly difficult to disentangle, boundaries between cognition, affect and conation. If
so, I assert that he is wrong to suggest that there is some “decision” (Mairet) or “choice”
(Frechtman) in the matter, at least, of fundamental propulsion of self. Rather persons are
helplessly and inevitably propelled towards the future by the very process that makes
them persons at all. In this way, Sartre was right at one level, that it is something inherent
in ourselves as persons that does the propelling, and perhaps that persons may be
secondarily responsible for some of these drives, when they rise to the level of affects or,
more pointedly, cognitive constructs, but wrong at another, since the basic driver of
personhood is not something that is open to subjective, second-order re-evaluation. The
“will”, described as prior to “wish” or plan, is deeper, prior, and “more spontaneous”
than the decisions or choices Sartre more generally speaks of in his work. I believe that in
these above-quoted words Sartre was feeling his way towards the idea of conation, and a
conative driver of the person, without wishing, however, to surrender the notion of
radical freedom or autonomy, the basis of the responsibility that was central to his
conception of the existential predicament, and ethic. In this way, Sartre and I disagree on
the level of autonomy that persons have over their own natures, but we seem to agree that
conation indeed gives rise to and motivates other desires, wishes, and later, plans towards
these, and further wishes based upon such cognitively-constructed plans362. On this
adjusted view, the personal condition363 is indeed still a predicament, for surely what we
feel in view of our mortality is a sincere and profound existential problem, a dissonance
between what we inevitably as beings are and what we know to be our inevitable fate.
And what are we to make of this helplessness, in relation to life-extension, and its value,
if it is indeed accepted that we are unavoidably mortal beings, however long we may
live? For us, helplessly future-projected beings, the difficulty is ex hypothesi never
alleviated, so long as we are persons. Perhaps this, or something like it, is what lay
                                                 
362 So Korsgaard’s constructivist ethics, taking place as it does, in the “heaven of intelligence”, is on
Sartre’s view also only secondary to this motivation.
363 For there is a crucial difference between the set of humans, and the set of persons, and it is very much
the latter that the personhood as process view regards.
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behind the Aurelian assertion that since we are all mortal, the timing of death is not
important:
If any god told you that you shall die tomorrow, or certainly on the day after to-
morrow, you would not care much whether it was on the third day or on the next,
unless you had a very degraded spirit for how small is the difference? So think it
no great thing to die after as many years as you can count rather than tomorrow.364
I consider that while this latter has some sense at one level, its force is not complete, and
that it does indeed make a difference to us. Of course, one answer is that it matters to us
what our own subjective purposes are, and in this instrumental way it is important
whether we die, for example, before we feel them to be fulfilled. In this way, Aurelius’
assertion seems to empty all such personal purposes, life plans, or values of any purpose
or value, in very much the kind of oversimplistic reductionist spirit I rejected in the last
subsection. But further, I think that this kind of thinking trades upon a fallacy of
equivocation since it seeks to address one question, which obtains at one level, but does
so by appealing to an entirely different level, where the question, the matter of interest
itself, simply doesn’t obtain in the first place. The apparent warrant for the equivocation
lies in the fact that the matter of interest, say, the concerns of the self, lie within the scope
of the more general and abstracted level, say the whole history of “Nature”, so this is a
kind of merelogical appeal. But I think that it fails, precisely because it fails to respect the
reality of the boundaries between the levels of the very categories or sets which must
exist in the mereology referred to. Nature is indeed monistic, but it is not simplistic and
without internal complexity. Why should we feel, qua ourselves, that it is “no great
thing” that all of our purposes are devalued in this way? If we, as the Stoics often liked to
do, in common with some Buddhists, and some reductionist philosophers such as Parfit,
seek to quiet our concerns of selfhood, or our selfhood-predicated concerns to the point
of their annihilation, by contemplation of “the grand scheme of things” or objective
realms and processes from which we arise as subjective beings, are we not doing so in an
illegitimate manner, since we thereby do not address the question posed at the level of
the self, or the person, but rather simply sidestep  it, by abstracting to the point that our
                                                 
364 Aurelius M. 1964. Meditations. Stanforth M. (trans.) Penguin Classics, London.  Book IV, XXXVII.
P.74
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perspective shifts and the self or the person simply disappears from view? This form of
“quietening” seems more like stifling. It seems to be a somewhat ostrich-like principle.
One may imagine an astronomer, who has discovered a comet on a collision course with
earth, who solves the problem and quietens his disquiet simply by refocusing his
telescope on the distant stars and galaxies beyond, and out of context of, the problem that
immediately troubles him. To be sure, the comet and the earth both lie in the grander
mereological realm of concern in which the stars and galaxies beyond also lie, and may
vaguely or abstractedly be appealed to as somehow, in the “grand scheme of things”
more significant, perhaps since greater and more enduring, but this is simply to fail to
respect the boundaries which make sense of any of it at all, and most particularly the
concerns of the person who is the astronomer themselves. Seen this way, the life plans
and values of the person must be addressed qua themselves, not qua some level of
reasoning or ontology that causes us to lose our grip on the very meaning or ontology of
persons, at their own level. But beyond this, at the deeper than simply instrumental, but
still very particular and not abstract, level of the conation-driven person-process which
gives rise to all such concerns, mortality, especially in a rigid “given” frame, remains a
pressing problem, which still must be addressed.
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3.3 Some symmetries and false solutions
In a post-hoc manner, after formulating the initial persons-as-process view with regard to
the value of life extension, I noticed some similarities between certain aspects of this
view, and the view described in the core Buddhist text known as the “Four Noble
Truths”. In this text, and in its later philosophic elucidations, it is asserted that desire is
what predicates suffering, and desire is fundamental to persons. The project of Buddhism,
in one sense, is to free the subject of this suffering by freeing the subject, ultimately, of
their very personhood, or rather by dissolving our belief in the selfhood of subjectivity at
all, by analysis of persons as nothing but a bundle of sensations, thoughts, affects, etc. in
process. The purpose of the “eightfold path” is to quiet particular desires or affects, and
that of meditation is to allow, eventually, a kind of “first-hand” insight into the
purportedly illusory nature of personhood, such that personhood, and the constitutive
desire that propels it, along with the affects which form the furniture of “samsara”, or the
game of personal life, and indeed the “becoming” of all life, evaporates, or is “snuffed
out” in nirvana365. The causes of future-directed coming-into-being, thus the personhood
itself, and indeed all causation of drives or one thing to another, indeed process, in this
manner ceases altogether on attainment of nirvana. It should be noted that the precise
nature of the “goal” of this religious practice is very obscure. The Buddha Gautama
famously declined to define Nirvana, saying only that it was not existence nor was it non-
existence, nor was it existence and non-existence, nor was it neither non-existence, nor
existence. In the face of such a denial, and in the absence of my own access to “nirvana”,
I can only note that the Buddha continued in fact to live, breathe, and to teach, act, move,
urge, cajole, attempt to persuade etc., after the purported attainment of this condition.
This may mean that nirvana is compatible with continued living existence, and so with
the conatus, but it may perhaps not.366 This dissertation is most certainly not the place to
begin such investigations, and so I will assume that what we are discussing is indeed the
                                                 
365 At its Sanskrit root, nirvana literally means nir- (out) vati (it blows).
366 It may simply mean that the Buddha, in claiming to have become truly “enlightened” in fact, had not, or
that “enlightenment” is not in fact possible, or does not achieve what it is reputed to achieve, even as this
reputation is in itself something incommunicable.
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cessation of the person-process. If I have misrepresented this position, then my critique
works very nearly as well for present purposes, as what is principally at issue here is the
question of scope to achieve the desired end, and less so the question precisely of what
that desired end, or rather the end of desire may be.367  I think that I have not entirely
misrepresented the position, however, since in its core tenets of the Four Noble Truths,
Buddhism refers to suffering as dependent upon the  “five aggregates subject to
clinging”. In an essay on the subject of mortality, Jonas states:
The basic clue is that life says “yes” to itself. By clinging to itself it declares that
it values itself. But one clings only to what can be taken away. From the
organism, which has being strictly on loan, it can be taken and will be unless from
moment to moment reclaimed. Continued metabolism is such a reclaiming, which
ever reasserts the value of Being against it lapsing into nothingness.368
Here Jonas, not directly discussing Buddhism, is referring to what he calls the “burden”
of mortality, that in order to be at all, living beings must continually strive. It seems to me
that this striving predicates the suffering that the Buddhists refer to as Dukkha, and
insofar as this is so, no living being will ever be free of this burden. However, since it
seems that this “burden” is the only way in which value for a living being obtains at all, it
would appear not to be a burden or suffering exclusively, but simply and more
importantly a condition of the existence of any value. So it is likely that, while I would
agree with the core Buddhist tenets at one level, I would deny the inference drawn from
them by the Buddhist tradition. However, while it is therefore, following Jonas, not
possible to be alive and to be free of this burden369 entirely, it is possible to be alive and
no longer to be a person. This may take place in a variety of ways, for example
destruction of the forebrain, with retention of the midbrain and brainstem. But such a
destruction is the destruction and not the resolution of a person. Perhaps what the
                                                 
367 In fact there are significant parallels between Spinozistic doctrine of “right-thinking” leading to
adequate ideas, which in turn still the affects, and reduce suffering as the mind approaches towards a grasp
of ultimate reality, and the Buddhist doctrine of the “eightfold path”. But equally, there are significant
divergences, with the Buddhists appearing to deny, for example, that there is any ultimate unified Being or
Substance at all.
368Jonas H.  1996. “The Burden and Blessing of Mortality.” In: Mortality and Morality: A Search for the
Good after Auschwitz. Vogel L. (Ed.) Northwestern University Press, Ilinois. p.91
369 The very concept of “burden” here maps very neatly onto the thermodynamic concept of the necessity of
“work” to be done in order for living systems to continue at all.
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Buddhists want is the resolution of the person- the coming to a point of stillness and
balance, an equilibrium which would mean that the person no longer possesses a conatus
qua the person, even if the conatus continues the basic processes of life in the body, and
therefore passes from existence. The destruction of the forebrain example shows that this
is at least conceivable. But destruction mid-process is not resolution, it is rather the
problem which we all resist, as persons, it is what occurs at the end of the Procrustean
bedframe: the sudden, brutal, catastrophic descent towards equilibrium which does not
respect, and indeed specifically disrespects the nature D3 of the person as a character.
Self-resolution, however, may not be so brutal a fate, the stilling of the becoming of the
person-process in an unforced manner in this way might represent an allowance of the
completion of the person-process, on its own terms, in accordance with and respect of the
particular shape of its nature D3 as character, and without the brutal intrusion of a
disvalue, a value-negation from without. But if such a person-respecting resolution could
occur in the psychology of personhood, if the person could be stilled, by their own
characterological process, to the point of ceasing to be at all, then such a being would
cease to display any person-type behaviours whatever. They would simply be person-
inert. I suspect, for this reason, that whatever Gautama was, post “enlightenment”, he was
still a person, for he exhibited eidetic plan-exhibiting care and concern enough to decide
to propagate his message in the world, to others. Even altruistic care or concern is a
person-predicated form of categorical future-directed desiring. Even if I am wrong in my
analysis of the Buddhist position, the strict focus is germane. The point here is that it is
generally acknowledged that, for the vast majority, nirvana, or the cessation of
personhood and with it, the process of becoming, whether desirable in itself or not, is not
attainable within the scope of an ordinary lifespan. About this I can agree. About the
apparent Buddhist solution to this issue –reincarnation- I can only say that I do not, since
it seems unlikely, unwarranted, unevidenced, and indeed irrelevant370.
What we may take from this, then, is that the Buddhists agree that there is a problem, but
pose a solution which is for the majority no solution at all, since in the meantime, the
                                                 
370 For what, meaningfully, can be considered to be being reincarnated? As regards the latter, it has formed
an aspect of intramural debate in Buddhist philosophy, as the doctrines of the illusory nature of self, and the
non-continuance of beings through time appear to undermine it.
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central problem, death in actuality as a non-person-respecting and brutal intrusion,
manifests. Something very similar may be said of the solutions offered by the other major
religions, which do not take the view that persons should seek self-extinction through
realisation of the illusion of selfhood, but, recognising the fundamental problem, seek to
compensate for it by conjecturing or constructing fantastic future worlds in which we do
continue to live, in any case, beyond our own deaths. Once again, however, in absence of
any good warrant, or evidence for this, we may bracket such hopes as rather conveniently
wishful, and focus instead on the problem, and the fact that whatever else may be true
about these ideas, the real predicator of the problem- the occurrence of death, occurs just
as factually along the way, as it does without such compensatory cultural construction.
Indeed, as discussed above, further problems are present in the picture of the “eternal”
person, which ironically have been raised by canonical conservative theorists seeking
mistakenly to criticise life-extension, when in fact they are criticising supernatural
immortality. As noted above, Leon Kass, perhaps especially, though among others is
guilty of this kind of error. In doing so, he also elides the perhaps more profound
difficulty for person-immortal compatibility with a more localised suggestion, which
attempts an end-run around the force of the mortal person problem here at hand. It is
argued that far from being a problem in view of the conative, striving aspect of persons,
mortality is what gives persons the drive they have.371 Of course I deny this on two
levels- first, that conation is constitutive, and therefore the lack of striving for persons
will never be a problem372, and is not, in any case, derived at base from awareness of
mortality at all, and secondly that physical persons are irrevocably mortal, and so even if
such theorists were right about striving, they would be wrong about the relevance of
immortality to life extension.
Kass himself does not really seem to take his own version of this argument seriously,
however, since he also touts as one of the virtues of aging, that its suffering gradually
                                                 
371 e.g. Kass LR 2003. Op. Cit. note 1
372 For a fuller refutation of Kass’ arguments on striving, see Horrobin, S. 2005, Op Cit note 203.
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overpowers our will to live373. In this, he echoes Montaigne, who is approvingly quoted
in this context in the Ageless Bodies section of the Beyond Therapy report of the PCBE:
I notice in proportion as I sink into sickness, I naturally enter into a certain disdain
for life. I find that I have much more trouble digesting this resolution when I am
in health than when I have a fever. Inasmuch as I no longer cling so hard to the
good things of life when I begin to lose the use and pleasure of them, I come to
view death with much less frightened eyes. This makes me hope that the farther I
get from life and the nearer to death, the more easily I shall accept the exchange
… If we fell into such a change [decrepitude] suddenly, I don’t think we could
endure it. But when we are led by Nature’s hand down a gentle and virtually
imperceptible slope, bit by bit, one step at a time, she rolls us into this wretched
state and makes us familiar with it; so that we find no shock when youth dies
within us, which in essence and in truth is a harder death than the complete death
of a languishing life or the death of old age; inasmuch as the leap is not so cruel
from a painful life as from a sweet and flourishing life to a grievous and painful
one.374
Kass approves and endorses this, even going so far as to state, quite shockingly in my
opinion, that the absence of such debilitation, disease and discomfort would “exacerbate”
the will to live, as if this were an obvious primary evil:
In other words, even a modest prolongation of life with vigor, or even only a
preservation of youthfulness with no increase in longevity, could make death less
acceptable and would exacerbate the desire to keep pushing it away.375
But of course aging does not do this except by a process of increasing impediment,
discomfort, exhaustion, and humiliation, none of which impinge in a central way on the
categorically open-ended conative drive of personhood, other than to make us find life
qualitatively and contingently more difficult and less appealing. To see that it is
contingent, one must simply accept that aging interventions are possible. And further to
deny Montaigne, in causing this suffering “Nature” is not “gentle”, but cruel, and bitterly
humiliating, literally mortifying; nor are the changes “imperceptible”, but keenly felt by
all who experience them. And we should not welcome these changes any more than a
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374 Montaigne M de. From: That to Philosophize is to Learn to Die. Trans. Frame DM. The Complete
Essays of Michel Montaigne. Stanford Univ. Press 1965; as quoted in the PCBE report Beyond Therapy, p.
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375 Kass LR 2003. Op. Cit. note 1.
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person who seeks euthanasia in view of a terrible terminal illness welcomes, or should
welcome the illness itself on the basis that it makes them more open to the idea of dying;
or a person condemned to die or in the process of being murdered should welcome the
administration of a drug which makes them presently feel less caring about what is
happening to them. One may also notice an analogy to the benefits of being tortured to
death, in view of its reducing the contingent willingness to live, and alleviation of the fear
of death. For example consider Orwell’s words on the matter, from his novel 1984:
‘…Even in the instant of death we cannot permit any deviation. In the old days the
heretic walked to the stake still a heretic, proclaiming his heresy, exulting in it.
Even the victim of the Russian purges could carry rebellion locked up in his skull
as he walked down the passage waiting for the bullet. But we make the brain
perfect before we blow it out. The command of the old despotisms was “Thou shalt
not”. The command of the totalitarians was “Thou shalt”. Our command is “Thou
art”. No one whom we bring to this place ever stands out against us. Everyone is
washed clean. Even those three miserable traitors in whose innocence you once
believed — Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford — in the end we broke them down. I
took part in their interrogation myself. I saw them gradually worn down,
whimpering, grovelling, weeping — and in the end it was not with pain or fear,
only with penitence. By the time we had finished with them they were only the
shells of men. There was nothing left in them except sorrow for what they had
done, and love of Big Brother. It was touching to see how they loved him. They
begged to be shot quickly, so that they could die while their minds were still
clean.’376
…
It was perfectly possible that before he was shot the whole drama of his arrest and
interrogation would be enacted all over again. The one certain thing was that death
never came at an expected moment. The tradition — the unspoken tradition:
somehow you knew it, though you never heard it said — was that they shot you
from behind; always in the back of the head, without warning, as you walked down
a corridor from cell to cell.
One day — but ‘one day’ was not the right expression; just as probably it was in the
middle of the night: once — he fell into a strange, blissful reverie. He was walking
down the corridor, waiting for the bullet. He knew that it was coming in another
moment. Everything was settled, smoothed out, reconciled. There were no more
doubts, no more arguments, no more pain, no more fear. His body was healthy and
strong. He walked easily, with a joy of movement and with a feeling of walking in
                                                 
376 It is interesting to note how this first passage illustrates rather well the potential for oppression, and the
desirability to the oppressor, of a substantialist view of human nature- “Thou art”.
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sunlight. He was not any longer in the narrow white corridors in the Ministry of
Love, he was in the enormous sunlit passage, a kilometre wide, down which he had
seemed to walk in the delirium induced by drugs. He was in the Golden Country,
following the foot-track across the old rabbit-cropped pasture. He could feel the
short springy turf under his feet and the gentle sunshine on his face. At the edge of
the field were the elm trees, faintly stirring, and somewhere beyond that was the
stream where the dace lay in the green pools under the willows. Suddenly he started
up with a shock of horror. The sweat broke out on his backbone. He had heard
himself cry aloud…377
As beautifully, horribly evident in this description, these scenarios are repugnant because
such a person does not desire to die. If they could, they would live. They desire to live.
But they know that they will die, and in the case of the euthanasia candidate or those
extremely decrepit through age, or being viciously tortured, know that nothing but
suffering intervenes. Death becomes a feature of a “blissful reverie” on account of the
suffering that precedes it. The cases of the people condemned to die or otherwise being
actively killed but issued with a palliative are both analogous to these other cases, but
also are very germane in the case wherein aging interventions become a viable reality,
since prevention of access to them would be analogous to pro-active legislation denying
terminally ill persons available and effective treatments. In such cases palliative care for
the elderly would attain a truly macabre status and quality. If no act/omission distinction
is accepted,378 then the State that enforces death through aging in fact becomes a brutal
and murderous Procrustes. Such a situation would be one of the grossest paternalism, one
which enforces a uniform life frame of arbitrary span, and in so enforcing, must become
an executioner by omission, if not commission as well, for what, can one suppose, would
be the sanctions for the breach of any statute established against life extension?
In all cases, the diminishing of contingent desire for personal continuance, based upon
qualitative considerations of life-experience in no way means that a person must have a
diminished categoric drive of personhood towards the future, nor that ceteris paribus, so,
in absence of the sickness unto death, does it mean that life extension would not, for them
and in view of this, be a clear, categoric good!
                                                 
377 Orwell G. 1949. 1984. Secker and Warburg, London. Part III, II and IV.
378 The literature is too extensive to reference here, but suffice to say that I generally accept the arguments
for a lack of such a distinction, in relevantly similar cases.
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It is the categoric desire to live which itself makes the suffering towards death most
intolerable, but it is intolerable only to the extent that the life’s continuation itself is
valuable.
One may accept that the reduction of caring about life’s continuance may be a good in the
face of our inevitable ultimate mortality, without accepting the purported good of and so
without embracing the means of enforced decrepitude, which forces by qualitative
discomfort the wholly contingent reduction of desire for life’s actual continuance in that
particular set of circumstances. In this way, a true self-resolution of the person process,
which in an unforced, gentle, gradual, nature as character D3 person-respecting manner -
and without the requirement for qualitative horrors- reduces the conative drive, perhaps
to nothing, prior to death, might be seen as a good. But if it is a good, it is a good which,
as the Buddhists observe, rarely if ever occurs within the scope of any ordinary lifespan.
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3.4 The Makropulos objection- the “fixity” of character and the
misunderstanding of boredom
Various modern commentators have taken up the suggestion, initiated in the discourse by
Williams, but using the example of Karel Capek’s opera The Makropulos Secret, that we
should not seek to extend life because it will end in boredom. In this work, Elina
Makropulos is the daughter of a man who has formulated the elixir of life. She is, at 342,
somewhat less than three times older than the present maximum known endogenous span
of 120 years or so.  Consider the following from Capek (the eponymous Elina
Makropulos is speaking of her own radically extended life):
Boredom. No, it isn’t even boredom. (…) you have no name for it. One cannot
stand it. For 100, 130 years, one can go on. But then (…) one’s soul dies. (…) For
you, everything has value because for the few years that you are here, you don’t
have time to live enough. (…) no one can love for 300 years – it cannot last. And
then everything tires one. It tires to be good, it tires to be bad. The whole earth
tires one. And then you find out there is nothing at all: no sin, no pain, no earth,
nothing.379
It is interesting to notice that Capek himself is not sure what he is speaking about, in this
passage: “No, it isn’t even boredom.” He is of course right, though, it is not boredom.
Simply put, boredom presupposes affect, and conation. We are not bored simpliciter.
Boredom without reference to something we would rather be doing is meaningless. When
people are bored, they speak of boredom in relation to having nothing to do (or else an
inability to do it), and having nothing to do is not, in itself, a problem, unless one is
feeling driven to do something! Capek, and his followers, illegitimately conflate, or rather
perhaps simply confuse two quite separate ideas. The person who is bored is indeed still a
person, still driven, and is one who feels boredom in view of feeling aggrieved at not
doing something! This misuse of the idea of boredom is especially inappropriate in
context of the other idea that I believe these commentators have in mind, without it being
sufficiently explicit, perhaps partly because of a lack of explicit analysis of persons as
                                                 
379 Capek K. 2000 (f.p. 1922). “The Makropulos Case” In: Plays: Vol 1. Methuen World Classics.
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processes: that, after a truly long period, the conative aspect of personhood may self-
resolve, achieve a kind of equilibrium status, wherein, at the level of the person, there is
little or no further activity, and therefore little or no remaining person. But, if I am right
about conation, then simply put, if there is no conation, then there will indeed be no
affect and no desire, but this will of course not be a problem for the person who then
remains, a la Elina Makropulos, since without conation there is no person whatever! In
the Makropulos case, it is clear from her various wailings (after all it is a drama) that
Elina very much remains a personality with strong affects, opinions, and concerns. A
person wholly without conative drive, wholly without affect, would simply not be
motivated to the complaints that Elina makes in this work of fiction. It is a wholly
inappropriate and mistaken concept to speak of having no affect, and more pointedly, no
conation as being bad in some way, or negative, qua the affect of the person in question.
Further, of course, it is important to notice that Capek here speaks of the failure of
valuation. Life’s continuance has no further value for Elina, but the basis for this value is
seen very much in the Kassian terms of being supplied by the limitation of lifespan. We
have already seen the reasons why this is neither valid nor sound. The bootstrapping that
is characteristic of the wholly autonomously predicated and sustained idea of valuation is
not noticed, and a false picture of the fundamental origin and driver of value is accepted,
without argument or question.
As a general observation, it should once again be noted that such arguments from
“boredom” are in any case wholly conjectural, or rather derived from a wholly
unactualised armchair thought-experiment, and so of very dubious pedigree as a serious
concern that must hinder our present action. If they are derived from any observed reality,
(and I know of none which actually bothers to cite examples or reference studies of, let
alone quote, the aged) it must be the reality of some of the very aged. But the boredom of
the aged is to a large degree contingent, surely, upon their inability to do the things they
would like to do, due to the disabilities of aging, rather than the specific number of years
they happen to have been around. If the boredom comes from a fixity of mind, rather than
physical or social circumstances, then it is possible, indeed highly likely that this fixity is
itself one of the pathologies of biological, not chronological aging, and as such would be
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a target for aging intervention. For even in the very aged, and despite physical
disabilities, this boredom appears contingent both on the circumstances of the person,
say, socially, and of themselves as characters. The oldest known person ever to have
lived, Jeanne Calment, who lived beyond 122 years, was sprightly, engaged, lively, funny
and interested until almost the last hours of her life. Having been confined, after breaking
her hip, to a wheelchair from the age of 115, at some point after her 117th birthday she is
recorded to have said, of boredom: “I’m reliving the good times of my life, and I never
bore myself”.380 Shortly after her 119th birthday she is recorded to have remarked, in
answer to the question “What used to please you?”: “Everything interests me, everything
interests me.”381 Notice the clearly deliberate present continuous tense. It is well
documented that she clearly enjoyed being famous, which fame had only begun after her
113th birthday, when it was noted, during celebrations of the centenary of Vincent Van
Gogh’s stay in Arles, her home town, that she was actually a contemporary of that event!
Of her fame, she would later state: “I’ve waited long enough to be famous, so I intend to
make the most of it as long as possible.”382 The researchers who later (after the age of
117) interviewed and examined her over a period of several years state in a co-authored
work that:
A purely factual, systematic listing of her memories was at once quickly
overturned by Jeanne Calment herself. She knew, little by little, how to captivate
us with her personality even more than with her feats of memory, and a much
stronger relationship progressively developed. She took herself – and us – for a
ride. Her joie de vivre, her mischievousness, her ease of exchange were ever-
widening pathways. In front of us was a woman who managed to forget her age,
which was as astonishing a feat as her age was enormous. Humour filled her
speech and bursts of laughter were frequent.383 … Jeanne Calment’s memory
turned out to be exceptional; if her memory were an attic, she easily had the
largest one in the world, and perhaps the fullest. Imagine describing precisely the
color of a dress you had when you were seven, naming your music teacher, or
explaining what was on the menu during a family gathering – a century ago! We
realize that the articles and press reports after each of these anniversaries [her
birthdays] leave one hungry for more. Fortunately, each interview blossomed with
                                                 
380 Allard M. Lebre V. Robine J-M. 1998. Jeanne Calment: From Van Gogh’s time to ours. Coupland B.
(trans.) W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, NY. p.17
381 ibid p.119
382 ibid p. 133
383 ibid p. 8
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witticisms and scathing lines hurled at journalists who came to meet her; often
Madame Calment herself dragged her interrogators out of the rut of
stereotyping.384
This is patently not an account of the moribund, bored, fixed, Struldbrug incapable of
novelty, optimism, or the forming of new and engaging relationships because of a fixed
character and overfull memory that the pessimists of the benefits of great longevity
would have us believe is inevitable. Given the proportion of the current population to
historical populations, and the fact of modern medicine, it is likely that Jeanne Calment is
the longest-lived human being of all time. Therefore the most striking actual case that we
have, by far the oldest human being ever known to have existed lies in straight defiance
of the conjectural cases, stereotypes of nothing real, but worse, only projections of
stereotypes, since they cannot be based in experience or evidence, laid out to frighten us
from the armchairs of the pessimists.
One should, after all, remember the possibly perspectival fact that years for the aged
seem far shorter than they do for the young. This, along with the greater capacity for self-
inherence in terms of rational functioning and cognition,385 helps to explain why the
young, not the old, are indeed the ones who are most rapidly and most easily bored.
While the young have few experiences to relive, the old are repleat with these same, and
may turn them over and over at leisure, considering and re-considering them and their
implications. Mme. Calment clearly enjoyed doing this. And why should she not? Any
even apparently simple situation is in fact deeply complex, and may be analysed almost
endlessly, as the tens of thousands of doctoral theses on the plays of Shakespeare will
attest! If this were not so, in a more ordinary, less academic way, we should not place
sculptures in our houses and gardens, for if the possibilities of their static, simple lines
were exhausted at a few glances, we should be bored of them forthwith. Would anyone,
other than the unimaginative, and uncultured, assert that Michaelangelo’s David was
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385 That comes with increased knowledge and cognitive function of the kind that is picked out by phronesis,
discounting the effects of the degenerations of aging pathologies, since these would clearly be among the
targets of aging interventions.
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simply boring? If this is not the case, however great the master is in his or her approaches
toward a reflection of life, how much less so the infinitely varied, phantasmagoric reality
we all actually inhabit? Why should an active mind rich with experience become bored?
Is it not that lazy and inexperienced, impoverished minds are bored more easily than
experienced and rich ones? Even one with a fairly fixed character should surely find that
a thousand years is but little time to evaluate, let alone experience, the whole world, the
whole universe of possible experience and knowledge! At least in this mode, I find
myself agreeing with John Harris that “only the terminally boring are in danger of being
terminally bored”.386 At base, then, there seems in this idea to be a further confusion
between or conflation of the simple fact of chronological aging, and the symptoms (for
some, but clearly not all for the major duration of the “third age”- though of course for all
by the end) of biological aging, which of course themselves would be targets of any life-
extending therapy! It hardly seems a good argument, though is not untypical of critics of
aging intervention, to urge the horrors experienced by the biologically aged as an
argument against aging intervention.
The concern about the fixity of character is set up as a dilemma by Williams, with the
kind of loss of identity through transformation worry outlined in 3.1 above on one hand,
and the problem of fixity on the other. We have already dealt with the Scylla of loss of
identity due to excessive flexibility above. The Charybdis of inflexibility has also
partially been dealt with above, but to facilitate a more focussed critique it will be useful
to lay it out in terms of its basic structure as follows:
CP1: Persons are characterologically inflexible, and must be so to preserve their
identity.
CP2: Based on CP1, radical life extension for persons will inevitably result in
terrible boredom, or if this definition is resisted, at least lack of
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possibilities for continuing engagement with the world, which must mean
lack of motivation and of affect.
CC1:  A radically life-extended person will be bored, or otherwise
exhausted to the point of having no conation or affect whatsoever.
The basic argument is supplemented by an implicit premise:
ICP: Having no motivation or affect is positively bad for persons.
Leading to the general conclusion:
CC2: Radical life extension is not a desirable goal.
Based on the kinds of observations given above, premise one is very dubious indeed,
since it appears to presuppose that persons have a uniform “natural” span within which
they can have interests, and outside which they will, by some constitutive element,
largely unexplained in the theory and simply assumed at CP1, be inevitably bored,
regardless of whether they are in full possession of their faculties and abilities, or not.
This seems to ignore the mind-boggling vastness of what there is to know, to experience,
and to do, and of course, though ex hypothesi, ignores the constitutive and inalienable
open-endedness and forward-directedness of persons as classes of being. Accepting for a
moment the idea that characters are fixed in some basic way, there is nothing per se about
the simple inflexibility of a character that will necessitate that they will not be able to
continue to engage in a rewarding and exciting manner with the world in general. A chess
player, for example, even of a fixed character, may continue to enjoy playing chess more
or less indefinitely, even though it is itself a game of very limited character (in that, for
example, it can never be checkers), on account of its potential for extremely complex
variation of pattern. If this is true of chess, how much more so of the infinitely more
complex real world? Mme Calment nicely expresses this in her statement concerning her
running over her own memories, and lack of boredom in so doing. But there are other
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examples, such as that of a man who has been extensively studied and is known as “EP”
in the literature to protect his identity, who is brain damaged and is consequently
incapable of forming lasting “new” memories, such that he has a personality and
character essentially fixed at the period prior to 1960.387 One of the striking things about
this man is that, despite his intrinsic inability to engage fully with the modern world, he is
apparently calm, and happy, and enjoys engaging with other people. He possesses a
personality, and is indubitably a person, but the stream of his personhood, albeit
conatively driven, simply does not connect with, and encompass fundamentally new
objects of knowledge, memory, and experience. His happiness is surely, however, a good
for himself, and we may not, surely, kill him with moral impunity, since his life, and its
continuance remains valuable, despite this lack of engagement in entirely new structural
relationships. This value is likely akin to the kind of value that a chess player derives
from playing iterations of a game whose rules do not change, have not changed for
hundreds of years, and will never change by definition of the game itself. This is not to
say that such a person is incapable of development, any more than playing endless
iterations of the game of chess will not lead both to development of the skill and
character (in terms of being a chess-player) of the player qua chess, but also in other
ways, perhaps of the kind that draws Zen practitioners towards repeated iterations of very
fixed forms of activity, such as archery.
In view of these kinds of considerations, CP1 appears wholly unwarranted, and therefore
rather gratuitous in nature, founded upon a false assumption. But worse, it appears to
miss the mark even if it is warranted at some level, for it does not bear the consequences
that it is considered necessarily to do. In this way, it fails to connect to CP2, and the
argument is both unsound and invalid.
Turning to premise CP2, as argued above, if referring to actual boredom it is self-
contradictory, and misunderstands what boredom is in the first place. Beyond this, even if
speaking not of boredom, but simply of lack of motivation, or affect, it likewise fails,
since if the motivational aspects of a person have self-resolved, or failed entirely, there
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simply is no person left to bewail their fate. This latter observation means that ICP is
unsound.
The Charybdis argument is therefore either blocked by the unsoundess of the premises
and/or the invalidation of the connection between CP1 and CP2, or if even these critiques
are not accepted, then because implicit premise ICP is denied, the argument fails to reach
its ultimate conclusion at CC2 in any case.
What, then, can be the merit of such an argument? It seems unlikely, after all, that such
intellects as Williams were wholly mistaken. So what is the true character of this
observation, and may its corrected construction in fact argue against radical life
extension, or could it perhaps amount to an argument for it, instead?
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3.5 Procrustes and the imperative for scope: conative
process, instrumental value, eudaimonia, nirvana,
and true quiescence.
Suppose, for a moment, that the solution to the muddled story of Elina Makropulos is that
Carel Capek, and his followers, have not fully grasped the role of conation in the process
of personhood and the conative basis for the valuation of life’s continuance, even if
secondarily endorsed at the level of the person. Suppose they have thought (incorrectly)
of persons as fixed substances, and mistaken the functionally or circumstantially
mediated boredom of the biologically aged, for the extinction of personhood that might
come as a result of the true end of striving, conation, and therefore affect, and indeed, ex
hypothesi reasoned cognition, perhaps as a natural consequence of person-processes
coming to a natural (character D3) self-resolution in deep time. I suggest, then, that it
may be that what Capek really wished to describe was not boredom, but something akin
to nirvana, or true personal quiescence. Such a nirvana would not be in the false,
commonly mistaken conception of some kind of bliss, but rather would be true nirvana,
being the extinction by character self-resolution within the scope of being alive, of
categoric desire at the level of the person and therefore personhood, entire. Seen in this
way, Capek simply did not have a full or clear conception of what he was attempting to
express, and Elina’s wailings and lamentings are therefore an absurd form of
malingering, since by them she demonstrates entirely conclusively that she is most
certainly not what she claims: absolutely empty.
But should complete emptiness, should the end of conation, should the cessation of
personhood in an unhindered, processual manner of natural character D3 self-resolution,
if such processes can indeed work themselves out to a standstill, should such true
quiescence be considered negative? Is this what makes death bad? Is the self-extinction
by self-resolution of the person, in such a manner of cessation prior to biological death
bad of necessity? The Buddhists, and I, would certainly suggest that it is not.
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But, putting that aside for a moment, if it is not, then why not suppose that we should not
just leave well alone, and allow the current situation on lifespan to obtain? Remembering
Procrustes, and considering the (perhaps) wisdom of the Buddhist insight concerning
both the possibility of nirvana’s attainment in one lifespan, and the high unlikelihood of
this, then death for the vast majority surely constitutes, whatever their circumstances of
health, a shocking and brutal foreshortening of the self-defining structure or character
(and hence nature D3 as discussed above) of the process of their persons.
To allow some perspective upon what I here suggest, take the example of Aristotelian
virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is processual in nature, and is (whatever is claimed by
Aristotle about substantial personhood) in fact person-process regarding, since the person
undergoes a process of gradual self-transformation towards the “good life”. From arête,
through phronesis, towards Eudaimonia, the process continues through life. But since
there are striking variations in the raw material of original or early character (as identified
with arête) and the opportunities for self-development afforded by life- and the self-
experiences of the person-processes (as identified with the accrual of practical wisdom in
the process of phronesis), Eudaimonia is unobtainable by most, indeed, by any but the
happy few. But what if there were greater scope for phronesis? Surely it seems
reasonable to suppose that character development requires, in this picture, some
significant and non-uniform-across-all-persons but rather person-predicated period of
extension in time, and that it is indeed true, that for many or most (and I would suggest
likely all) the present extension will be insufficient for the purpose. The one-size-fits-all
approach to appropriate lifespan just seems to mistake or worse, ignore, what various
structures person-processes are, and how they generate their own purposes and structures,
or character-natures D3.
One may of course here add the very considerable weight of instrumental values of the
ordinary life-plan kind into the mix. For who in life is so fortunate to fulfil half the
dreams they have had? And it should be remembered that all such are ex hypothesi
generated semi-spontaneously out of the conative drive of the person-process that we all
are, such that so long as we are persons, we shall continue having new desires, new
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dreams, of one form or another. This latter need not mean that self-resolution is
impossible, only that it is not, by a long chalk, easy.
For a person-process that has achieved self-resolution, and come to a processual end, for
a true Makropulos, there would be no passion, no fear, no affect, no boredom, no
disvalue, no wailing.388 There would simply be no person. Instead of continuing the
process of becoming, the person would have unfolded their whole character, and would
fully have become. Life extension would have no value, and death no horror or disvalue,
whatever. True quiescence of the person-process would have been achieved, and the
structure of the person-process whole and complete. Such an outcome, if plausible at all,
would appear to obviate the difficulty posed by biological aging (or anything else!)
bringing death within a rigid frame, to person-processes.
But for a person, for one who still feels and is constituted by the powerful, primal
conative drive, pervasive as gravity, and progenitor, sustainer, and motivator of all
desires, rational plans, goals and values; in the ordinary way, their process unfolds the
limitlessly variable body of their personal life upon the uniformly short iron frame of
ancient and irrelevant biological circumstance, continuously towards the relentless,
purposeless Procrustean cleaver of decrepitude and death at its end.
Seen in this light, a Makropulos story told in full consistency would look, I suggest, more
like an argument for life extension, than one for false quiescence in the face of, or brutal
compliance with, the biohistorical dictates of Procrustes389.
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Conclusion
Biogenerontological research has come of age. The mechanisms of aging are no longer
wholly mysterious as they once were, and the capacity for significant interventions in
human aging, leading to significant or radical extensions of personal lifespan is at least
realistically conceivable, and at most, imminent. This mandates a reanalysis of the
bioethical evaluation of the value of life, and the value of life extension, to persons. I
have sought to demonstrate that this re-evaluation requires a reconsideration of the
analysis of the nature of Nature in general, and of persons in greatest particular. The
reanalysis that I have performed modifies the classic conception of persons as self-
conscious, autonomous, rational valuing agents, to account for the fact that persons so
conceived must necessarily be conceived as processes, a necessary element of whose
primary constitution is the fundamental motivating driver, the conative aspect of mind.
The consequence of this analysis for the concept of the value of life, is that the value of
life necessarily must be considered to be the value of life’s continuance, and this value is
a necessary constituent of the concept of persons as conatively-driven valuing agents. In
this wise, the value of life’s continuance is an inalienable value for persons. A major
consequence of this analysis is that it supplies a corrective element to the structure of the
liberal conception of the value of life such that this latter, conceived as the value of life’s
continuance, is far more stable than has been offered hitherto by the subjectivist branches
of this conception, since it is not apt to cancellation even by reflexive subjective re-
evaluation. As such it offers a novel, and more comprehensively grounded, approach to
the liberal view that in turn may obviate some of the major bases of objection which have
classically motivated, justified, or been posited by the holders of conservative views of
personhood. In this way, the view offered may afford some scope for reconciliation
across the liberal-conservative divide in bioethics, as concerns what has traditionally been
termed the value of life.390 Additionally, this analysis has significant implications for our
conception of the morality of suicide, as well as the more general conceptions of personal
identity, the disvalue of death, the nature of the good of living, and the nature of the good
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life as a complete nature-as-character D3.  Further, it should represent and generate
significant underpinning for arguments against ageism. In the wider area of metaethics,
this analysis, especially in its extended version including the underpinning in the
biodynamics of living systems, would appear to have significant implications for our
understanding of the nature of value in general, and would appear to afford a route to the
naturalisation of valuation “all the way down” to the level of the border between non-
living and living dynamic systems. Even setting aside this wider thesis, grounded in
systems dynamics, the core thesis itself provides grounds for a re-analysis of certain
metaethical systems, in particular non-cognitivist and constructionist conceptions of the
nature of valuation in ethics.
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